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ABSTRACT

Sedimenting Territory: A Political Geology of Oil, Earth, and Spatial Politics Turkey
by
Zeynep Oguz

Advisor: Gary Wilder
Building on the recent turn to the material and earthly aspects of resources and political power in
environmental anthropology and political geography, this work historically and ethnographically
examines the kinds of territorial politics that oil’s materiality, geological qualities, and
infrastructures have generated in Turkey. Despite being surrounded by oil-rich neighbors in the
Middle East, Turkey’s domestic oil reserves supply only 7 percent of the country’s oil, all of
which has been drilled in the Kurdish provinces of Batman, Diyarbakır, and Adıyaman in
Turkey’s southeast, where the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) has been fighting the Turkish
state since 1984 for cultural and political rights for the Kurdish people, who have been subjected
to mass killing, oppression, and assimilation since the 19th century. In addition to being
entangled with the militarized and uneven geographies of Turkey’s Kurdistan, hydrocarbons
have been also at the center of the Turkish government’s plans to secure energy independence in
the near future through offshore exploration near Turkey-occupied Cyprus as well as its nostalgia
for the lost oil-rich territories of the Ottoman Empire. Oil in Turkey is placed at the nexus of
territorial politics that extend from internal colonialism and armed conflict to expansionist
foreign politics in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean. What kinds of
territorializations and counter-territorializations have the material and earthly politics of oil
mediated, generated, or unsettled in Turkey? To address this question, this work examines
petroleum geology and geologists’ accounts of oil exploration; relations between state officials,
geologists and engineers, and Kurdish villagers in oilfields; conspiracy theories and epistemic
uncertainties generated around oil; and public debates over geopolitical disputes regarding Iraq,
Cyprus, and the Kurdish Question. The research incorporates participant observation, oral
histories and memoirs, technological and legal reports, newspaper archives, and interviews
collected during 14 months of fieldwork in Turkey. Drawing on this data, chapters explore the
intersection of oil and earth on the one hand and processes of territorialization and counterterritorialization on the other, as manifested in resource nationalism, uneven development,
foreign policy, and warfare in Turkey. The dissertation concludes that oil has been central to the
emergence and sedimentation of Turkey as a territorially bounded nation-state and to the
unsettling of such territorial arrangements through the emergence of unexpected relations
between earth, people, and politics.
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INTRODUCTION:
TERRITORY, EARTH, AND POWER IN TURKEY

Figure 1 Map of Turkey and Southeastern Anatolia or Turkey’s Kurdistan. Shand/International Crisis Group
2017. The majority of Turkey’s oilfields are in Batman, Diyarbakır. Modified by the author.
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This country—Netamiye, as they call it—was born out of the bile of an almighty
dragon. We were there; we saw the whole thing. It was a half-doomsday, a
harbinger. That’s a lie, of course. The dragon was not almighty at all. It was a vile
creature spilling pus out of its wings. It was sick, constantly vomiting as it flew. It
shivered one last time, opened its mouth as it glided and laid a bubbly paste-like
liquid onto the ancient water, like a long and narrow carpet. As the dragon started
falling to the ground like a ripe pear, the carpet rapidly hardened; from its bubbles,
mountains, valleys, and seas sprung up, and this is how this country came into
being.
This is why it has such a rotten smell of decay at all times (Uyurkulak 2006, 25).

Making Resource Frontiers in a War Zone
In August 2012, the statements of the Republic of Turkey’s Minister of Energy and Natural
Resources, Taner Yıldız, made headlines. From an exploration site in Hakkâri, Turkey’s
southeasternmost province bordering Iraq and Iran, the AKP (Justice and Development Party)
government’s minister posed with the president of the national oil company Turkish Petroleum
and victoriously declared that they encountered petroleum indications in Hakkâri. “But,” he
added, Turkish Petroleum was “unable to drill due to activities of terrorism in the area” (Sabah,
2012). Commentators noted that despite its oil-rich southern neighbor Iraq, Turkey lacked easily
exploitable oil deposits; they speculated that if large-scale drilling began in Hakkâri and oil was
discovered, Turkey would finally be able to meet its swelling demand for oil.
By “terrorism” Yıldız referred to the ongoing war between the Turkish Army and the
PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party). The Kurdish-populated southeastern region of Turkey, or
Turkey’s Kurdistan, has been an unacknowledged internal colony since the 19th century
(Deringil 2011; Houston 2009) and its political status has been contested since the end of World
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War I. The newly founded Republic of Turkey denied any political or cultural rights to the
Kurdish people in 1923, engaging in ethnic cleansing and implementing assimilation policies in
the region. And since 1984, Turkey’s Kurdistan has been a war zone, with the start of an armed
insurgency led by the PKK. With a Marxist-Leninist agenda of creating an independent Kurdish
state, the PKK fought against the Turkish military forces for cultural and political rights and selfdetermination for Kurds in Turkey, first in the countryside mountains and more recently in the
form of urban warfare. In the meantime, the demands of the Kurdish movement have shifted
from self-determination and political independence to the recognition of cultural-political rights
and self-government. While none of these demands have been met, if anything, as everyday life
in Turkey has sprawled into a perpetual state of emergency in the recent years with the so-called
“authoritarian turn” of the AKP-Erdogan regime, the violent effects of the new regime in
Kurdistan have been twofold. At the same time, the conflict between the Turkish state and the
PKK has become a forcefield of competing spatial politics and territorial imaginaries such as
Kurdistan, Anatolia, or Turkey.1 At other times, the war has been waged as a conflict over the
natural resources of the region and operated through turning spaces into liberated zones,
enclaves, or ruins. As the news on “terrorism” and oil prospects in Hakkâri indicate, oil has a
central place in territorial politics in Turkey. Oil also shapes the ways in which politics are made,
reconfiguring the war between the Turkish state and the PKK as a conflict among Turkey’s
future as an energy-independent nation-state on the one hand, and “Kurdish terrorists and
Western imperialists,” on the other. From the perspective of the PKK, petroleum resources
belong to the Kurds, who have been subjected to exploitation and underdevelopment for decades.

1

See Batuman (2010), Culcasi (2006), and Gambetti and Jongerden (2015) for discussions of space, topography,
and maps in relation to the Kurdish Issue.
3

In 2012, the same year when news about Hakkâri and oil prospect surfaced, the Turkish
government began negotiations with the leaders of the PKK, calling it the “peace process.” The
consequent ceasefire that lasted for three years triggered hopes of peace, of course, but also
aspirations for the emergence of new frontiers in the previously inaccessible terrains of Turkey’s
war-ridden southeast and plans for resource exploration in previously unexplored areas of the
former war zone, where the Turkish state’s sovereignty over its territories had been highly
fragile. The peace process, however, collapsed in 2015 and full-scale war was resumed. As the
war shifted to urban spaces, the Turkish military reclaimed some of the rural and mountainous
areas that were once controlled by the PKK. Recently, for example, newspapers heralded that
Turkey was “finally set to drill for oil in area freed of terror” (Milliyet 2018; Barlık 2018). One
article claimed that following “successful operations” near a highland against the PKK on the
outskirts of Mount Herekol in the Eruh district of the province of Siirt, Turkish Petroleum had
finally begun exploration. Garnished with colorful photos of the newly erected drill rig, group
pictures of soldiers, the governor of Siirt, and Turkish Petroleum employees, the article quoted
the president of Turkish Petroleum saying that this had been a project they had been “developing
for a decade but were unable to implement due to terrorism” (Milliyet 2018). The governor of
Siirt also confirmed these statements, remarking that the area had been “a high-terrorist-activity
zone and was almost impossible to reach.” But things had changed:
There used to be PKK camps here. Now, we—engineers, workers, the governor, police—
can easily come here. Our workers can work here without any disturbances. We have
discovered high gravity oil here. As the region is eradicated from terrorism, resources are
being utilized to contribute to Turkey’s economy. Our national company, Turkish
Petroleum will start drilling very soon here in Herekol, and we hope to discover
commercially viable oil within two months. (Milliyet 2018)

4

Mount Herekol, Hakkâri and Eruh, Siirt were both places of immense symbolic importance for
both sides, having served as crucial PKK bases in the past.2 According to the Turkish pro-state
media, the subsoil of Herekol and Eruh could be re-territorialized as resource frontiers and
spaces of hydrocarbon potentiality finally. Yet, as the photographs that accompanied news about
the resource potential in Hakkâri unintentionally made visible, oil exploration in Hakkâri was
still dependent on the heavy presence of Turkish military forces in the so-called new oil frontiers
of Turkey. Reterritorialization, or the re-incorporation of the subsoil into the sovereign-state
space was going to be neither smooth nor easy. One major reason behind this was the
geophysical characteristics of the terrain. Very high, steep, mountainous, and prone to extreme
climates, Hakkâri, for example, had always been a region in which state sovereignty remained
weak.
As this story demonstrates, the AKP government’s prospects of oil discovery in Mount
Herekol and Eruh, are situated within a larger history of the production of uneven colonial space,
warfare, and insurgency in Turkey’s Kurdistan, where oil has been at the heart of. This work
examines the historical trajectory through which oil and territory have shaped each other since
the end of World War I, when modern Turkey’s territorial unity was set, and the Republic of
Turkey emerged as a sovereign nation-state in 1923. As this work demonstrates, however,
territorial boundaries have been constantly unsettled by counter- or deterritorializing politics and
imaginaries that ranged from demands for autonomy by the Kurdish freedom movement and
expansionist politics in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean that are pursued by the
AKP government, to the limits and uncertainties that earth and subsoil posed on political and

2

Located in Turkey’s southeast province of Siirt, Mount Herekol functioned as a base for the PKK for many years
and the organization’s courts had been found there—a challenge to the juridical sovereignty of the Turkish state over
the territories it calls southeast Anatolia. Eruh is where the PKK carried out its first attack against the Turkish Army
in 1984.
5

technological projects of resource exploration and extraction in Turkey. Sedimenting Territory
focuses on the ways in which resource politics around oil’s specific materiality in Turkey have
been entangled with territorial politics since the end of World War I. It demonstrates the mutual
making-becoming of territories and resources and analyzes the kinds of territorializations and
deterritorializations that take place at the intersection between oil and space. As the following
chapters demonstrate, the kinds of territorial politics that emerge out of these entanglements are
fundamentally indeterminate. In Turkey, they have generated both openings and closures, the
possibilities of autonomous spaces of radical democracy and fascism. Finally, this work reveals
the ways in which neither are fixed and stable entities, but constantly shifting processes that are
played out against the backdrop of imperial and national histories on the one hand, and
indeterminate futures, on the other.

Figure 2 “Terror Ended, First Well Drilled!” (IHA, 2018)
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Figure 3 Hakkari Governor, Pervari District Gendarmarie commander, military officers, private security
guards, and Turkish Petroleum engineers at the press conference near Mount Herekol. Ulusal Kanal, 2018.

Earthly Territorializations: Political Geographies of Territory and Power
As a naturalized and fixed concept in the modern Western political imaginary, territory
has been inextricably linked to state and sovereignty. In the 19th century, “grafting the nation
onto the state, territory became a primordial feature of the body politic and an essential
component in the demand for and creation of new sovereign states” (Shah 2012, 63).3 As
political geographers argue, territory has become a “trap” (Agnew 1994), being dehistoricized
and cast as a state’s pre-cultural, pre-social, nonhistorical “existential identity” (Shah 2012, 62)
and an essential component of state and sovereignty. Against such approaches that take territory
as a given, bounded, and static space, social scientists have approached territories as spaces that
are brought into being through contested and uneven arrangements of calculation, science,

3

See Agnew (2009), Hale (1971), and Rasmussen and Brown (2005) for discussions of the “body politic” metaphor.
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technology, politics, and nature (Braun 2000; Mukerji 2009; Goswami 2004). Elden’s work
approaches territory a process and as a political technology and a process rather than an outcome
or effect (Elden 2005, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2013), suggesting that rather than “territory,” the term
“territorialization” better captures the processual nature of territory-making (and unmaking)
through calculative, economic, and political technologies, such as cartography or geology (Braun
2000). Building on these works, this study takes territory as a friction-ridden and uneven
techno-political processes that capitalizes upon the material forces of the earth.
Territories “naturalize” the relationship between earth’s geophysical surface and subsoil,
and state-sovereignty. As the recent turn to materiality in social sciences (Coole and Frost 2010)
suggest, however, the very physical and material qualities of the earth’s surface and subsoil
shape and complicate political designations of territory in non-deterministic and complex ways
(Clark 2011; Dalby 2013; Elden 2013; Steinberg and Peters 2015; Yusoff et al. 2012).
Territorialization, in this way, becomes the “politics of the earth” in which earth and political
processes of territorialization and state power transform each other. Elden (2017) argues that
such a politics of the earth or “geo-politics” in its literal sense would
Take into account the power of natural processes or resources; the dynamics of human
and environment; the interrelation of objects outside of human intervention; the relation
between biosphere, atmosphere, and lithosphere; and the complex interrelations that
produce, continually transform and rework the question of territory and state spatial
strategies. (Elden 2017a, 299)
Elden’s argument is in conversation with feminist geophilosophers who note that earth and its
inhuman forces are not stable and passive objects: Earth is a dynamic composition of separate
but entangled forcefields, and the relationship between power and the forces of the earth is not
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unidirectional (Clark 2011; Grosz 2008; Yusoff et al. 2012).4 Ice melts, volcanoes burst,
earthquakes shake earth’s crust, jeopardizing states’ attempt to fix and capitalize over the earth.5
Dalby (2007), for instance, criticizes the field of “geopolitics” for understanding “the
geographical features of the earth’s surface to be relatively stable, the stage as it were for the
political dramas to unfold” (105). Elizabeth Grosz calls this dynamic and creative relationship
geopower, as “the relations between the earth and its life forms, runs underneath and through
power relations” (Yusoff et al. 2012, 975). Building on these accounts, this study of
territorialization and resource politics in Turkey analyzes this interlinked process: How the
Turkish state attempts to territorialize earth, how other political actors respond to such attempts,
and how inhuman forces of the earth shape, destabilize, or exceed the operations of political
power, generating uncertainty, indeterminacy, speculation, and conspiracy theories in everyday
life in Turkey.
This work examines the interlinked relationship between the making of territory and
resources. Shah (2012) argues that the emergence of territory was intimately linked to the
delimitation of resources as “natural.” In this way, natural resources or earth’s physical
geography was translated into “natural resources,” whose territorialization were seen as essential
to a state’s “security and prosperity (Shah 2012, 66). As Coronil’s (2008) work demonstrates, oil
has been fetishized as a “magical” commodity in Venezuela and cast as an integral part of the
body of the nation, while sustaining the magical power of the state. Coronil writes that “as an oil
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Neither it is a singular unity. As Maguire and Winthereik (2017) note in relation to their work on earthquakes and
seismic instability in Iceland, “by using the shorthand placeholder word ‘earth’ we are invoking a whole series of
differentiating turbulent forces, which play out as pressure, magmatic heat, rock and phase-transitioning fluids boil
and explode water and steam out of the ground into wells, through pipes, into turbines, and into electricity pylons”
(166).
5
At other times, ice melts, volcanoes burst, and the forces of the capital see this as a novel opportunity of
capitalization, as in the case of natural disasters and glacier melting. See Klein (2007); Dodds and Nuttall (2015).
These processes point to a perpetual movement of territorialization, deterritorialization, reterritorialization under
capitalism and climate crisis today.
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nation, Venezuela was imagined as having two bodies, a natural body (the material source of its
wealth) and a political body (its citizenry), both of which were represented by the state” (1987,
116).
Unlike Venezuela, Turkey never became an oil nation. Having lost significant territories
after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the World War including the oil-rich regions in
Mesopotamia (present-day Iraq, Syria, and Iraqi Kurdistan), oil could not establish a smooth link
between the nation’s natural body and political body. Instead, oil has acquired a phantomatic
materiality in Turkey, situated in a grey area between presence and absence, past and future, and
loss and discovery.6 This work examines how this specific socio-material ontology of oil in
Turkey as phantomatic has been central to both sedimenting and destabilizing the statesovereignty-territory nexus in Turkey. It demonstrates how oil has been entangled with both
resource nationalisms and the production of uneven-colonial-spaces in Turkey’s Kurdistan and
countering the state’s territorial technologies, as in the case of the Kurdish freedom movement.
Finally, this work considers the role oil has played in fueling territorial imaginaries that
reproduce, extend, and challenge the state-sovereignty nexus, through expansionist and
irredentist policies, as in the case of Cyprus and Iraq.
While territorialization is a process that simultaneously shapes and is shaped by the
materiality of earth, resources are also far from being given, static, or natural things. Below,
through a brief survey of critical studies on the politics of science and technology, infrastructure,

6

In conversation with Derrida’s (2011) notion of hauntology, Astrid Schrader (2010) has used the term phantomatic
ontology: “The term ‘phantomatic ontology’ is closely allied with Derrida’s notion of hauntology, which describes
the paradoxical existence of a specter as neither being nor non-being, neither present nor absent, neither of the ‘past’
nor of the ‘future’, but which affirms an indeterminate relationship between being and becoming and between ‘past’
and ‘future’ (2010).” Gordillo (2014) uses the term phantom to describe the twofold formation of Los Indios as
archetypal figures that become more ghostly through their absence and the haunting created by the debris left by
criollos’ perceptions about Indians (45). In Gordillo’s reconfiguration of Derrida’s terminology, phantom is a fetish
that embodies both a past that haunts and a future to come.
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and nature, I elaborate on how this work approaches resources in general, and specifically oil as
a complex and ongoing material, epistemic, infrastructural, and symbolic arrangement.

Resource Becomings of Oil: Knowledge, Nature, and Materiality
In its examination of the mutual makings of territory and oil in Turkey, this work builds on
scholarship in social sciences and humanities at the nexus of nature, science-technology, and
politics-power: political ecology, environmental anthropology, and science and technology
studies (STS). Political ecologists have examined how uneven relations and violent events such
as disasters, deforestation, or soil erosion are not natural, but rather historical and social products
of the uneven, racialized, and gendered operations of capital and state power.7 Environmental
anthropology has attended to the complex and uneven ways in which humans, non-human
animals, resources, and inorganic matter relate, affect, and shape each other in the face of
colonialism, capitalism, racism, and environmental crisis, while paying close attention to the
ethical, phenomenological, and ontological implications of these relationships and ways of
being.8 Documenting the social construction of scientific knowledge (Bloor 1976; Hacking 2010;
Latour and Woolgar 1981; Pinch and Bijker 1984), works in STS argued that the knowledgemaking practices of science and technology do not provide a direct route from nature to ideas
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Political ecologists, along with Marxist geographers of nature and capital, have denaturalized the structures of
power—domination, exploitation, dispossession, and violence—and the historical structure of human-nature
relationships. Political ecologists have analyzed state and capital’s relationship with nature, property, and society in
systems of access to and control over resources and how their commodification reproduced uneven relations.
Further, criticizing environmental determinisms, neo-Malthusian arguments, and resource scarcity arguments, they
have also shown that events marked as natural disasters or environmental problems, such as soil erosion, social
inequality, drought, famine, and land degradation, have been historically and socially produced by the circuits of
capital and state politics. See Watts (2000), Smith (2008), and Peluso (1994).
8
Environmental anthropologists have examined human, non-human animal, and plant relationships in multiple
settings such as conservation, adaptation, resilience, toxicity, extinction, climate change, or disasters. See Rose
(2011), West (2016), Checker (2005) Fortun (2001), Ogden (2011), Barnes (2014), Cruikshank (2005), Rademacher
(2011), Swanson (2017), Moore (2018), and Vaughn (2017).
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about nature, but rather translate messy realities into objective facts (Law 2004). Moving from
epistemological questions to ontological ones (Mol 2002), STS has further looked into the ways
in which science intervenes in reality (Hacking 2010; Latour and Woolgar 1981; Pickering 1995)
and how science and society “co-produce” each other (Jasanoff 2010).
These works have deeply impacted anthropology in the last decade with studies on the
intersection of sciences, infrastructures, technology with politics of citizenship, race,
colonialism, sovereignty, statehood and nationalism. Anthropologists have examined technology,
expertise, and infrastructure, are entangled with social, cultural, and political worlds through
detailed case studies on how scientists, engineers, and other experts produce particular sets of
knowledge about nature; how engineers shape ideologies and nations; how technical and
scientific practices re-calibrate the relationships between humans, non-humans; and how
relations between environmental knowledge and toxicity are also enacted along gendered and
racialized patterns of violence. Anthropologies of biology, physics, archeology, have questioned
the implicit ontological assumptions of scientific fields and outlined the ways in which they have
been both socially and culturally constructed and influence cultural norms and political notions.
Further, the recently developed areas of interest over infrastructure and engineering deal with
questions around nature and state power at the same time, highlighting the implications of large
infrastructure projects—dams, canals, satellites—in the production of uneven space, modes of
citizenship, and notions of nationhood.9 The trajectory of the scholarship in these areas also
reveal a gradual move from epistemological and cultural questions to ontological ones—
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See works in postcolonial STS and decolonial studies of nature and science: TallBear 2013; Abu El-Haj 2012;
Fortun 2008; Franklin 2007; Haraway 1991, 1997; Helmreich 1998, Martin 1998; Clark 2001; Mukerji 2009;
Mrázek 2015; Harvey and Knox 2012.
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questions interested in the “constitution of the world” (Jensen et al. 2017), in addition to
questions of cultural meaning, knowledge, and representation.
The renewed attention to materiality and ontology is also prevalent in social studies on
resources (Chapman 2013). Arguing that resources are not natural things waiting to be extracted,
instead coming into being through complex arrangements of matter, technoscience, and political
economy. Examining “resource materialities,” Richardson and Weszkalnys (2014) highlight the
ways in which resources come into being through complex arrangements of “physical stuff,
extractive infrastructures, calculative devices, discourses of the market and development, the
nation and the corporation, everyday practices, and so on, that allow those substances to exist as
resources” (Richardson and Weszkalnys 2014, 7). Further studies on “resource becoming,” or
“the cultural, political, and scientific means through which resources are imagined, abstracted,
and brought into being as natural objects” (Kneas 2018, 754) reveal how the coming together of
materials, forms of knowledge, technologies, and infrastructures shape or disrupt spatial
arrangements, temporalities,10 and political ontologies (Weszkalnys 2011; Appel 2012;
d’Avignon 2018; Ferry and Limbert 2008). Oil plays a central role in these myths, depicted as a
fetishized natural resource with enormous political and economic power and “geopolitical”
significance (Coronil 1997, 321; Watts 2004; Appel, Mason, and Watts 2015, 3), oscillating
between great wealth and power and political violence and underdevelopment.
Building on Richardson and Weszkalnys’s (2014) argument that natural resources are
spatially, temporally, ontologically, and materially “distributed things whose essence or
character is to be located neither exclusively in their biophysical properties nor in webs of socio-
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Such as “deferral,” (Limbert 2010), “suspension” (Choy and Zee 2015), “aftermath” (Kneas 2018), and “pause”
(Weszkalnys 2011).
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cultural meaning” (2014, 8), this work traces oil’s specificity according to its historical ontology
rather than an essence or mythic qualities. Oil is a geo-political relation,11 a material-technopolitical arrangement that has been used by the forces of capital and state powers to mediate
geological forces and political worlds more successfully than other resources in the past
century.12 It has historically been central to the production, reproduction, and mediation of social
and political life in the 20th century (Valdivia 2008) and crucial to sustaining regimes of living
and political ontologies, including liberal notions of freedom, democracy, and perpetual growth
(Chakrabarty 2009; Huber 2013).13 In oil-rich states, this has led to deep links between oil,
nature, state, and the nation, fueling national myths and political ontologies (Coronil 2008).14
Oil, in other words, is fetishized in a particular way, concealing the violence inherent to
processes of territorialization in nation-state projects. In order to avoid reproducing oil fetishisms
and to capture the distributed and historical ontology of oil, this work focuses on geology and oil
exploration.

Theorizing the Intersection of Geology and Power
Geological knowledge about the subsoil and extraction of resources have been central to the
production of particular political arrangements of national space, colonization, and modern urban
and rural warfare, while these practices cast space as vertical and volumetric (Bruun 2018; Elden
2013; Grundy-Warr, Sithirith, and Li 2015, 93; Weizman 2007; Graham 2011; Graham 2018).
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This statement is a reference to Diamanti and Szeman, who state that “oil is not a thing, but a social relation”
(2019).
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Albeit an unsuccessfully mediated relationship given the climate crisis.
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Against this Euro-American focus, Doug Rogers’ work on Soviet Empire and oil examined oil and politics from
the perspective of a socialist political economy (2015). The Nigerian oil boom has similarly inspired a variety of
cultural analyses (Apter 2008). Watts (2004) has analyzed the fetishizing discourses, oil mythologies, and booster
narratives that arose around Nigeria’s booming oil economy of the 1970s. See also Limbert (2010), Behrends,
Reyna, and Schlee (2016), Labban (2008), Appel, Mason, and Watts (2015), Bebbington and Bury (2013).
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See Valdivia (2008) on settlers and oil workers in Amazonia and discourses around oil and nationalism.
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The centrality of geology—the knowledge and study of the earth— (and adjacent fields of
geophysics, geoengineering, geomorphology) in shaping political worlds have been largely
overlooked by social scientists with few notable exceptions. There has been recent attention
given to the links between the production and circulation of geological knowledge and state
formation, nationalism, and territorialization (Braun 2000; Himley 2018; Marston 2019; Shen
2014). Arguing that western political discourses have overwhelmingly highlighted the surface of
the earth rather than its depth, geographers have started to look into the connection between
knowledge and technologies of the subsoil and strata on the one hand and modern forms of
producing space and governance on the other.15 These works point to the vertical and volumetric
quality of power (Elden 2013; Braun 2000, Bridge and Le Billon 2013; Weizman 2003), while
rethinking the term geopolitics, not as international relations of power, but in its literal sense: the
politics of Earth (Yusoff et al 2012; Depledge 2015; Elden 2017b). These works have also
investigated the historical links between geological knowledge production and colonialism,
racism, and other forms of violence (Braun 2000; Yusoff 2017) and the connections between
geological knowledge and global capital by attending to the histories of petroleum exploration,
mining, and extraction (Klinger 2018; Himley 2018). In the works mentioned above, “geology”
figures as the study of earth and its processes, and the studies reflect the entanglement of power
and science. But “geology” also refers to Earth and earthly processes in and of themselves,
which in Clark’s (2011) words, might not conform to political projects (2017).
In conversation with the insights of these diverse scholarship, the noun “oil,” in this
work, always denotes these material, technical, epistemological, and political-economic
arrangements and infrastructures. Building on Mitchell’s work on techno-politics and Barry’s
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conceptualization of the “technological zone,” (2006) Watts (2009) coins the term “oil
assemblage” or “oil complex” as a system that holds together multiple infrastructures, expertise,
ideologies, and calculations. This work parallels Watts’ conceptualization of oil as an
assemblage of fragmentary and complex symbolic and material politics, but also considers the
ways in which the geological properties of oil as earthly matter and its pre-commodity state in
subsoil inform modes of territorialization and politics.
An example of how Earth and the materiality of earthly processes play into the makings
of resources and territorialization might clarify my points about the ways in which
territorialization and resource becoming are entangled in Turkey, and how these processes both
shape and are shaped by the material forces of the Earth. Below, I present a story in which an
earthly, geological process is at the center of both the phantomatic material ontology of oil and
processes of territorialization.

Geopolitical Collisions
“Why does Turkey have such little oil despite being surrounded by some of the largest petroleum
reserves in the world? Are we actually sitting on a sea of petroleum? Are there other forces that
are trying to obstruct us? Or, are we just unfortunate?” asked a young, male reporter to Professor
Ozan Kaya, hoping to stir up a juicy debate. A small group of Turkish reporters and young
engineers had surrounded the professor at the 23rd World Energy Congress (WEC) held in
Istanbul Convention Center in October 2016. Professor Kaya is a rather famous 65-year-old
academic and geologist, who often comments on hot topics like “Turkey’s energy future” or
“energy geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean” on national TV. He had given a talk on
Turkey’s petroleum potential, a topic loaded with friction and speculation. The professor smiled
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at the reporter’s question and replied calmly but playfully, “Well, you know what’s
unfortunate?” Everyone leaned in. “It’s that geology—let’s be more specific—tectonic plates are
totally indifferent to our political boundaries!” With a hearty laugh, he left the room. “What the
hell is plate tectonics?” grumbled a reporter next to me.
Plate tectonics is a theory describing the geophysical movements the plates of Earth’s
lithosphere starting around 3 to 3.5 billion years ago (Molnar 2015, 14). As petroleum geologists
often remark, the political entity now known as the Republic of Turkey sits in the collision zone
of three tectonic plates: the Eurasian Plate, the Arabian Plate, and the Anatolian Plate. The
Anatolian Plate has been “sandwiched between” the other two massive plates (Molnar 2015, 14).
Because of 50 million years of this collision process, it has been rotating counterclockwise, while
being pushed west by the Arabian Plate (Aitchison, Ali, and Davis 2007; Hacıoğlu, Başokur, and
Çiftçi 2018, 161; Şengör and Yılmaz 1981). The Eurasian-Arabian collision has also resulted in
the elevation of the area, forming widespread mountain ranges, volcanoes, and the two major
sutures: the Northern Anatolian Fault and the East Anatolian Fault (Angell 2014; Barry 2017).
As Professor Kaya indicated, and to the surprise of the reporters at the World Energy
Congress, tectonic plates and their movements have shaped questions related to oil’s presence in
Turkey, too. The Anatolian Plate is geologically separate from the Arabian Plate and therefore,
does have the same source rocks that contain oil in the Arabian Plate. Yet, why did Turkey’s
southeastern parts have some oil? In geological terms, the political region that the Turkish state
calls “southeastern Anatolia” was in fact not a part of the Anatolian plate; rather, it constituted
the northernmost edge of the oil-rich Arabian Plate. Earth’s crust has been significantly
deformed by the Eurasian-Arabian collision there, as the continental crust buckled and rocks
piled up, lifting the mantle and forming mountains. In the southeast, oil has either completely
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escaped through the fractures in rocks or settled in very small petroleum traps, making it be both
extremely difficult to find and commercially unviable, according to exploration geologists.16
This is why, in contrast to its neighbors in the Middle East, Turkey has only some oil reserves,
giving oil a phantom-like quality between presence and absence in the country. Despite—or
perhaps because of—it’s phantomatic ontology of oil carried immense political weight in
Turkey.

Figure 4 Plate Tectonics and the Anatolian Plate. (European Geosciences Union 2018)

In 2016, Turkey’s domestic oil reserves supplied only 7 percent of the country’s oil
consumption. Not surprisingly, all of this oil has been drilled in the provinces of Batman,
Diyarbakır, and Adıyaman in Turkey’s southeast, which corresponds to the northernmost part of
the Arabian Plate. Yet, as geologists from Turkish Petroleum often remark, the war between the
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PKK and the Turkish state” has been the primary reason that large parts of Turkey’s southeast
remain “unexplored” and that Turkey’s petroleum potential is still considered indeterminate.
With no new large oilfield discoveries in recent years and with the existing fields maturing,
Turkey’s oil production tends to fall each year as demand increases.17 To diminish its heavy
reliance on imported fossil fuels, which threatens “energy security” and “energy independence,”
the government has launched a bold national energy plan. The plan pushes for energy
diversification,18 a heavy reliance on domestic resources such as coal and hydropower, and
increased hydrocarbon exploration onshore and offshore (ETKB, 2014). These activities took
place in areas marked as under- or unexplored and in Turkey’s Kurdistan, but also in the Eastern
Mediterranean Sea, unleashing new geopolitical collisions against the backdrop of old ones at the
interface of Earth and politics. These collisions, or “contingent interferences” (Barry 2016, 101),
of geological forces and political life, in other words, take place through existing, historical
political-territorial ontologies, such as colonial territoriality and warfare in Turkey’s Kurdistan,
while disrupting or reproducing them and generating new ones.
Imperial histories constitute another area where geopolitical collisions crystallize around
oil in Turkey today. The oil-rich regions in Iraq and Syria were once part of the territories of the
Ottoman Empire, which was succeeded by the Republic of Turkey in 1923. The Republic of
Turkey emerged as a nation-state in the aftermath of World War I and the collapse of the

17

According to the Petroleum and Natural Gas Platform Association (2018), Turkey’s domestic oil consumption
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countries — Azerbaijan and Iraq. The two nations combined annually supply around 120 million tons of crude oil,
with nearly 71 million tons coming from two pipelines in Iraq.
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Ottoman Empire, a multinational, multilingual empire that controlled most of southeast Europe,
parts of central Europe, western Asia, parts of eastern Europe and North Africa between the 14th
and early 20th centuries. With Constantinople as its capital and wielding authority over lands
around the Mediterranean basin, the Ottoman Empire controlled major trade routes between
Europe and Asia. With its gradual integration into the capitalist world system, the empire entered
into a relationship of economic and cultural dependence on the West throughout the 18th and
19th centuries initiated through trade privileges granted to European states that tempered
Ottoman sovereignty and economic independence.
The Ottoman Empire’s defeat in World War I and the ensuing Allied occupation resulted
in the partitioning its territories in the Near East.19 The national War of Independence (1919 to
1923) against the occupying Allies led to the abolition of the Ottoman monarchy and the
emergence of the Republic of Turkey in Anatolia.20 From this moment on, Anatolia was
reluctantly cast as the “heartland of the nation” by the founders of the Republic, amidst the
struggles of composing political unity out of a messy, heterogeneous composite of people,
political identities, prospects, and geology. As the following chapters show, the historical trauma
of the dissolution of the empire, its dependence on the West, and its loss of territory figure
heavily in everyday politics in Turkey (Lepselter 2017, 168; Caruth 1995; see also Derrida 2011;
Ivy 1995; Pemberton 1994; Mueggler 2001). Oil’s phantomatic materiality has captivated the
affective forces of this sense of imperial loss, generating returns to and reconfigurations of the
past, which, in turn, fuel political aspirations of territorial expansion.
Geological forces and formations play a double role within these collisions: They are
seen as matter to be harnessed and utilized for political claims, but they also figure as forces and
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These territories were divided between the United Kingdom and France.
Chapter 1 focuses on this period between the end of World War I and the formation of the Republic of Turkey.
20

realities that cannot be overcome. Geopolitical and territorial aspirations, for instance, are fueled
by political-territorial notions such as Turkey, Kurdistan, and Anatolia. These do not smoothly
correspond to geological formations, which cannot be fully known or controlled by
technoscientific efforts. Kurdistan’s political status, for example, has been complicated by the
convoluted entanglements with geological and geophysical forces.21 The political geography of
Turkey has no geological unity, as it sits between two huge tectonic plates (Eurasia and Arabia),
inexorably grind against one another. Second, the notion of Kurdistan is not only spread out
across four nation-states (Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran); it is also located at the convergence of
the boundaries of the Arabian Plate and Anatolian Plate. The plates and their boundaries
correspond neither to political nor cultural categories and imaginaries, while the Turkish state
has historically defended Turkey’s political unity by resorting to geological and geographic
arguments. As the following chapters demonstrate, arguments over geological unity or continuity
play a crucial role in attempts to naturalize territorial politics in Turkey’s expansionist policies in
the Middle East and the ongoing occupation of Cyprus. As political actors and states capitalize
upon the earth, geological forces also limit or complicate these attempts, creating a complex
entanglement of earth and power in Turkey today.
At the center of the Turkish government’s plans to secure energy independence, the
material and earthly politics of oil has been entangled with the militarized and uneven
geographies of Turkey’s Kurdistan, as well as the Turkish governments’ nostalgia for the lost
oil-rich territories of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey’s offshore exploration activities near
Cyprus. Exacerbating conflicts over territorial imaginaries and politics, oil sits a complex nexus
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of territorial politics that extend from internal colonialism and armed conflict to expansionist
foreign politics in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean. What kinds of
territorializations and counter-territorializations have the material and earthly politics of oil
mediated, generated, or unsettled in Turkey?

Overview of Arguments
Examining the mutual becoming of territories and oil in Turkey, this work analyzes fragments
from the history of oil exploration and production by the state-owned MTA (Mineral Exploration
and Research Institute) and TP (Turkish Petroleum) since the foundation of the Republic of
Turkey in 1923.22 The examination of the mutual composition of oil and territorialization, reveal
both the material-infrastructural-and political processes that make oil into a resource and the new
kinds of political, territorial, and sociocultural arrangements that these processes enable. In doing
so, this work focuses on four areas in which the nexus of oil and territorialization has played a
central role the generation of the following political and territorial formations: (1) geopolitics as
expansionist policies in Iraq and Cyprus, (2) uneven-colonial space and warfare in relation to
Turkey’s Kurdistan, (2) resource nationalisms, and (4) speculation, uncertainty, and excess that
cut through the former three formations.
(1) Geopolitics: The neo-Ottomanist and Islamist politics of the AKP government go
hand in hand with interventionist, expansionist, chauvinist politics in the present. However, as
this work demonstrates, these political patterns are grounded in longer histories of the Cold War
and World War I, and Turkey’s own uneven relationship with imperial and capitalist nations at a
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global scale. As Chapter 1, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4 demonstrate, present expansionist
aspirations in relation to the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean are rooted in such
broader historical currents. Further, they are reflective of the political significance of the
aftermath of World War I as a constitutive moment for not only the Turkish nation-state, but also
for the making of a new political world order, whose current crisis feed into revisionist politics in
the present. This work also demonstrates how oil has figured centrally in negotiating the
relationship between the geology of southeastern Turkey and the historical traumas over the loss
of territories following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the kinds of irredentist and
expansionist politics they have incited. Examining the period between the end of World War I
and the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which left the fate of the oil-rich province of
Mosul undecided, and the consequence of the debates at the League of Nation commission
around Mosul, this work analyzes the ways in which geological arguments played a central role
in the territorial arguments of the Turkish and British sides. Geologically founded territorial
claims have also played a central role in Cyprus Issue, as Turkish nationalist arguments have
supported annexation claims through arguments that linked the geology of Cyprus to Anatolia,
thus forming a natural and temporal link between the two pieces of earth.
(2) Uneven-colonial-space and warfare: the phantomatic materiality of oil and
infrastructures in Turkey have been crucial in producing Kurdistan as an uneven internal colony
but also casting Kurdistan as a counter-territory for the Kurdish freedom movement. In
examining the territorialization of Kurdistan, this work builds on Gramsci’s writings on the
“southern question” (2005) and Lefebvre’s (1991) theorization of the production of uneven space
and state power. It demonstrates how the production of uneven spaces in Kurdistan have been
mediated by the infrastructures of oil (Chapters 2 and 5) and how these infrastructures figure in
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the ongoing war in Turkey’s Kurdistan. As I show, these infrastructures—pipelines, roads, and
barrels—produce, mediate, and unsettle territorial processes of the Turkish state. Finally as
Chapter 5 demonstrates, oilfields and earth were turned into instruments of warfare in Turkey’s
Kurdistan by both the PKK and the Turkish state, which radically reconfigured space,
transforming urban space into spaces of occupation, enclaves, and total destruction, and the rural
countryside simultaneously into ruins and new geological frontiers in the present.
(3) Resource nationalisms: Examining resource nationalism as a particular constellation
established between the materiality of oil, infrastructure and technologies, nation, and statespace, this work examines how left-leaning political subjects in Turkey have portrayed resource
nationalism as an anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist ideology and by countering foreign
companies in the 1960s and neoliberal privatization after the 1980s. As I argue, resource
nationalism—“the idea that resource wealth should be used for the benefit of the nation” (Young
2017)—was shared by actors with contrasting political agendas and adversaries during the
“national oil” campaign (Chapter 3) and the occupation of Cyprus (Chapter 4). As Chapter 3
demonstrates, resource nationalism was instrumental for the adoption of a nationalized
framework of anti-imperialism, preventing the Turkish left from recognizing both the centrality
of state violence in the formation of Kurdistan as an uneven-colonial space and Kurdish demands
of freedom and autonomy. As Chapter 4 illustrates, arguments over sovereignty and national
energy independence which circulated during Turkey’s occupation of Cyprus, were met with the
silent approval of the majority of the Turkish Left. As Chapter 1 demonstrates, a blend of
resource nationalism and anti-imperialism today fuel Turkey’s geopolitical aspirations in the
Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean, legitimizing irredentist politics and military
interventions in Cyprus, Syria, and Iraq. As a political ontology that links earth and territory to
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each other in particular ways, resource nationalisms in Turkey were paired with nationalist and
non-internationalist forms of anti-imperialism, as they reproduced and legitimized existing
relations of coloniality in Turkey’s Kurdistan and sustained the occupation of Cyprus.
(4) Speculation, Uncertainty, Excess: Territorial technologies and oil politics, or the
Turkish state’s attempts to frame or capitalize over the forces of the earth produce excess,
spillovers, and indeterminacy or in other ways, epistemological and ontological forms of
uncertainty and deterritorializations, before these forces are recaptured and reterritorialized by
the state or other forms of power. Conspiracy theories and speculation about oil are places where
excesses of geological matter, debris of history, and epistemic uncertainties, erupt in everyday
life, to be rearranged into particular political and social outcomes by political subjects and states.
This work captures indeterminacy inherent to geological knowledge production (Chapter 1) and
how these modes of unknowability fuel speculations, conspiracy theories, and other “fictions”
around oil and territory. Some of these speculations in turn fuel technologies of power,
legitimizing colonial occupation, or expansionist policies in Turkey’s Kurdistan, Cyprus, and the
Middle East (Chapter 1, Chapter 3, Chapter 4). Infrastructures generated around oil in Batman,
including pipes, roads, and paper, mediate the production of territory, but as the concept of
infrastructural indeterminacy (Fisch 2017) suggests, they are also productive of unexpected
subversions that exceed the ontologies of the political regimes and actors that have generated
them. Kurdish villagers often “misuse” or utilize these infrastructures through de- or counterterritorial logics as during the height of war between the PKK and the Turkish state in the 1990s
(Chapter 5). Examining the ways in which infrastructures and media are sabotaged, used, and
misused in disruptive, militant, and queer ways, as well as the ways in which they are open to
misfunctioning or being otherwise as technical objects, this work analyzes the ways in which
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these modes of indeterminacy found in earthly and infrastructural forms catalyze the creation of
new forms of territorialization.23

Context and Fieldwork Research
Following the start of peace negotiations between the Turkish government and the PKK in 2012,
in April 2013, the PKK announced having moved its forces in Turkey to northern Iraq, raising
expectations that this would mark the end of the 30-year conflict. In the general elections in June
2015, AKP lost its single-party majority after over a decade in power. With such a dramatic
decrease in its votes, Erdoğan’s ambitions for an executive presidential republic were deemed to
have been rejected by the electorate. HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party), on the other hand,
garnered 13 percent of the vote, gaining more than 80 seats in parliament, clearing Turkey’s high
threshold. In accordance with the constitution, the coalition talks began.
HDP is a left-wing, pro-Kurdish, pro-peace, alliance party that is built upon the principles
of self-governance, pluralism, and democratic autonomy. Vocally against nationalism,
oppression, and the patriarchal state, the HDP brought together a broad coalition of leftist
Kurdish and Turkish parties, Armenians, Alevis, and Yezidis, civil society representatives,
ecological movements, labor unions, LGTBQ movements, and women’s organizations. HDP’s
electoral success in the 2015 elections and the sharp 9 percent decrease in the AKP’s electoral
power were interpreted as the main reason why the war between the PKK and the Turkish state
was resumed by the AKP, who perceived the HDP as a major threat. The crackdown came after
the HDP eclipsed the 10 percent threshold needed for parliamentary representation in the June
2015 elections — a major electoral setback for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP),
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Sara Ahmed has been developing a concept of “queer use” (2019). See also Mitchell (2013) on sabotage.
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which was denied an absolute majority and, at least momentarily, blocked the Erdoğan-AKP
regime from establishing an authoritarian presidential system.
As the coalition talks were ongoing, on July 10, 2015, a bomb in Suruç, a district near the
Syrian border, killed 33 people. Most of the victims were college students who had been giving a
press statement on their planned trip to reconstruct the Kurdish border town of Kobanî following
the destruction caused by ISIS, who claimed responsibility for the attack the following day. But
after the bombing, the Turkish government launched a series of airstrikes against mostly Kurdish
fighter groups in northern Iraq and Syria, despite the fact that these Kurdish groups were fighting
against ISIS. In such an atmosphere of war, the coalition negotiations broke down.24 By July
2015, the ceasefire between the PKK and the Turkish Army had fully collapsed, and full-scale
warfare in Turkey’s Kurdistan resumed.
With the resurgence of the war between the PKK and the Turkish state, the so-called
peace or resolution process that had begun in 2012 was completely dismissed in 2015. With a
summer season of daily state violence and urban warfare in Kurdish cities and the mass arrests of
Kurdish politicians and activists, hopes for a democratic solution to the Kurdish Question faded
once again.25 The renewal of full-scale war in Turkey’s Kurdistan and the production of internal
enemies intensified nationalist sentiments in Turkey and helped AKP consolidate its electoral
base.26 In an atmosphere of military operations in Iraq and Syria, ISIS bombings in urban centers
of Turkey, warfare in Turkey’s Kurdistan, the criminalization of the HDP and persecution of its
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Davutoğlu stated that he would subsequently relinquish the task of forming a new government. Not giving the
duty to form a government to the second party CHP’s leader Kilicdaroglu, Erdogan violated the constitution.
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This is when “Academics for Peace” signed their now-famous petition and were condemned by Erdoğan, which
triggered a set of lawsuits against them.
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A watershed moment in this nationalist consolidation was the attempted coup attempt on July 15, 2016, a moment
that marks the beginning of this dissertation’s ethnographic storyline. I will return to the July 2016 coup attempt in
the following sections.
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members, elections were repeated on November 1. The snap election resulted in a victory for the
AKP, which got 49.5 percent of the vote, consolidating its power.
The second major event in the reconsolidation of AKP’s power was the failed coup
attempt of July 15, 2016. I arrived in Istanbul to start the official part of my fieldwork research
on July 14, 2016. I had decided to stay for a week in Istanbul, finalizing arrangements for the
research I planned to conduct in other parts of the country. I also wanted to spend some time
with family and friends before I took off. The next day, I met with friends from college at a bar
in Besiktas, a historic and lively neighborhood located at the European shore of the Bosphorus.
Around 10 p.m., some of us said goodbye to the rest of the group to catch the last ferry to
Kadıköy on the Asian side. While we were at the outdoor deck of the ferry, watching the alwaysspectacular view, my friend Zafer alerted the group about a recent flood of tweets, concerning
something strange taking place on the Bosphorus Bridge, right in front of us. “People are saying
that soldiers have blocked the bridge, what the hell is going on?” Zafer was yelling, appalled. My
friend Deniz was shaking me at the ferry that crosses the Bosphorus strait in Istanbul from the
“European” side to the “Asian” one, asking, “Is this another ISIS attack?” I looked at my friend
with blank eyes, with dozens of possible scenarios in my mind.
We wanted to stay together and figure out what was happening, so we went inside an
Irish-themed pub in Kadıköy with big TV screens. I was sipping my drink and scrolling down on
twitter, reports on low flying jets above the capital Ankara were coming. Some tweets claimed
that this was a coup attempt. At that moment, a female speaker on TRT, the official TV network,
started reading a statement released by a putschist group in Istanbul that called itself “Yurtta
Sulh” (peace at home) in a reference to a well-known maxim by Turkey’s founding father,
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk , that goes, “Yurtta sulh, cihanda sulh” (peace at home, peace in the
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world). A state of slow panic had begun to infest the air. Storeowners started to pull down their
shutters; people hastily began emptying the restaurants, cafes, and bars. We did the same and
started walking to Deniz’s nearby apartment swiftly. “I can’t believe what’s going on,” Eda,
another friend, snarled: “I can’t believe that ours will be a generation who has witnessed a real
coup d’état too.” Born in 1984, Eda had missed the last violent coup attempt in Turkey’s history
that took place on September 12, 1980 –a coup that has left bitter and traumatic memories in
many of the older generations.
Around 11 p.m., the usually swarming streets of Kadıköy were already deserted. We soon
realized, however, that grocery stores were full of people trying to stock up pasta, water, and
bread. There were long lines at the ATM’s on Moda Street. When we finally arrived at Deniz’s
place, we started watching this spectacular unfolding of the event on TV. Soon after, the-thenPrime Minister Binali Yildirim announced that an attempt to overthrow the government was
underway. A faction of the army then said, via a state broadcaster, that it had seized power to
protect democracy from President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. A curfew, martial law and the
preparation of a new constitution were announced. Erdogan, who was on holiday in a seaside
resort town, called on his supporters to take to the streets in protest and returned to Istanbul.
Over the course of a violent night, we learned that TV stations were raided by soldiers,
explosions heard in Istanbul and Ankara, protesters shot at, the parliament and presidential
buildings fired upon, a military helicopter shot down and the Turkish military chief taken
hostage.
Not being able to garner popular support or mobilize other factions within the state, the
coup attempt failed. Following the coup attempt, the AKP government immediately declared a
state of emergency, enabling the president and cabinet to bypass parliament when drafting new
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laws and to restrict or suspend constitutional rights and freedoms.27 Inadvertently later described
by Erdoğan as “God’s blessing,” the July 15 coup attempt became a new milestone in the
Erdoğan–AKP regime, who used it as a tool to consolidate their base, eliminate the opposition,
speed up the transition to a new regime, and intensify repressive politics through populist
strategies, continuous war, and polarization. The most significant move was setting a date for the
presidential referendum, which was viewed by the opposition as the final move to dismantle the
democratic institutions of the republic and destroy any hope of a regime change. As the April 16,
2017 referendum on the transition to an authoritarian presidential system approached, the
government strove to gain supporters through further cultural polarization and a rhetoric of
internal and external enemies, labeling those that oppose the impending regime change as
“inauthentic” (gayri milli) and, therefore, enemies of the pious “people” (millet), whom Erdoğan
claimed to be the true representative of.
I have been visiting Turkey for preliminary fieldwork for 2-3 months per year due to
social and political connections since 2012. As a part of my “official” research, I spent a total of
14 months conducting participant observation, interviews, and archival research in Turkey
between July 2016 and September 2017. The ethnographic fragments and stories in this work
reflect the months following the coup attempt. The political uncertainty and paranoia, state of
emergency, increasing authoritarianism and political pressure, the impending force of the April
2017 presidential referendum, political purges and arrests, the attempted erasure of Kurdish
politics from public life, the political exhaustion, and the constant sense of insecurity incited by
the threat of bombs exploding in the cities saturate the following chapters. I divided my research
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The massive purges that began shortly after the failed coup have resulted in hundreds of thousands of civil
servants, teachers, judges, academics, security officials, and employees of state-run institutions being fired. As of
July 2019, more than 150,000 were forcefully dismissed and more than 96,000 arrested. See
https://turkeypurge.com/
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between Batman and Ankara. In Ankara, I spent four months, conducting research at the
National Archives and conducting interviews with geologists, petroleum engineers, bureaucrats
and other professionals in Turkey’s oil industry. They were mostly employed at MTA, TP, and
the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. The rest of my research activities took place in
Turkey’s Kurdistan, particularly in Batman, where TP’s headquarters is located. In this province,
where first oil was discovered 70 years ago, I stayed at TP’s guesthouse, except when other
guests and I had to vacate for “security reasons” because an important person—the minister of
energy, prime minister, or President Erdoğan—would be arriving. At TP’s headquarters in
Batman, a large campus with outdated facilities that had once been luxurious and modern, I spent
time in offices, dining halls, parks, and trucks, conducting interviews with current TP
employers—engineers, geologists, workers, technicians, drivers, and their friends and families—
as well as local journalists, unionists, and bureaucrats. I frequently traveled to two other
provinces where TP’s oilfields are located: Diyarbakır and Siirt. In the highlands, valleys, hills,
and mountains surrounding Batman, Diyarbakır, and Siirt, I spent time in oil camps, at
exploratory and test drilling sites, refilling stations, CO2 facilities, production sites, and villages
near these facilities. Finally, I participated in geological and seismic surveys conducted by TP’s
geologists in Eruh, a district of Siirt. Stories from these observations, interviews, and trips are
woven into each chapter.
Examining the mutual making and unmaking of territory and oil politics in Turkey, each
chapter establishes links between the ethnographic present and periods from Turkey’s history
where oil, earth, and politics of space intersect. Analyzing how oil’s phantomatic materiality has
imbricated territorialization, informed territorial aspirations, and counter-territorial politics, this
work examines oil within a wide nexus of geology, infrastructure, and power around which
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practices of territorialization crystallize. Each chapter examines a particular aspect that oil has
mediated forms of territorialization with reverberations between the present and a historical
constellation. Thus, when read from the beginning to the end, this work constitutes a “non-linear
history” (DeLanda 1997) of Turkey’s relationship to oil and Kurdistan. The methodology that
this work pursues can be called “political geology” (Barry 2017; Bruun 2018; Bobbette and
Donovan 2019; Swanson 2016; Yusoff 2013) Different than political ecology, political geology
takes the inhuman, inorganic, and geological components of the world into its considerations of
power and politics. It also seeks to understand how massive, inhuman temporal and spatial scales
of the earth impact human notions and experiences of temporality and territory. Different than
political geography, it engages with the strata of the earth, the subsoil, depth, and volume,
categories that geographers have only recently started considering in their analyses. As Bobbette
and Donovan (2018) state, political geology “explores the geos in its proximity with the political
and in doing so poses questions about both the epistemology and materiality of the geos” (27).

Summary of Chapters
Chapter 1 examines how geology and geopolitics mediate the perceived materiality of oil in
Turkey as lacking, to understand how this relationship generates both conspiracy theories and
speculations over oil and expansionist-revisionist territorial imaginaries in relation to Mosul after
the end of World War I to the present. It analyzes meetings and public discussions around energy
and geopolitics, conspiracy theories and speculation around hidden oil abundancy, historical
treaties and geological claims that attempt to fix Anatolia as the homeland of the new Turkish
nation-state, and to include Mosul in this political formation. This chapter argues that the Treaty
of Lausanne, which designated the sovereign borders and territorial unity of modern Turkey in
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1923, is constantly revisited by political actors in Turkey as a period of territorial-ontological
instability and malleability. It argues that the convergence of territorial malleability and
indeterminacy inherent to geological knowledge production open political orders in Turkey into
question, fueling speculations, conspiracy theories, and irredentist and revisionist aspirations in
Turkey today.
Following the accounts of bureaucrats, travelers, and other state officials to oilfields in
Turkey’s Kurdistan right before and after the discovery of commercial oil in 1948, Chapter 2
examines how oil infrastructures are linked to the discovery and emergence of oil and the
making of Kurdistan as an uneven-colonial space, while also fueling anxieties about the
unintended forms of connectivity and spaces oil’s discovery and infrastructures might generate.
Examining everyday relationships between Turkish Petroleum geologists, engineers, and
Kurdish villagers, this chapter also analyzes how oil infrastructures —pipes, barrels, paper—
mediate uneven socio-material relations of collaboration, negotiation, and reciprocity in
Kurdistan, creating novel forms of territory and counter-territory.
Chapter 3 examines how resource nationalisms are entangled with notions of nature and
earth in relation to the ways in which political actors have configured the “Eastern Question” in
Turkey in the 1950s-1960s and the present. Analyzing stories about the mythical figure of the
Kurdish bandit Koçero, demands of resource sovereignty and nationalism in National Oil
Campaign in 1964, the Eastern Meeting in Kurdish cities, and Turkish Petroleum geologists’
narratives of geological surveys from 1970s, this chapter analyzes resource nationalisms of oil. It
argues that as a particular way of linking earth, nation, and territory together, resource
nationalisms in Turkey have concealed the role of the state in the production of uneven colonial
space in Kurdistan.
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Chapter 4 focuses on how geology mediates geopolitical disputes that the discovery of
hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea have generated, against the backdrop of Turkey’s
territorial claims over Cyprus and the events leading to the occupation of the island in 1974.
Analyzing how Turkish nationalists utilized geological arguments and linked Cyprus’ geology to
Anatolia to naturalize demands of annexation, as well as the Turkish left’s support to the
“national cause” of Cyprus, this chapter provides another avenue in which resource and
technology-infrastructure nationalism generate new forms of territorialization.
Chapter 5 focuses on Eruh, which has been recently framed as a resource frontier in the
media through the “cleansing” of the PKK guerillas from the region. This chapter examines how
oil infrastructures and the geophysical materiality of oilfields in Turkey’s Kurdistan have been
entwined with insurgency, counterinsurgency, and urban warfare in the 1990s through the
present. Through an ethnographic analysis of a geological survey, historical accounts of the
impact of the Gulf War (1990–1991) in Batman, and an examination of the Turkish state’s
shifting warfare tactics, this chapter examines the ways in which earth and oil infrastructures
have been utilized by the Turkish state and the PKK guerillas, and the new territorial formations
—enclaves, frontiers, and ruins — that these entanglements have brought into being in Turkey’s
Kurdistan today.
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Figure 5 Petroleum basin fields and structures data from IHS International Energy Database (January 2010).
Retrieved from “Petroleum Systems of the Tethyan Region” (AAPG 2014).
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CHAPTER 1
THE SPECULATIVE SUBSOIL:
GEOPOLITICS BETWEEN GEOGRAPHIC DETERMINISM AND GEOLOGICAL
INDETERMINACY

Introduction: Is Geology Destiny?
“Let me slightly change Ibn Khaldun’s famous words, ‘Geography is destiny,’ and say, Geology
is destiny,” spoke Besim Şişman, Director General of Turkish Petroleum, on October, 25, 2016,
in front of an audience of geologists, engineers, students, and bureaucrats who had filled up the
Turkish Petroleum (TP) auditorium. This was the first morning of the “Symposium of 70th
Anniversary of Petroleum Exploration in Turkey” held in Adıyaman, a small, rural city in
Turkey’s southeast. “Geography is destiny” is a phrase recited on almost every talk show,
political speech, or conversation on “geopolitics” or “geostrategy” and Turkey. Political science
professors, “geo-security experts,” politicians, and defense sector employees would sit around a
table and discuss Turkey’s significance and future in the Middle East, Balkans, and the eastern
Mediterranean. Although Napoleon was rumored to have uttered “geography is destiny” before
invading Russia, this phrase has been attributed in Turkey to the 14th-century Arab historian and
philosopher Ibn Khaldun, who, in Muqaddimah, wrote about the determining influence of local
environment and diet on the physical, mental, and spiritual qualities of the inhabitants and the
flourishing of civilization. The determining qualities of environment or geography in political
power and territoriality were also the primary interest of classical geopolitics. As elsewhere,
“geopolitics” in Turkey assumes direct relation between a state’s geographical location and
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political power, conjuring up various environmental determinisms and references to geopolitical
theorists and geographers.28 Şişman’s version of “geology is destiny” alluded to these traditions,
but with a twist of geology.

Figure 6 Flyer for the “Symposium of 70th Anniversary of Petroleum Exploration in Turkey.” Author copy.
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For example, Halford John Mackinder’s famous “heartland theory” from his essay “The Geographical Pivot of
History” (1904) is often cited by “geopolitics” or “geostrategy” experts in Turkey. Before World War II, Mackinder
declared, “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland / Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island /
Who rules the World-Island controls the World” (1919, 186).
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Geology and politics seemed to be inseparable at the symposium that day. The panels
resembled an international relations event more than one on geology, with titles such as “Global
Energy Trends and the Future of Petroleum,” “Geological Evolution and Hydrocarbon Potential
of Southeastern Anatolia,” and “The Geopolitical and Geostrategic Importance of the Southeast
Anatolia’s Near Geography.” Şişman, who delivered the opening talk of the event, encouraged
everyone in the room to be “more political.” Students from Adıyaman University were in the
room, especially petroleum engineers, as I was told by the members of the organizing committee.
“If there are those of you who do not engage in social and political discussions, you’re missing a
lot,” Şişman said right at the beginning of his speech. “Engineers especially should be very well
informed on such matters, particularly in such tumultuous times in our yurt29 and the Middle
East, right under our nose” he added, referring to the ongoing war and crisis in Syria and the
failed coup attempt, whose aftershocks were still being felt given the nationwide state of
emergency.
The months following the coup witnessed mass arrests and purges targeting tens of
thousands of civil servants suspected to be members of the US-based Gülen movement, whom
Erdoğan blamed for the coup. Things were also turbulent in other fields: Turkey’s shifting
political alignments in its foreign policy and its development of close political ties with Russia,
partly in response to the US support of Kurdish YPG fighters in Syria, had stirred things up.30 In
fact, Erdoğan seemed to be indirectly blaming the US for the coup attempt, interpreting the
events as retaliation for Turkey’s strategic alignment with Russia. Fearing the formation of an
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“Yurt” in Turkish is synonymous with “homeland.”
People’s Protection Units (YPG) is a democratic-socialist Kurdish-majority armed organization in Syria and
Rojava. YPG won a victory against ISIL at the siege of Kobani in 2015.
30
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independent Kurdish state backed by the US army south of its borders, the Turkish government
had decided to use its rapprochement with Russia as leverage against the US-YPG alliance.
In October 2016, Turkey finally joined the military forces present in Iraq during the
Battle of Mosul, a military campaign to retake the city of Mosul from ISIS, who had seized the
city in June 2014. Only two days before the symposium in Adıyaman, Turkish military forces
had started firing on fired on ISIL positions near Mosul, despite protests in Baghdad demanding
Turkish forces withdraw from Iraq (Al Jazeera 2016). The Syrian civil war and Turkey’s
intervention in Syria and Iraq were topics that were difficult to avoid, even at a symposium on a
seemingly technical topic. For Şişman, the war taking place right beyond Turkey’s southern
border was both a testament to the geopolitical reality of the Middle East and a call to action for
Turkey:
The particular geography we live on generates problems naturally. If Turkey were next
to—let’s say—Austria, we wouldn’t be having any of the problems we are having now.
We have to get used to the geography of Anatolia, the problems around it, and we have to
develop the skills to solve those problems. Otherwise, we will be annihilated. The world
system is no longer unipolar, and we are the only alternative power in our region. Please,
do not underestimate Turkey’s power. We are not a 90-year old state but a 5,000-year-old
one. This state is now called the Republic of Turkey. Before that, it was called the
Ottoman Empire, and something else before that. [. . .] I always liken Turkey to a ship.
We have to reach the open seas. But they want us to be occupied with the small fistfights
in our cabins. Do we have internal problems? Of course, but they are intentionally
prodded by our enemies. [ . . .] Geography might be destiny, but we also make our own
destiny. Yes, our oil resources are limited, according to our current geological
knowledge. But is this our destiny? Is Lausanne our destiny?
Signed in 1923, following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, the
Treaty of Lausanne constitutes the foundational text that recognized the territorial unity and
sovereignty of the Republic of Turkey up to this day. After defeating the Ottoman Empire,
Britain, France, Italy, and Greece planned to occupy Anatolia. The national resistance movement
thwarted this attempted division through shrewd diplomacy and several years of war.
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Subsequently, the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne recognized Turkey’s victory and established the
borders of modern Turkey.

Figure 7 Turkey's borders according to the Treaty of Lausanne. Hri.org.

The Treaty of Lausanne thus became one of Turkey’s foundational texts, along with the National
Pact of 1920, which was declared by the last Ottoman Parliament against the notorious Treaty of
Sèvres. The Treaty of Sèvres was not recognized by the resistance movement led by Mustafa
Kemal and the new Turkish government. Signed on August 10, 1920 by the Allies and the
Ottoman government, Sèvres decreed independence to Armenia and administrative autonomy to
Kurdistan. Against Sèvres, the new Turkish government embraced the National Pact, thus
framing it as a foundational text that encapsulated the nonnegotiable borders of the emerging
political unit that would later become the Republic of Turkey. The National Pact was used as
constant reference point later on as well, providing legitimacy to the territorial claims—including
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Mosul—of the new government in Ankara: The national territory envisioned by the National
Pact would be repeatedly conjured—albeit pragmatically in modified versions—as the homeland
to be defended against the enemy before the Treaty of Lausanne and later as the source of
irredentist aspirations.

Figure 8 The Treaty of Sèvres and Ottoman Empire according to the Treaty. CC BY-SA 4.0.

Until 1950, the anniversary of the Treaty of Lausanne had been celebrated as a national
holiday in Turkey, as “Peace Day” on July 24, on which schoolchildren dressed in costumes
representing the formerly contested or occupied regions of Anatolia. In the national elections of
1950, DP (Democrat Party), came to power, defeating the founding party CHP (Republican
Peoples’ Party) and ending the single-party-rule. The celebrations were then canceled, and the
national holiday repealed but has since remained a founding date with positive connotations in
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Turkey’s official history and public memory. It did, however, suddenly open up the treaty for
debate in the last decade, a debate which escalated with the ongoing crisis in Syria, causing
public upheaval, aspirations, and fears over Turkey’s future and its territories. Questions around
oil and geology stood at the center of these debates.
Şişman’s speech pointed to an ongoing crisis of the international world system and global
hegemony. The diagnosis that the US had lost its once-unquestionable global hegemony also
factored into the foreign policy of the Turkish government, which was trying to carve a space for
itself in the region and become a regional power during a period of crisis, which the Turkish
government saw as an opportunity. Questions of energy and resources were at the heart of these
efforts, just as they were during the first day of talks at the symposium in Adıyaman. Thus, the
expansionist undertones in Şişman’s talk were not exceptional, but rather characterized the
general character of Turkey’s foreign policy at the time, especially in relation to Mosul and other
“former Ottoman territories.” Oil was the key to these concerns over the links between geology
and political destiny, establishing a convoluted route from environmental-geographical
determinism to political expansionism in Turkey. Twentieth-century territorial agreements and
declarations are at the heart of this story.
This chapter examines the production of territories and oil through “geopolitics" in its
classical sense in the Middle East. It analyzes how present debates over Turkey’s foreign policy
in the Middle East are linked with the AKP government’s “neo-Ottomanist”31 and historical
revisionist project as well as irredentist-expansionist visions of territorial sovereignty and oil
wealth. These visions crystallized in debates about the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) and
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Neo-Ottomanism is a popular political ideology that encompasses both cultural or consumerist practices around
Ottoman paraphernalia and political ideals and foreign policy orientation that aim to recreate the territories and
political power that Ottoman Empire once held.
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speculation over its expiration in the near future. Analyzing these attempts to rearticulate
imperial and national pasts, this chapter also examines the aftermath of World War I and
demonstrates the role of geology in forming Turkey’s current southern borders with Syria and
Iraq, during and after the Treaty of Lausanne. Finally, examining petroleum exploration and its
inherent uncertainties, this chapter demonstrates how contemporary politics, speculations, and
debates around territory in Turkey are produced at the nexus of geological uncertainties of the
present and the ongoing aftermaths of World War I. In doing so, it demonstrates the ways in
which territoriality is made through oil’s mediation of geology and politics. Finally, this chapter
demonstrates that politics of historical revisionism and irredentist politics in Turkey today are
fueled by the coming together of epistemic and ontological uncertainties in geology and the
fragilities inherent to the political world order. This is why, this chapter argues, political actors
like Besim Şişman are invested in manipulating both geology and destiny.

Figure 9 Turkey's borders according to the "National Pact." CC BY-SA 3.0.
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Debating Lausanne and Mosul
Conjuring up the Treaty of Lausanne opened a box of controversies, revisions, and aspirations
about Turkey’s past and future in 2016. There were two main themes in these debates. The first
one revolved around the assertion that Lausanne was a defeat and that Mustafa Kemal and İsmet
İnönü, who led the negotiation committee for Turkey, had “given up on” Mosul. Lausanne’s
reconfiguration as a defeat in 2016 led to imagining other possibilities. If Lausanne was
debatable, Turkey’s current territories could also be debatable. These aspirations fit well into
neo-Ottomanist imaginaries and claims over the former territories of the Ottoman Empire in the
Balkans and the Middle East. The other speculation implied that Lausanne had an expiration
date, which would annul Mosul’s placement “outside of Turkey’s territories.” These arguments
often referred to the National Pact, which included Mosul within the borders of Turkey and
framed the pact as Turkey’s “true” foundational borders.
Another speculation had to do with Turkey’s sovereignty over its existing territories and
oil. In 2011, the AKP government declared its 2023 vision, a list of ambitious economic growth
goals to coincide with the centenary of the founding of the Republic of Turkey in 2023.
According to the 2023 vision, Turkey would be an economic powerhouse with a $2 trillion
economy (making it the world’s 10th-largest), a per capita income of $25,000, and $500 billion
in exports—all by 2023. Other goals include increased energy capacity, the commissioning of
three nuclear power plants as well as ambitious infrastructure and transportation projects.
However, according to a popular theory, something else, something big would be happening in
2023: Lausanne was going to expire on the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of
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Turkey. And when it does expire, Turkey would supposedly finally have full sovereignty over its
petroleum reserves. These debates are detailed below.

Figure 10 "Lausanne Will Be Over: Goal 2023": an unofficial graphic for the AKP’s presidential campaign.

A few months after the failed coup attempt, Erdoğan declared, “July 15 is Turkey’s
second National War of Independence. In 1920, they showed us the Sèvres card and made us
settle for Lausanne. Then some people tried to sell Lausanne to us as a victory” (Erdoğan
2016b). Later that week, Erdoğan asserted in an interview that “Lausanne should be updated”
(Smith 2017), alarming Turkey’s neighbors, including Greece, Bulgaria, and Iraq.
Erdoğan made these comments at a time when Turkey was carrying out multiple military
operations in the Middle East. During the civil war in Syria, Turkey was involved in two military
operations across its borders in Syria: OES (Operation Euphrates Shield) in August 2016 to
March 2017 and OOB (Operation Olive Branch) in January to March 2018. Collaborating with
Turkey-aligned Syrian groups—the “Free Syrian Army”—in opposition to Bashar Assad’s
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regime, Turkish officials argued that its military operations were acts of self-defense in response
to ISIL as well as against SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces). But many foreign journalists claimed
that despite the pretext of fighting against ISIS, the Turkish military was also targeting YPG.
OES brought the Turkish forces deep inside Syrian sovereign territory, west of the Euphrates.
Here, according to critical commentators, Turkey’s main concern was the potential formation of
a Kurdish state south of its borders and the alleged territorial threat this would pose to Turkey.
Turkey also increased its military presence in Iraq following the fall of Mosul to ISIS in
2014. Expecting to have a role in the offensive and wanting a role for the Sunni forces, the
Turkish military had been training at a base north of Mosul with the aim of liberating the city.
On October 1, 2014 Erdoğan said in a speech to Turkish parliament, “We will play a role in the
Mosul liberation operation and no one can prevent us from participating” (Lister and Alkhshali
2016) and remarked that Turkey’s presence in Iraq was only to ensure that Mosul did not fall to
Kurdish or Shia control and become a threat to Turkey (Arango and Gordon 2016). Iraq was not
convinced. Days later, once again alarming Turkey’s neighbors, Erdoğan declared that
Our physical borders are one thing; our heart borders are another. We will of course
respect physical borders, but we cannot demarcate our hearts, and we won’t let it be
demarcated by others. Some ask why we’re interested in Iraq and Syria. [. . .] No one
asks the same question, “What are you doing here?” to the countries that come from
thousands of kilometers away and operate under our nose: Are Antep and Aleppo,
Mardin and Al-Hasaqah, Siirt and Mosul not places that are related to each other? Exit
from Hatay, up to Morocco, you may see traces of us in every Middle Eastern and
Northern Africa country you pass through. From Thrace to Eastern Europe, in every step
you take, you’ll come across traces of our ancestors. We read about the National Pact in
our history books, right? What does that entail? [. . .] This is why paying attention to32
Iraq, Syria, Libya, Crimea, Montenegro, Bosnia, and our brother countries is our duty and
our right. [. . .] Turkey is not just Turkey. (Erdoğan 2016a)

32

“Paying attention to” also means “caring for” and “being interested in” in Turkish.
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Already disapproving of the presence of Turkish troops in the Bashika region of Mosul, both the
Iraqi government and the public in Iraq reacted harshly. Then-prime minister of Iraq, Haider AlAbadi warned against Turkish intervention in Iraq. Yet during another talk a few days later,
Erdoğan said that Turkey could not remain inert with regard to Mosul. “What are they saying?
Turkey should not enter Mosul. How can I not?” He continued,
I have a 350-km common border with Iraq, and this border is under threat. We will be
part of the operation, and we will be at the table. Our non-involvement is out of the
question. Why? Because there is a history here for us. They can read the National Pact if
they wish and learn our past from there. (Erdoğan 2016a)
In another speech, Erdoğan declared that Turks were not happy with Turkey’s current borders,
“Our territory, which was 2,500,000 km2 in 1914, shrank to 780,000 km2 nine years later, when
Lausanne was signed. […] Those who are trying to imprison Turkey in a vicious circle since
1923 wish to erase our thousand-year history in this region” (Yeni Safak, 2016).
As Erdoğan’s words exemplify, the National Pact serves a popular reference point—a
rival to the Treaty of Lausanne—and a map that embeds future territorial possibilities within it.
As an ambivalent and malleable document,33 the National Pact could be used to incorporate
multiple territorial claims. Second, since it had been declared by the last Ottoman parliament and
not the new one in Ankara, the pact could also perfectly feed into neo-Ottomanist notions.
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On the National Pact’s ambivalence and how Mustafa Kemal Atatürk used this deliberately: Contrary to some
established ideas, there was not a strict, predeclared territorial principle in the National Pact. For the regions cited by
name—the provinces of Elviye-i Selâse (Kars, Ardahan, and Batum) and Western Thrace—, there was not an open
claim but rather a proposed plebiscite. Atatürk used this uncertainty as an instrument of ambiguity with regard to
territorial objectives, and he interpreted the National Pact as a means of narrowing the frontiers in accord with a
realistic assessment of military capabilities. Throughout the national war, in a series of foreign policy decisions, the
National Pact was totally blown off of its original imperial course, modified to refer to the territorial integrity of
Anatolia, especially against the Armenian and Kurdish claims, and gained a more “national” character. In this
respect, the period between 1919 and 1923 can be characterized as the “nationalization of the National Pact,”
providing a basis for the modern territorial Turkish citizenship.
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Defeat or Victory? Rearticulating Imperial and National Histories
The Turkish military intervened in Iraq on October 23, 2016. Following the intervention, public
debates came to be dominated by discussions around Turkey’s “historic rights” in Mosul.
Ottoman Empire maps from various periods circulated on TV programs, while columnists drew
attention to the founding documents of the republic. In the evenings I spent at the guesthouse of
TP in Batman, I would turn on the TV in my room and almost always come across a program
with guests discussing “Is Lausanne a defeat or a victory?” A male host wearing a blue or a
checkered suit, as was the fashion of the pro-government media at the time, would say:
As the audience might know, the National Pact—the “Magna Carta” of Turkey—was
declared by the heroic and patriotic Ottoman parliament in 1920 during the National War
for Independence. Here is the map of Turkey according to the National Pact. And here
are the borders of the Republic of Turkey as designated by the Treaty of Lausanne in
1923, signed by General İsmet İnönü.
The two maps would be contrasted, and it would be made clear that while the former placed
Mosul inside Turkey’s national borders, the latter had left it outside. Then, a guest speaker would
start talking about how Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his friends had “given up” Mosul and other
places included the National Pact but excluded them from the Treaty of Lausanne.
Reconfiguring the meaning of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and World War I, the
treaties that delineated the current borders of Turkey were, thus, central to the history-making
project of the AKP regime and complement “the political-economic revolution” with a culturalideological one. Is Lausanne a defeat or a victory? This question has been key to revanchist,
neo-Ottomanist history-writing attempts from the early 2000s.34 Deep History, a popular and
populist, pro-AKP magazine funded by sources close to Erdoğan, often brought Sèvres,
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Such currents were often encouraged by the liberal revisionist historiography of the 1990s, which criticized the
Kemalist historiography of the former period that had discredited almost every aspect of Ottoman modernization and
assumed a radical rupture between the empire and the republic.
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Lausanne, and Mosul to its cover, with sensational titles such as “We Took Peace, Gave up
Petroleum at Lausanne” (July 2016), “How Did We Give Mosul to the British?” (November
2016) “The Title Deed of Mosul and Kirkuk Belongs to Abdulhamid II” (October 2017). Indeed,
after becoming aware of oil resources in the area, Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II transferred the
title deeds of Mosul and Kirkuk to himself in 1890. In 2016, the property records of Mosul
resurfaced, with TV news claiming that they had been “discovered,” and that they proved that
Mosul belongs to Turkey. I came across one of those programs on the evening of the symposium,
as a reporter from the Ottoman Archives of the Prime Minister’s Office in Ankara, cheerfully
informing audiences that the long-lost documents had been retrieved.

Figure 11 July 2016 cover of the magazine, Deep History: “We took peace, gave up petroleum in Lausanne.”
Author copy.
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Figure 12 November 2016 cover of the magazine Deep History, with a photo of İsmet İnönü: “How Did We
Give Mosul to the British?” Author copy.

One of the key figures in the rearticulation of imperial history was the Ottoman Sultan
Abdulhamid II, whose depiction in academic scholarship of the 2000s as an expert in modern
governmentality over a centralized state stood in contrast to the former caricaturized depictions
in Kemalist historiography, which portrayed him as an Islamist reactionary and an antimodernizationist. The post-Kemalist historiography of the 2000s challenged this conventional
image of Abdulhamid II, among other conventions in Ottoman historiography (Deringil 2011).
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The AKP government pragmatically utilized these new accounts during the first decade of its
power, and then actively started composing a counter-history with new sacreds, myths, and
milestones in its second decade, becoming less and less concerned about basing these stories on
the authority of scientific fact. This counter-history project materialized in the form of popular
cultural products, in popular TV series and magazines.

Figure 13 A Payitaht: Abdulhamid graphic with the actor who plays Abdulhamid II and the Ottoman Coat of
Arms.

In the counter-myth-making project of the AKP government, Abdulhamid II was turned into an
equivalent of the persona of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. “Payitaht: Abdulhamid” (“The Last
Emperor”), for instance, a TV series that aired on the state-owned TRT and depicted the
Hamidian Era, often drew parallels between the Sultan’s reign and the Erdoğan regime. In the
often-anachronistic plot of the series, Abdulhamid II was depicted as a dedicated, proud, and
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patriotic ruler, whose power was constantly being threatened by malicious and menacing internal
and external enemies ranging from the evil Catholic Church or Europeans to Ottoman-Jewish
traitors and Freemason plotters, surviving countless assassination attempts and conspiracies. As
critics noted, the show completely lacked historical accuracy at times and reflected the antiSemitic, conspirational worldview of Turkey’s political present (Daglioglu 2019; Korucu 2019;
Erdemir and Kessler 2017).
In addition to semi-fictional works, popular history magazines and TV shows flourished
in the 2010s along with a newfound public interest in revision and conspiracy, with titles such as
Backdoors of History, Hidden History, and Deep History. The foundational narratives of modern
Turkey and, thus, Lausanne were often scrutinized on these platforms. Some commentators
highlighted the “conditional” approval of Lausanne. Deep History claimed that the British had
approved Lausanne only after the abolishment of the Islamic Caliphate by Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk (Derin Tarih 2016). The most popular version of the “conditional approval” thesis
revolved around the theme of oil. According to this theory, only by giving up Mosul and, thus,
the oil-rich Mesopotamian lands that the Ottoman Empire once held sovereignty over, Mustafa
Kemal and his friends were able to convince Britain, France, and others to recognize the newly
founded Turkey. This theory reversed the conventional historical narrative by portraying the
founders of the republic as traitors or as having collaborated with imperialists. It used to be
Kemalists who accused Mehmet VI (Vahdettin), the last Ottoman sultan, of being a traitor for
signing the Treaty of Sèvres. The neo-Ottoman revisionists of 2016 reversed this charge and
directed it towards the founders of the republic. The theory also evoked a possible future in
which the Treaty of Lausanne would be void and Mosul would finally be included in Turkey.

52

Figure 14 Extended territorial imaginaries. This map reimagines Turkish territories as to include Mosul,
Greek Islands, Cyprus, and Western Thrace. Uludağ Sözlük, 2016.

Other theories brought up a curious fact about Lausanne to assert that the treaty had never
been recognized in the first place: the US never recognized the Treaty of Lausanne, and its
reasons for doing so supposedly went back to an unrealized railway project and oil. In 1923, the
congress of the newly founded Republic of Turkey approved the Chester Concession, a project
that allowed the US to develop a 2,700-mile railroad from Mosul to the port of Alexandretta on
the Mediterranean Sea and Samsun on the Black Sea. The US corporation involved in it, which
had been granted tax-exempt status, would have the rights to all the mineral resources,
including oil fields, within a 25-mile zone on both sides of the railway lines as well as being
allowed to do subsidiary activities like the laying pipelines, utilizing water power for
construction, and building port and terminal facilities on the Black Sea and the Gulf of
Alexandretta. The project would mark the first large-scale introduction of US capital into
the Near East. The new Turkish government wanted to be free from foreign economic influence,
since one of the main reasons that Ottoman Empire sovereignty had been hindered were trade
privileges given to foreigners, but the concession was initially approved. The reason behind this
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strategy, according to historians, was that the concession would guarantee the support of the US
during negotiations with the Allied powers at the Treaty of Lausanne. Turkey successfully
received American support during the meetings at Lausanne, but the Chester Railway Project
was ultimately never realized, and the Turkish Parliament failed to approve its concession in
1924. For historians of Turkey, this event reflected the entry of a yet-inexperienced United States
into the competition for petroleum resources in the Middle East and the Turkish government’s
pragmatist strategy of foreign policy, claiming that Mustafa Kemal had never intended to sign
the concessions in the first place but used them as a leverage against Britain and other European
states.35
Neo-Ottomanist commentators and speculations in 2016, however, reinterpreted this
event as a sign that Mustafa Kemal was not an anti-imperialist after all, that he was ready to “sell
off the country to the Americans.” Other theories called into question the very recognition by the
US of Turkey’s sovereignty and territorial integrity during the Treaty of Lausanne. A popular oil
conspiracy book, for instance, claims that the US responded to the cancellation of the railroad
project by refusing to recognize the Treaty of Lausanne (Çebi 2011). If the US had failed to
recognize the territorial sovereignty of Turkey, what would it say about Turkey’s territorial
sovereignty?
Finally, the map of the proposed railroad project became evidence to support another
theory: that Turkey was “floating on a sea of petroleum.” This theory was fueled by the way in
which railroad projects and concessions in Mesopotamia, such as Baghdad or Hejaz railways,
had been linked to the oilfields. The same could be true for the area surrounding Van, which
were to be reachable based on the Chester railway sketches. The Chester Project became a
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Can (2000) refutes those claims and argues that Mustafa Kemal and his friends genuinely wished to realize the
project.
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historical event that could open up a future in which Turkey held full sovereignty over its
minerals and resources. These events were also translated into evidence that there were secret
and hidden powers out there actively obstructing oil discovery and extraction in Turkey, pointing
to the possibility of a subsoil that is abundant with oil or that “more oil is hidden” (Limbert 2015,
347).

Figure 15 Map of the proposed Chester Railway Project. Isikoglu 2014.

Debates, speculation, and conspiracy theories over the Treaty of Lausanne were made up
of a mixture of facts and fiction, truth and fabrication, as most conspiracy theories do.
Conspiracy theories have been analyzed as symptoms of a collective, political pathology, a
“paranoid style of thinking” in politics that should be eliminated (Hofstadter 1964), or as
pathological phenomena specific to certain cultures or places such as the Middle East (Zonis and
Joseph 1994). Against such pathologizing and ethnocentric approaches, critical psychoanalytic
approaches analyze conspirational thinking as symptoms of the dynamics of power and politics
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in a society. Conspirational thinking has been analyzed as the very paradoxical result of regimes
of living in liberal societies that are governed by the principles of transparency and
accountability. Claims to transparency in liberal societies paradoxically lead to the proliferation
of conspiracy theories and beliefs in hidden and secret powers (West and Sanders 2003). Jodi
Dean argues that conspiracy theories are critical theories that are “misread as empirical [ones]”
(2000, n.p.). Dean sees the dynamic of secrecy and publicity as central to the logic of conspiracy
theory. For Boltanski (2014), conspiracy theories reflect the suspicions of the members of a
political community concerning the exercise of power. For Boltanski, conspiracy theories are
“political ontologies,” answers to unknown and unnerving questions like, “Where does power
really lie, and who actually holds it?” Thus, they are symptoms of what Melly (2000) calls an
“agency panic,” which people experience in a globalizing, uncontrollable world. Yet, with their
enactment, conspiracy theories still cling to a national fantasy of freedom from social control.
Fenster (1999) views conspiracy theory as an excessive, overreaching interpretive practice.
Likewise, for Dean (2000), conspiracy theories disavow closure or a final interpretation, arguing
that the excesses of conspiracy theory speak to the “surpluses, the libidinal supports, of political
and economic power” through their portrayal of networks of power.
Excess, in Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, refers to things that are beyond signification
and symbolization. For Lacan (1992), there is a non-verbalizable, non-representable “thing”
outside of the cultural and social world of the Symbolic Order and language. Grosz (2008)
directs attention to the excessive forces of sexuality, corporeality, and matter. Bataille (1985;
1991) turns his attention to cosmic forces of existence and economy, and writes about the
energies of the sun, which constant exceed the limits of human experience and organic bodies.
Going beyond Sausseurian limits of signification, this chapter considers linking the political
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“excesses” of conspiracy theories about the Treaty of Lausanne, not to a psychoanalytic
framework of excess, but to the excesses of matter and epistemic uncertainty (which emerge in
relation to this excess). As I show in the following section, debates over the Treaty of Lausanne
are situated within a larger background the history of the Republic of Turkey and the aftermath
of World War I, which point to the fragility, malleability, and historical contingency of the
formation of territorial borders. Second, as the final section demonstrates, these conspiracies and
speculation are also entangled with the uncertainties intrinsic to geological knowledge
production and the indeterminate materiality of the subsoil and geological matter. Fueled by the
uncertainties and indeterminacy inherent to oil and geology, conspiracy theories highlight the
fragility of international agreements, notions of territory and sovereignty. In return, they are
mobilized by the AKP government as a temporal device of historical revisionism and irredentist
politics in a period of global political crisis.
Below, I narrate a scene from the first day of the symposium in Adıyaman, where
discussions on Turkey’s politics in the Middle East and energy geopolitics went hand in hand
with rearticulation of the aftermath of the World War I. Next, I turn to this heavily debated
period between the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and Mosul’s “loss” to Iraq in order to
capture the conditions for the emergence of conspiracy theories and speculation over the Treaty
of Lausanne, and, thus, Turkey’s territorial-political ontology.
Debating Oil, Geopolitics, and Turkey’s Political Future
The symposium in Adıyaman was coorganized by TAPG (Turkish Association of Petroleum
Geologists), TP (Turkish Petroleum), and MTA (General Directorate of Mineral Research and
Exploration). First oil might have been discovered in Batman, but we had gathered in Adıyaman,
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where TP’s other district management center was located (in addition to Batman). The Adıyaman
District Management was founded in 1992, following the most significant oil discoveries since
the discovery of Türbüz and Karakus oilfields in the 1980s. I was sitting next to Ismail Bey, who
was one of the symposium organizers. He was a 51-year-old petroleum geologist trained at
Ankara University before starting to work at TP, specializing in petroleum exploration. Since
2010, he had been the chief exploration geologist for the southeastern Anatolia region based out
of the Ankara TP headquarters. I had met Ismail Bey a couple of months ago at his office. He
was the one who invited me to the symposium, saying that it might be informative for me and
allow me to meet with the people I needed to.

Figure 16 "TP Culture Center" in Adıyaman TP District Management Site. Photographed by the author on
the morning of the symposium on October 25, 2016.
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The opening and closing panel of the second day of the symposium was aptly titled “The
Geopolitical and Geostrategic Importance of the Southeast Anatolia Near-geography.” The panel
had four other participants: Kemal Türkeş, a political science professor from METU (Middle
East Technical University) in Ankara; Yılmaz Tuna, a professor of global studies at Medipol
University in Istanbul; Volkan Ediger, professor of energy systems engineering at Kadir Has
University in Istanbul; Aytaç Eren, CEO of Güney Yıldızı (a private Turkish oil exploration and
production company) and director of PETFORM (Petroleum and Natural Gas Platform
Association); and Besim Şişman, director general of TP. Below, I present scenes from a heated
discussion that took place during the panel, which evolved into a debate of contested visions over
Turkey’s future and political place in the world.
The first speaker was Professor Volkan Ediger. Originally trained as a geological
engineer at Middle East Technical University, he received his PhD in geosciences from
Pennsylvania State University in 1986 and worked at TP for 30 years. Professor Ediger had also
become a historian of energy and petroleum in the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey
and gained wide recognition with his book Neft and Petroleum in the Ottoman Empire (2006).
He had served as an advisor on energy to three presidents of Turkey for 12 years. Ediger’s talk
surveyed current “energy trends” and emphasized the energy transition processes and how
petroleum industry will have to adapt to these changes. His first point was about the global trend
of “state capitalism.” His second point was that the global balance of power was shifting, and
that the world was no longer a unipolar one. The United States was losing its singlehanded
power, and this was why, Ediger commented, global struggles for energy were entangled with
struggles of power. Once Ediger finished his talk, Aytaç Eren, CEO of the private oil company
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Güney Yıldızı, said that he had a question for Professor Ediger. “Professor, I wanted to ask you a
question that has been bugging me for a while,” he said and continued,
Our border with Iraq is drawn starting from the Khabur River. Yet, it is not a straight line,
as many designed borders are. If this were a straight line, it would run to Semdinli,36 and
the Tawke oilfield would be within our territories. Tawke has a potential of 200,000
barrels; this field alone would meet one-third of Turkey’s energy need. The same thing is
also true for the Syrian border. It is an indented line. And wherever those indents don’t
make much sense, you will see that there is an oilfield there, which remained outside of
Turkey’s borders. I think this is not a coincidence and that geologists had a very
important role in here. Again, Iraq’s Peshkabir field is only 10 km away from us. It is a
surface anticlinal37 discovery. Am I right?
These oilfields, Tawke and Tawke-Peshkabir were in Iraqi Kurdistan, and currently jointly
owned by the Norwegian oil company DNO and General Energy International. “Of course,”
Professor Ediger replied. “Abdulhamid himself invited Paul Grosskopf, a mining engineer to
investigate Mesopotamian oil fields. He had prepared a report and map, which was then
presented to both Abdulhamid and Germany. These things have been known for a long time.”
Ediger was referring to the Hamidian Era (1876 to 1909), where first oil exploration studies were
carried out in the Ottoman Empire by German and French geologists and engineers in Baghdad,
Mosul, and Kirkuk. In Ottoman Mesopotamia, certain areas had been known for thousands of
years to contain oil springs and seepages, but, apart from local uses, there was no developed
industry. Grosskopf’s map paved the way for the granting of various concessions38 to companies
36

Semdinli, Shemsdin (Syriac), or Şemzînan (Kurdish) is a mountainous district of Hakkari in Turkey, bordering
Iraq and Iran.
37
Anticlinal theory, which argued that productive wells were closely associated with the axial area of anticlines or
upfolds, was a widely accepted theory for oil and gas exploration in the 19th century. in the classic textbook
“Fundamentals of the Petroleum Industry,” the US geologist Dorsey Hager stated unequivocally that “the anticlinal
theory is as fundamental to the geologist as Newton’s gravitational law is to the physicist.” The theory explained
that, over millions of years, compression and tension of the earth’s crust folds the rock layers, occasionally forming
uplifts or anticlines that can often be recognized at the surface. Oil, being lighter than water, moves upward, and as
long as the uplift is sealed with a layer of impermeable rock the oil gets trapped, resulting in a reservoir of oil-filled
porous rock (Mau and Edmundson 2015).
38
Concessions (imtiyaz) were grants by a state to citizens, aliens, or other states of rights to carry out specific
economic activities and of capitulatory rights on its territory. Ottoman concessions in the 19th century enabled
European states to get trade privileges and obtain operation rights of natural underground or overland resources,
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and individuals—Ottoman and European entrepreneurs, who obtained oil concessions in
Baghdad, Mosul, Diyarbakır, Van, Alexandretta, and Adana between 1887 and 1905. With the
growing influence of Germany over the Ottoman Empire, Deutsche Bank obtained concessions
for a railway project during the Hamidian Era, which granted rights over potential petroleum
reserves as well. Thus, the first foreign concession over Mesopotamian oil was given to the
Anatolian Railway Company, owned and controlled by Deutsche Bank in 1881. The map
prepared by Grosskopf of the Mesopotamian petroleum districts was used by the Anatolian
Railway Company. This map resurfaced in the 2000s with the resurgence of the interest in
Abdulhamid and the growing speculations around oil reserves in Turkey. It became
“Abdulhamid’s Petroleum Map” and was interpreted as part of Abdulhamid’s visionary and
patriotic policies against growing European colonization attempts and the Ottoman Empire’s
diminishing sovereignty.
For Aytaç Eren, the role of geologists and their knowledge on oilfields before and during
World War I in the Ottoman Empire’s territories in Mesopotamia clearly showed that the science
of geology was not innocent, and borders were drawn in accordance with classified intelligence
on oil potentiality. For Şişman, this would also indicate that those borders could be open to
further modification. He joined the conversation:
That’s why they cannot accept a Turkey that has Mosul-Kirkuk. I think we need to study
those years meticulously. If Atatürk had lived longer, other things would be possible. If
Hatay had been successfully annexed in 1939, the same could be done for Mosul and
Kirkuk, too. I am one of those people who think Mustafa Kemal might have been
murdered by those who feared that his political genius that had enabled the annexation of
Hatay could also annex Mosul.
I hadn’t encountered this conspiracy theory before, but I was familiar with arguments around

transportation and finance sectors. In this context, these powerful states politically and economically established
pressures on the governments to increase or stabilize their investments, serving the interests of the state that obtained
concessions rather than the state that granted it.
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Hatay’s annexation in 1939 being utilized for claims over Mosul. Formerly known as “the
Sanjak of Alexandretta,” present-day Hatay is a southern province in Turkey that borders Syria.
Although the sanjak and the major cities of Antioch (Antakya) and Alexandretta (Iskenderun)
were initially included in the National Pact of 1920, the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne left the sanjak
outside of Turkey’s borders, along with Mosul and Batumi. It was placed under the control of the
French Mandate for Syria and Lebanon and supervised by the League of Nations. In 1939,
following the success of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s diplomatic efforts and arguments about its
natural inclusion in Anatolia, Alexandretta was annexed to Turkey and named “Hatay,”
accompanied by narratives of the rightful and natural unification with the motherland, the end of
estrangement and longing, and a triumphant reunion. On June 23, 1939, France and Turkey
signed a treaty making the boundary between Syria and Hatay, the current border between
Turkey and Syria.
For Besim Şişman, international agreements were not destiny. They were fragile,
fabricated political fixes that could be unfixed. Şişman, just like other commentators on the
Treaty of Lausanne, conjured up the past and rearticulated it before reclaiming a new, more
sovereign, more powerful, territorially larger Turkey. Reminiscent of the “Looking Back to Look
Forward” phrase Agnew (2012, 301) employs to describe geopolitical notions in China, Şişman’s
words glanced at the World War I moment and the aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman
Empire, before it had envisioned a future of geopolitical power and national sovereignty.
Exemplified by Şişman’s talk, the AKP government’s irredentist visions of territorial expansion
went hand in hand with historical revisionism. They imagined sovereign futures and territorial
expansion in the Middle East, especially at a moment when the post–Cold War order and the USled global order was perceived to be under threat by the “rising powers” of Russia, China, and
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Iran. Such a crisis of the status quo could be an opportunity for Turkey to expand its “sphere of
influence” and even its territories towards political power and oil wealth.
Then, Professor Ediger took the microphone, saying that he “would like to add a few
historical notes that are relevant to the conversation.” He continued:
Let’s go back to the year 1914. All of us are quite familiar with the names Mosul and
Kirkuk nowadays. Well, one of the main reasons why World War I took place was this
petroleum-rich region of Mosul-Kirkuk, which was under Ottoman jurisdiction then.
Britain had a plan: divide the Ottoman Empire and put these petroleum-rich regions
under the British Mandate. Germany had a different plan: keep the Ottoman Empire’s
unity intact and take the oil in Mosul-Kirkuk through certain deals, concessions, and
trade privileges. Naturally, the Ottoman Empire sided with Germany and as you know,
after the war, there was a completely different picture in the Near East. The task to design
this geography was given to Gertrude Bell, a British woman, who drew the boundaries of
the Middle East. She became a “nation-builder,” as social scientists would say. Read her
memoirs; you’ll find them very interesting. And as you know, the Treaty of Lausanne
was signed after eight months of negotiation. In Lausanne, the problem of Mosul
province could not be resolved and was left to the League of Nations. The league
finalized its decision in 1926, and Mosul became a part of Iraq, and in 1927 our eastern
border was finally drawn, too. And this was the date the first petroleum well in Iraq was
drilled.
And finally, in a direct reference to the debates going on at the moment in Turkey, he added,
These days everyone keeps asking: “Was Lausanne a victory, or was it a defeat?” I don’t
know. If you’re looking for answers to those kinds of questions, just turn on the TV
tonight and you might run into ten different talk shows debating the issue. But let me tell
you a fact. If we had not given up Mosul, we wouldn’t be able to form our republic. We
wouldn’t be the sovereign nation-state we are now.
Ediger’s words covertly pointed to a danger in questioning the fabricated, fragile, and
malleable nature of territorial agreements and political borders. Wanting “Mosul back” would
mean questioning the legitimacy of the Treaty of Lausanne itself and, through that, the very
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Turkey. Yet, this was the very thing that some
commentators wanted to open up for discussion and bring the possibility of territorial expansion
back into the table. Questioning the status quo, however, could also bring total destruction.
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In the next part of the panel, political science professor Türkeş tried to caution the
panelists against this. For some time, Türkeş had seemed exasperated by the conversations going
on around him. When it was his turn, he grabbed the microphone looking pained and spoke:
I don’t agree with you on your point that the current war is a clash of civilizations or
religions or cultures. I also don’t think energy resources are the driving force in these
conflicts. It’s an important commodity, but that’s all. What’s currently going on is a
manifestation of a struggle for political-economic hegemony over the globe. The singlepolar world order has collapsed, true. But please, we have to make sure our analysis is
accurate. If our diagnosis is faulty, our solutions will be inaccurate, and our actions will
have catastrophic consequences. I urge everyone to stay clear of the “Huntington Trap.”
Huntington made a clash over political-economic power look like it was a clash over
civilizations, a fight between Islam and the West. This is ideology. Do not buy into
ideology! Similarly, we should not read the world order through energy, but instead
analyze the place of energy in the world order. Energy is not enough in itself to attain
global hegemony. One needs other things, such as military power or scientific and
technological capacity. And then the power to generate your own ideologies so that
everyone accepts your hegemony; they even start to like it, want it. Do we have that kind
of power? Please, let’s not fool ourselves.
Besim Şişman, who used to be a fervent right-wing activist twenty years ago, seemed irritated by
this application of Marx, Althusser, and Gramsci to contemporary questions of global power and
hegemony. He grabbed a microphone and started speaking with an elevated voice,
ROKETSAN, ASELSAN—I’ve visited them all.39 I’ve seen what we can do. We are
developing our own drones! They fly by themselves, hit their targets, and fly back. We
might be an energy-poor country, but we are developing our own defense technology.
What happened to Japan? What happened to China? There was a time we used to sniff at
them. Look what they’ve accomplished through science and technology. It’s time to stop
whining and complaining and finding excuses. I’ve heard you talk about “hegemonic
powers.” So what? Maybe tomorrow Turkey will become a global hegemonic power. But
ours won’t be a colonizing one. Ours will be about justice. [...] We cannot keep looking
at the ground. One who does might never fall, never make a mistake, but it also cannot
know where it is going. We have to look ahead, to the horizon. We must run; even if we
fall down, we must stand up and keep running.
Prof. Türkeş replied:
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ROKETSAN is a Turkish weapons manufacturer and defense contractor focusing on rocket technology. The
company also provides technology and engineering solutions for other integrated civilian and military platforms.
ASELSAN is a Turkish corporation that produces tactical military radios and electronic defense systems for Turkish
armed forces.
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We have to be nuanced when we think about the Ottoman Empire’s power. We should
look at it historically. Was the Ottoman Empire still a global power right before World
War I? Was it in the top three? No. Let’s take a look at the 1907 census. What was the
population of the Ottoman Empire according 1907 census? 21 million—including the
populations in Balkans, Anatolia, Hijaz. England’s population, except its colonies, was
more than 45 million. Germany’s population was more than 65 million. Russia: 120
million. The numbers are speaking. You cannot claim that the Ottoman Empire was a
strong imperial power in the 19th and 20th centuries. If you understand this fact, you’ll
also understand why and how it had already lost its territories, and why it collapsed
following World War I. You’ll understand that it had already lost its power before it lost
its physical territories. Now, to your suggestions that we should expand towards the open
seas, or start flying. I don’t quite remember the specific metaphors you used, excuse me.
All I want to say is that the Republic of Turkey is a country with mid-sized power.
Having our head in the clouds is the biggest mistake thing we can make. “Turkey will be
a world power,” “Turkey will be energy hub,” “Turkey will be a game-changer, a
playmaker….” this kind of talk has been circulating here and there for a while, but I find
it nonsensical. I just want to caution everyone here to be cautious.
Besim Şişman had been grinning the whole time the professor was talking. Then he leaned over
and said, “Your words upset me, Professor. I thought METU’s politics were anti-imperialist. But
your comments have been pro-imperialist,” he looked over the audience for support. “Intense!”
Ismail Bey whispered in my ear.
Yes, we know that the last 150 years of the Ottoman Empire were diseased, and Mustafa
Kemal healed this disease. I just want to say that we cannot infect our young students,
engineers, and scientists who are here inferiority complexes. We are trying to keep a
great state intact in the middle of the most difficult times, in the midst of the harshest
political geography in the world. This is not an easy task, and we will fail if we keep
abasing ourselves.
Turkeş wasn’t going to give up. “Let’s not fool ourselves,” he said, and continued, “Turkey is an
old and big ship. You cannot change its course without hitting something.” His metaphor was a
direct reference to Şişman’s ship metaphor. He was also referencing debates about Turkey’s shift
in foreign policy and whether it was getting closer to Russia and distancing itself from the
Atlantic Alliance. Türkeş went on:
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Whether you like it or not, we are a medium-sized power, in terms of our global political
and economic power. Medium-sized powers getting carried away with large-sized
aspirations is a recipe for disaster. You cannot sharply change the course of a big ship;
you either damage one side or, worse, lose it. You’re saying you want to lead a
civilization that you think has existed before. It’s not that easy. Yes, a new polarization, a
new struggle for hegemony is taking place, and some may think this provides an
opportunity to shape the rules of the game. But this is not easy. Such an attempt would
come at a heavy price, and that price is war. Think of Iran. Does it have military power
equal to the US? No, it does not. Does Turkey have that? If you think yes, you’re fooling
yourself. There is a relationship of dependence in terms of military technology. We have
to develop that, and it’s impossible. We have to carefully consider the price we might
have to pay for an overly ambitious foreign policy. Remember the old saying, “you might
end up losing the bulgur you already have at home as you head to Damietta to buy rice.”
In the following section, I move away from contemporary debates to history and examine
the aftermath of World War I from the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne to the Mosul Question.
The historical analysis places Turkey as a territorial nation-state “within and against the wider
historical-geographical field of its emergence” (Goswami 2004: 6). I examine this by focusing on
the ways in which the geological features of the disputed topographies were utilized for
territorial claims. Examining this historical moment also reveals the emergence of—or a new
framing of—the Kurdish question for the new Republic of Turkey and its entanglement with oil
and geology. Finally, the following pages point to the ongoing haunting of these historical
processes and the political and territorial ontologies they brought into being.

Aftermaths of the Great War
The Ottoman Empire’s involvement in World War I ended with tragedy. As per the conditions of
the Armistice of Mudros in 1918, the Ottomans surrendered their garrisons outside Anatolia and
granted the Allies the right to occupy forts controlling the Straits of the Dardanelles and
the Bosporus, including the right to do so “in case of disorder” in any Ottoman territory in the
event of a threat to their security. The Ottoman army was demobilized, and all ports, railways,
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and other strategic points were opened to the use of the Allied forces. The armistice was
followed by the occupation of Istanbul by British, French, and Italian armies.
On August 10, 1920, the Ottoman Empire signed the notorious Treaty of Sèvres, the
equivalent of the Treaty of Versailles and other peace treaties signed in the aftermath of World
War I. Yet the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres seemed far more severe than those imposed on the
German Empire and other Central Powers, due mainly to the “crimes against humanity” that the
Ottoman Empire had committed during the war.40 The wartime crimes committed by the CUP
(Committee of Union and Progress) against Ottoman-Armenians was the central concern for the
Allied Powers. Leaving the Ottoman Empire, in Zurcher’s (2017) words, “only a rump state in
northern Asia Minor with Istanbul as its capital,” (147) Sèvres enabled the occupation and
partitioning of Anatolia by British, Greek, French, and Italian forces.41 The treaty was perceived
as a document of total annihilation imposed upon the defeated empire by the Allied powers for
most of the officers and civilians that had fought in the war.
Ottoman army officers who had first fought against the collapse of the empire prior to
World War I and then against the Allied powers in Gallipoli, Dardanelles, and elsewhere refused
to recognize Sèvres, while peoples’ movements and resistance grew in Anatolia, against the
occupation of western Anatolia by Greek forces backed by Britain to enforce the clauses of
40

Taner Akçam (1998; 2011) argues that the Allied Powers saw Anatolia’s partitioning as a punishment against the
massacres of Christian populations and especially the Armenian Genocide in 1915. Akçam also notes that the
national resistance movement did not deny these war crimes and was ready to pay reparations for them. However,
the Allied powers insisted on territorial partitioning as a punishment against crimes against humanity, which was
materialized in the form of Sèvres, forcing Mustafa Kemal, who initially called the Armenian Genocide “a shameful
act” to change his position radically following the treaty that promulgated the annihilation of Turkey (Akcam 2006).
41
Sèvres gave Eastern Thrace and the area around İzmir to Greece, foresaw the creation of an independent
Armenian republic in eastern Anatolia, enabled the establishment of French mandates Syria and Lebanon and a
sphere of influence in southern Anatolia. Britain established mandates in Palestine, southern Syria (now called
Transjordan) and Mesopotamia (Iraq), including the oil-rich province of Mosul. Italy received the southwestern part
of Asia Minor as a sphere of influence. Kurdistan to the north of the province of Mosul was left with the Ottoman
Empire but was to receive autonomy and the right to appeal for independence to the League of Nations within a
year.
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Sèvres. The command structure of the Ottoman Army—the Young Turk42 officers who had made
their careers over the previous 10 years—almost uniformly supported the resistance. They
sabotaged the disarming and demobilization of their troops and secretly supplied the regional
resistance organizations with arms and ammunition. Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the grassroots
resistance that gathered around him slowly transformed regional organizations into one national
resistance movement, which designated Ankara as its central location.43
On January 28, 1920 the parliament in Istanbul adopted the National Pact, the resistance
movement’s official statement of aims throughout the War of Independence. Identifying the
territories of the empire that the new government was prepared to fight for and declaring
political, judiciary, and economic independence as the foundational principles of the new
government, the National Pact consisted of six articles and included a map that designated the
territories inhabited by Muslim Ottomans that “form an indivisible whole.” Specifically, it
claimed those territories that were still held by the Ottoman army in October 1918 when
Constantinople signed an armistice with the Allied powers. On Turkey’s southern border, this
line ran from north of Aleppo in present-day Syria to Kirkuk in present-day Iraq (See Figure 8).
The nationalist movement fought a struggle on two fronts. It simultaneously organized
the resistance in Anatolia against the occupying powers, mainly the British-backed Greek army,
while also fighting the monarchy in Istanbul, splitting with it and setting up Ankara as the capital
of the new governing body. After a two-year war, the Turkish nationalist army defeated the
British-backed Greek army, which had extended its zone of occupation over all of western and
northwestern Asia Minor and over Thrace. The war later became known as the “Turkish War of
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Young Turks was a political reform movement that defended the replacement of the Ottoman Empire's absolute
monarchy with a constitutional government.
43
Ankara was far enough from occupation and still at the head of a railway line directly linked to Istanbul.
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Independence” in nationalist historiography. The withdrawal of Greek forces in western Anatolia
and the success of the armed struggle and the new Ankara-based government led to the
annulment of Sèvres and paved the way to the Lausanne Conference in 1922 and 1923.

Lausanne Conference
At the Lausanne Conference, the Turkish side was represented by the chief negotiator İsmet
Pasha. As the victors of the war, the Allied powers interpreted Lausanne as a means to adjust the
terms of the Treaty of Sèvres to the new situation. The Turkish side, however, saw themselves as
the victors in a national independence war, and completely rejected the impositions of Sèvres
(Toprak 2013). For Toprak (2013) the Turkish side came to Lausanne with a maximalist
interpretation of the National Pact; had instructions to demand the inclusion of the district of
Alexandretta (İskenderun), the Syrian inland up to the Euphrates, the province of Mosul, and the
Aegean islands adjacent to the Anatolian coast in the new Turkey; and demanded a plebiscite for
Western Thrace (Zurcher 2017). As Zurcher argues, “the main problem remained the Allied
powers’ insistence on economic and judicial concessions in exchange for abolishing
capitulations,” as the “Turkish side refused anything that amounted to an infringement of the
complete sovereignty of the new Turkish state” (2017, 162).
After eight months of negotiating, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed on July 24, 1923,
with the Allied powers recognizing the sovereignty and independence of the new Republic of
Turkey. With Lausanne, Turkey’s borders—except for its southern borders— were designated in
correspondence with the National Pact. The treaty also abolished the notorious capitulations and
other economic restrictions and regimes of dependence. All attempts by the powers to establish
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supervision over the Turkish judicial system had failed, and all inhabitants of Turkey, including
foreigners, were now subject to Turkish courts. All wartime reparation claims were renounced.
Following the signing of the treaty, the Entente immediately began withdrawing its occupying
forces. On October 1, 1923, the last British troops left Istanbul.
Historians of Turkey interpreted Lausanne as a “great and historical bargain” (Akşin
2007, 210) and a diplomatic victory that was exercised in equal terms, something that was very
different from what the defeated parties in the treaties of Sèvres or Versailles had faced (Toprak
2013). Following the success of the armed struggle in Anatolia, Turkey reentered peace
negotiations as a victor and on equal terms with the Allied powers. As a replay of the peace
treaties of World War I, the Treaty of Lausanne replaced the severe conditions of Sèvres after an
armed struggle in Anatolia and granted a dignified status to Turkey—something that Germany or
other defeated parties of World War I did not have. Lausanne installed a long-lasting regime of
peace to Turkey and the region and remained in place during World War II, the Cold War, and
the present. According to historians of Turkey, the success of the treaty—the equal conditions
upon which it was signed and its peace-making and sustaining character—were among the main
reasons Turkey would be able to avoid having to enter World War II, making Lausanne the only
treaty that laid the groundwork for a political system that dates back to the first quarter of 20th
century (Toprak 2013).
Following the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey emerged as a fully sovereign state recognized
by international states.44 While Anatolia and eastern Thrace became part of the new state,
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Following the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey also formally accepted the loss of Cyprus (which was leased to the
British Empire following the Congress of Berlin in 1878, but de jure remained an Ottoman territory until World War
I) as well as Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (which were occupied by British forces with the pretext of "putting
down the Urabi Revolt and restoring order" in 1882, but de jure remained Ottoman territories until World War I) to
the British Empire, which had unilaterally annexed them on November 5, 1914.
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Kurdistan and Armenia did not attain a political-legal status. In contrast to the Treaty of Sèvres,
the Treaty of Lausanne abandoned Kurdish demands for self-determination. This not only
sidestepped Turkey’s “Eastern Question” but exacerbated it and allowed for it to carry over to
the Republic of Turkey. The Turkish territorial demands that had been crystallized in National
Pact were almost completely realized through the Treaty of Lausanne. One exception was the
province of Mosul (which was included in the National Pact and that Turkey had claimed but
Britain occupied) remained part of Iraq pending a decision by the League of Nations.
In the next section, I overview Turkey and Britain’s claims over the disputed territory of
the Mosul Province, detailing the ways in which political-legal claims were attempted to be put
forward through constant references to geographical and geological attributes of the region.

Geology Made Destiny
Following Lausanne, the political fate of Mosul was left to the League of Nations. Although
Turkey pushed for a plebiscite to determine Mosul’s views, the British rejected the proposal,
claiming that the residents of Mosul were not educated enough to decide on their best interests.
When the parties could not agree over Mosul’s status, the issue was submitted to the League of
Nations in Geneva, of which Turkey was not yet a member. A commission appointed by the
League decided instead to travel to the province to evaluate the best resolution for the dispute.
To lay claim to the status of Mosul, whose residents, like other Ottoman communities, had
belonged to multiple groups simultaneously—identifying by family, location, occupation and
faith—, each of the parties attempted to justify their claims to the province through multiple
themes: ethnographic, climatic, historical, political, legal, geographical, and strategic. This
section will examine the geographical-geological and other environmental arguments through

71

which Turkish and British claims were made and analyzed in a 1925 report by a League of
Nations commission to be submitted to the Council who would make the final decision.
The Kurdish population of the region was used by both sides in order to improve their
arguments. In order to back its claims over demographic and ethnic terms, Turkey attempted to
prove that Mosul was ethnically Turkish and Kurdish, who were argued to be of Turanian45
descent and, thus, ethnically related to Turks. In 1926, H. I. Lloyd noted, “The Turkish
government declared that the whole of Mosul province was Turkish in blood and sentiment, and
if not Turkish was at any rate not Arab” (Lloyd 1926, 104). Britain on the other hand, argued that
Mosul was mainly composed of Kurds and Arabs, maintaining that “the Turks, who live in
Mesopotamia, form a vanishing minority” and that the “majority of the population wants to
separate from Turkey and to join the State of Iraq” (Elbe 2018, 235).
This moment marked one of the first times that the thesis that “Kurds were from another
branch of the Central Asian Turks, and therefore they were indeed Turks” was voiced publicly.
This idea of “sameness” was officially systemized for the first time during the discussions in the
Turkish National Assembly within the framework of preparations for the London Conference
that gathered to discuss the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres in 1921 (Içduygu and Kaygusuz
2004). Talks on Mosul became another international platform upon which these claims were
voiced and supported by supposedly scientific and historical arguments. During debates over
Mosul, Turkey also appealed to historical arguments about the Ottoman past and argued that
Mosul had been a Turkish property for 1,100 years and that the long political affiliation of the
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Turan (Turan Depression or Turanian Basin) is a geographical-historical region in Central Asia, stretching from
present Turkmenistan through Kazakhstan. Turkish nationalist theses state that Turkish people, among other people,
have descended from the Turan region. Pan-Turanists, for example, believe in the racial unity of the Ural-Altaic
peoples, such as Turks, Finns, Hungarians, Mongolians. Up until very recently, some nationalist theses in Turkey
have claimed that Kurdish people are also of Turanian origin, thus Turkish, in order to delegitimize Kurdish claims
of nationhood, autonomy, and cultural rights.
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region with Turkey, existing economic and political ties, and the desire of the inhabitants of the
region proved the “maintenance of the state of unity” with Turkey:
The Kurds are race-related to the Turks; both are of Turanian descent. Also, from the
point of view of religion and custom, both tribes form solid national unity [ . . .] Between
the Mesopotamian Kurds and the Turks of Asia Minor [ . . .] there is a centuries-old sense
of closest political togetherness, based on the commonality of race, religion and culture.
Contemporary Turkey is a nation-state of Kurds and Turks. (Elbe 2018, 237)
The diplomatic battle for Mosul’s status was waged through geographical and geological
observations and claims. As Sarah Shields states, linguistic and ethnic diversity had
characterized the Mosul vilayet (province) for centuries; its people reflected Mosul’s location as
a geographic transition zone and an economic distribution center characterized by “fluidity and
mobility” allowing “Ottoman populations to circulate, to carry out trade, to create connections
across the vast empire” (Shields 2009, 216). This “fluidity” also pertained to the geography and
geology of the region and this attempt to designate a territorial boundary required the enactment
of difference—geographical and geological frontiers, unconformities, and divisions out of a fluid
space.
Turkish arguments, for example, claimed that Mosul was geographically not part of
Arabic Iraq, but rather formed part of Upper Mesopotamia. According to the same argument,
Mosul and southern Iraq were climatically diverse landscapes while, conversely, the Mosul
region had the same climatic conditions and geological formations as Anatolia. To the south,
Turkey asserted, Mosul was closed by the hills of Djebel Hamrin against Arab Iraq. The political
boundary had to adapt to this natural geographical boundary. It was also argued that Mosul was
most closely associated with Anatolia and the ports of the Mediterranean Sea, which were in
possession of the Republic of Turkey (League of Nations 1925).
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The British argued that geographically, Mosul was “sharply separated” from Turkey by
high mountains. Describing in detail the importance of downstream trade routes that in Mosul,
the British argued that direct trade between Turkey and the Mosul region was insignificant.
Further, it was asserted while that Mosul had secure connections with cities in the south of
Mesopotamia during all seasons, it was completely cut-off from Anatolian Turkey in the winter.
In this argumentation, geography figured prominently in the formation of many “natural”
boundaries, which had to be adhered to Economically Mosul was claimed to have “every
affiliation with Iraq and almost none with Turkey,” since the high “mountains make trading
between the two countries extremely difficult” (League of Nations 1925). With Iraq and Syria,
however, the trade route connections of Mosul were “exceptionally easy” (ibid.). According to
British claims, “the northern border of the Mosul region, with its high, inaccessible and difficult
to pass mountains, form[ed] a natural and easily monitored strategic border for the State of Iraq”
(Elbe 2008, 236). “These mountains gradually slope down over plains to the desert which
separates it from Syria,” it was claimed. Thus, “the geo-graphical relationship between Iraq and
Mosul” was an “obvious and an ideal one” (ibid.).
Further, describing the Ottoman rule as a “centuries-long foreign domination over
Mesopotamia,” the British cast Mosul as Mesopotamian rather than Anatolian and depicted
Ottoman rule as a deviant occupation that disrupted the natural-cultural history of the region.
Major H. I. Lloyd, a British administrative inspector, made a case for Mosul’s inclusion in Iraq
in his geographical study of Mosul in a 1926 Geographical Journal article, stating that it is "well
known to all who have traveled in that area, the province of Mosul is an integral part of ’Iraq
[…]” (Lloyd 1926, 104). In response to these claims, Turkish Government argued that,
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from the topographical and climatological points of view, the line of separation between
Anatolia and Iraq is the line of the Diala (river), Jebel Hamrin, Jebel Makhul (Jebel
Fuhul), Wadi Tartar, Jebel Sinjar . . . To the north of this line the Vilayet of Mosul offers
climatic and other conditions and geological formations identical with those of Anatolia,
whereas the Vilayet of Baghdad is entirely different from that of Mosul and also from
Anatolia. The line possesses all the advantages which the line proposed in the British
Government’s reply lacks. (League of Nations 1925, 21)
The British memorandum criticized the frontier proposed by the Turkish Government and
described the Jebel Hamrin and its continuation, the Jebel Makhul, as “an insignificant range of
hills of little importance as a barrier. Not a great range of mountains but merely a series of
rolling downs (dunes).” To this the Turkish Government replied, “The mountain chains referred
to above are not, as the British memorandum states, a series of downs (dunes). On the contrary,
they form one continuous line of heights in an otherwise flat country and are consequently an
obstacle difficult to cross” (ibid., 22). In relation to the debates around mountains, Lloyd quoted
the League of Nations Frontier Commission’s geological observations:
Geologically the whole vilayat belongs to the mountain system which borders Iran on the
south-west —a system which is generally called by the collective name Zagros. It
occupies a part of the south-western slopes of this chain, composed of Cretaceous rocks
and particularly nummulithic calcareous formations and a part of their foothills, that
characteristic gypsum formation which begins at Jazirat-ibn-Omar and extends probably
as far as Baluchistan or even farther. This formation extends towards the west and the
south at any rate as far as the Euphrates, but here it is mostly alluvia. The tectonic of the
high mountains to the north of Mosul is very complicated: igneous rocks, serpentine,
crystalline schists, up to the Eocene of the chains coming from the south-west. None of
this has anything to do with the neogen plain of Mesopotamia formed by slightly
undulating strata. (Lloyd 1926, 106–107)
Climatic arguments were also crucial in determining the boundaries of Turkey and Iraq and as to
which one Mosul belonged:
The winter cold is intense, and throughout the mountainous parts of the country fairly
abundant rains fall. It also has the characteristics of 'Iraq, the great heat in summer,
increased as it is the case of the surrounding desert by the highly continental character of
the country. The annual thermic range is Baghdad 24.3 C, Mosul 27.1 C, Diarbekir 31.8
C. The great extremes often produce and disastrous effect on vegetation. North of Kirkuk
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and Tekrit, the date palm does not grow. The Mosul country with its semi-desert pastures
on the West of the Tigris, with its better-watered and consequently more fertile clayey
plains on the east, and the circle of hills and mountains surrounding it, is an area of
transition, or combination of the climatic areas of the Zagros mountains, lower
Mesopotamia, the Syro-Arabian desert, and the southern slopes of the Armenian Taurus
—a district which even possesses certain of the characteristics of the Mediterranean
climate. Its principal feature is the contrast between great aridity in summer and a clearly
defined rain season in the late winter and spring. (Lloyd 1926, 107)
Following “geological and geographic observations” (ibid., 13) conducted by the League of
Nations commission, in September 1925, the League favored the inclusion of Mosul in Iraq, a
decision Turkey formally acquiesced in June 1926. In return, Turkey agreed to receive 10
percent of the province’s oil revenues over the next 25 years. The League of Nations commission
stated that the mountainous frontier between Turkey and Mosul was an ideal strategic boundary
and that the line drawn by the British, which is farther north than the temporary Brussels Line,
would make an excellent protective boundary but they thought that the Brussels Line, although
giving less territory to Iraq, would be an equally effective frontier (League of Nations 1925, 86).
So far, this chapter has examined geopolitical debates in Turkey, Turkey’s expansionist
politics in the Middle East, its military interventions in Mosul, and conspiracy theories about the
Treaty of Lausanne. I focused on how despite seeming to be grounded in the notion that
geography and geology are naturally linked to politics and power, proponents of expansionism
and neo-Ottomanist revisionism in Turkey turn this kind of environmental determinism upside
down and insert the inherent malleability of political territories and boundaries. Going back to
the discussions around Mosul before 1926, I have also shown how geological and geographical
arguments were used to make territorial claims and asserted that the final League of Nations
report provided space for arguments on both sides and, in its evaluation, reflected a deep
ambivalence about the “fate” of Mosul despite its official decision favoring the British claims.
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The report’s contradictions and ambivalences point to the fluidity of geological formations and
the difficulty of forging naturalized arguments for territorial claims out of them.
In the final section of this chapter, I examine the uncertainties intrinsic to petroleum
geology and geological matter. I argue that geological uncertainty and indeterminacy are a
primary force behind conspiracy theories and speculation over the Treaty of Lausanne in Turkey
today. In the following pages, I go back to the symposium in Adıyaman, to a talk on the
petroleum potential of “southeastern Anatolia” given by the exploration geologist Ismail Bey.
This section tackles the theory of plate tectonics mentioned in the Introduction and once again
examines geologists’ discussions on how the geology of southeastern Turkey makes petroleum
exploration very difficult compared to other sites in the world, in addition to the intrinsic
indeterminacies embedded in petroleum exploration. Examining the tensions, unknowabilities,
and uncertainties that are generated in petroleum geology and exploration in Turkey, the
following pages link the conspiracy theories over the expiration of the Treaty of Lausanne and
speculation with uncertainty in geology and the indeterminacy of the forces of the earth. Finally,
I suggest a link between the fragility and malleability attributed to territories and histories of
political agreements and geological uncertainties and indeterminacies. I argue that it is at this
nexus of history, territory, and geology that the AKP and its supporters generate expansionist
politics.
The Black Cat: Petroleum Exploration and Geological Indeterminacy
Ismail Bey was the first speaker of the second day of the symposium, at the conveniently titled
panel, “The Future of Exploration and Production Fields in Southeastern Anatolia.” Ismail Bey
started his talk with a question:
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Why does Turkey lack oil when its neighbors have the largest reserves in the world?
That’s the question I always hear; a question people always ask me when they learn what
my occupation is. I’m sure other geologists and engineers in the room are also familiar
with it.
Even I was familiar with the question. Whenever I mentioned my research to someone in Ankara
or Istanbul—where oil extraction and production is not as present as it is in the cities of
Kurdistan such as Adıyaman, Batman, or Diyarbakır—I would always get the same response:
“Are the rumors about 2023 true?” I would ask them which rumors they were talking about.
“Don’t you know? In 2023, the Treaty of Lausanne expires, and we’ll finally be able to extract
our oil below the ground.” Sometimes I would counter them by saying “As far as I know, the
Treaty of Lausanne does not have an expiration date.” My words were often met with laughter.
“Of course, none of the official sources will tell you that. There are secret clauses in the treaty.
And you can’t find them, because they’re secret!” This was an unwinnable fight for me. Ismail
Bey continued, “Well, their question is not irrelevant, but I usually answer their question with
another question: How do you find a black cat in a dark room? This is what exploring oil in
Turkey is like.”
Some people from the audience laughed, while some raised their eyebrows with a
performance of nuisance. Well, of course, we have some hydrocarbon reserves—about 270
million barrels of proven oil reserves—but they are minor in comparison to OPEC countries,
which border us in the southeast,” Ismail Bey said. Two young men, petroleum geologists from
Ankara, who were sitting in my right smirked. “Not exactly Iraq, huh?” said one of them. “There
are a couple of reasons why Turkey relatively lacks hydrocarbon reserves,” Ismail Bey
continued. “I will explain in a bit for our non-geologist friends in the room. Due to these
complex geological realities, Turkey has some of the smallest and most difficult-to-locate
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oilfields in the world. They’re scattered all around the subsoil. The underground is so fractured,
so complex, and full of surprises here, in the Southeast. This means good and bad surprises.
Because of oil these qualities, the chances that you are not going to find oil is almost 90 percent
in some places.” In the remainder of his talk, he listed the billions-year-old geological realities
that had caused these formations. He also noted that the economic realities of the present: oil
prices were too low nowadays, which made oil exploration less economically viable. And,
finally, there were security issues; there was a war going to between the Turkish state and the
PKK. He did not say it exactly like that, but everyone understood when he mentioned “security
issues.” “In sum,” he said, “if you are a geologist in the southeastern Anatolia region, and if you
have been successful, you will be a star anywhere else.” The whole room burst into laughter.
In this section, I am interested in the ways in which these “difficulties”—especially those
derived from gaps in knowledge—are entangled with conspiracy theories about Lausanne. There
were various theories about what will happen in 2023 once the Treaty of Lausanne would
supposedly expire, rendering Turkey’s modern borders obsolete. Origins of the theory were
unknown but seemed to have started in 2012, when the rector of the University of Thrace in
Edirne sparked a heated debate when he stated, “2023 has become a buzzword nowadays, but we
must keep in mind that 2023 will mark the expiration of the Treaty of Lausanne, and we must all
unite to protect our republic.” He was talking at an event on the 89th anniversary of the Treaty of
Lausanne. Since then, rumor has slowly grown into full-blown myth, finding its way into even
the most serious TV talk shows and newspaper columns. On Mirrors of History, a program
airing on Show TV in early 2017, a guest speaker identified as an “history expert” told a story
that had allegedly taken place right after the signing of the treaty: “After signing the Treaty of
Lausanne,” he spoke in a bold, confident voice, “İnönü leaves the room, has a big sigh of relief,
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and declares, ‘We have earned another hundred years.’” For the speaker, this story proved that
Lausanne would expire on its 100th anniversary and that the Republic of Turkey in 2023 was just
a “temporary state.” After 2023, its future would be wide open. For those with fantasies of
territorial expansion, the treaty did not have an expiration date. Like all treaties, it would become
obsolete if one of the parties rejected it—or if war were declared. In fact, almost all of the
political treaties that shaped the Middle East had been undone in the post-Cold war period. The
infamous Sykes-Picot Agreement, which carved out Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel, for
instance, has been completely undone in the past decades. Why not Lausanne as well? This was
the subtext of the TV debates, newspaper columns, daily conversations, panel talks, and
politicians’ speeches in 2016 and 2017.
According to this speculation, with the expiration of Lausanne, Turkey would gain full
and total sovereignty over its underground resources. For neo-Ottomanists, the end of Lausanne
marked a golden opportunity to reify the pre-World War I borders of the Ottoman Empire and
the emergence of the modern Turkish Republic. For them, “the valuable and prolific oil reserves
in Turkey’s southern and southeastern provinces had been already documented by Sultan
Abdulhamid,” but Lausanne had banned them from exploiting them (Derin Tarih, 2016). When
Turkey would finally be “freed from Lausanne’s constraining articles, it would want to follow
the footsteps of the Ottomans.” For those with a different ideology, it would lead to Turkey’s
embracing of a Turanist policy, since Turkey would “gather Middle Asian Turkic states under its
leadership and become a world leader.”
The debates about Mosul and the speculation over the expiration of the Treaty of
Lausanne caused public upheaval in 2016 and 2017. Almost every day, prominent historians
rushed to TV programs to persuade the public that the agreement did not in fact have an
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expiration date and that opening the agreement up for discussion would be “extremely dangerous
for Turkey.” Historians, columnists, and other experts wrote “Lausanne is the title deed of the
Republic of Turkey,” implying that discussing Lausanne also meant putting the Turkish state’s
sovereignty on the table—a “highly dangerous act.” Erdoğan’s remarks and debates regarding
Lausanne even reached beyond Turkey’s borders. An October 2016 article in Foreign Policy
with the title “Turkey’s New Maps are Reclaiming the Ottoman Empire” criticized the Turkish
nationalist media’s “irredentist cartography and rhetoric” (Danforth 2016). Finally, in 2019,
polling company Konda reported that every 48 out of 100 people in Turkey believed that the
Treaty of Lausanne would expire in 2023. A tweet about Konda’s findings went viral, as users
interpreted this as the ignorance and idiocy of the government sympathizers in the face of
scientific and historical evidence that showed the truth: that Lausanne had no expiration date
(Gurses 2019).
Geologists reacted similarly to theories about Turkey’s hidden oil resources. TP’s and
MTA’s websites devoted pages to explaining the mechanisms of plate tectonics to the publics,
that Turkey was sitting on a tectonic collision zone, and why despite neighboring rich oilfields,
Turkey had relatively poor oil resources, using rich graphics, theories, and academic citations.
But more than the inability of scientists and experts to “persuade” publics about scientific facts
or ignorant publics that refuse to accept them, these instances have pointed to the ways in which
matters of fact and “matters of concern” do not always match (Latour 2004). The also implied
that ignorance is also a productive component of power, rather than the opposite of knowledge
(Anand 2015).
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Uncertainty, Indeterminacy, Secrecy
Anthropologists have examined how future risk has been capitalized upon in the present.
Following approaches on risk societies (Beck 1992; Giddens 1991), limitations of technocratic
knowledge (Latour 1996; Mitchell 2002), and the governance of risk as a technology of power
(Foucault 1991), scholars have examined how contemporary worlds of investment, security, and
environmental crisis go hand in hand with increased attention on the future as a site of
preemption, precaution, or preparedness (Anderson 2010; Cooper 2006, 2010; Grove 2012;
Lakoff 2007; Masco 2014). Adams et al. (2009) argue that these “regimes of anticipation” work
to legitimize and enable governmental, economic, environmental or medical interventions in the
present through a sense of urgency and a proliferation of threatening or promissory futures
(Amoore 2013; Massumi 2007, 2009; Riles 2000). In these works, there has been a gradual shift
from the avoidance or management of risk to the active productive of uncertainty, especially in
relation to industrial and infrastructural projects, environmental hazards, and toxicity.
Uncertainty’s relationship to epistemological politics is illustrated by Whitington (2019), who
argues that uncertainty “is not the opposite of knowledge but a constitutive relationship that
acknowledges the role and value of knowledge to projects of living” (6). In his ethnography of
the limits of expertise in the Lao hydropower industry, Whitington also points to the difference
between risk and uncertainty, being that risk is about epistemological concerns while uncertainty
is about ontological ones. He argues that risk politics
hinged on an epistemological dilemma and was preoccupied with how to make socially
valid decisions when safety could not be guaranteed. [ . . .] By contrast, the ontological
politics of uncertainty is characterized by powerful actors who strategically produce
uncertainty (for instance, by undermining scientific truth claims); by deep-seated
disinvestment in knowledge infrastructures; by uncertainty as “built in” to ecological
relations themselves (rather than as only a discursive or epistemic problem); and by the
destabilized temporalities of anthropogenic natures, infrastructures, and knowledges (in
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which people are obliged to speculate on dangerous futures or attend to the latent effects
of the industrial past). (Whitington 2019, ix–x)
Thus, Whitington argues that there is a movement from “discursive construction of authoritative
knowledge or expertise” to the “active production of uncertainty” (6) and “… a shift from the
comparatively discourse-centric risk politics of the 1980s and 1990s to what we can call an
ontological politics of uncertainty” (ix) in contemporary politics. With uneven distribution and
consequences entangled with capital and state interests, the “manufacturing” of uncertainty is
linked to what counts as truth and fact, how things and people are rendered “toxic” or “sick,”
who is deemed culpable, and which bodies are cared for (see also Murphy 2006; Petryna 2002;
Michaels 2008; Markowitz and Rosner 2002; Kirsch 2014; Conway and Oreskes 2010; Sawyer
2015). Whitington notes that “unlike risk in the sense of social distribution of probabilities, such
as with insurance, uncertainty is qualitative rather than quantitative” and “uncertainty takes form
as threat and opportunity, promises, fears, and aspirations” (Whitington 2019, 6–7).
The interplay between uncertainty and expertise is clearly apparent in oil politics and
poetics. Examining the projections and prognoses of depletion calculations and reports of oil
reserves in Oman, Limbert (2015) points to the co-presence of increased enhanced technologies
of accuracy and an increased sense of disbelief. The prolonged horizon of oil depletion in Oman
is deferred once again with more accurate scientific calculations and enhanced engineering
techniques, “increased transparency has produced increased disbelief, rather than a sense of
respect for precision, in the geological sciences and faith in the institutions and individuals that
report them” (2015, 345). Limbert notes that as oil projections are meant to become more
accurate and transparent, they simultaneously become more opaque and less trustworthy.
In another account, writing about “the indeterminacy at the heart of petroleum
production,” Weszkalnys (2015) describes the uncertain phenomenon of “first oil” in São Tomé
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and Príncipe (STP), as generative of “pauses and gestures” of prospective oil in the face of
uncertain futures. As Weszkalnys states, “First oil is a protracted and precarious achievement
based on a speculative epistemology and reliant on specific technical, legal, and commercial
practices and devices with surprisingly incongruous effects” (2015, 612). Commenting on the
pre-extraction moment of oil’s indeterminacy in STP, Weszkalnys notes,
It is a moment when stuff, not yet extracted and largely cut off from human interference,
finds its many possible modes of being (including its geochemical versatility, highenergy density, and ready transubstantiation into monetary form) already anticipated by
social practice. This is not to essentialize the geologic matter. It is to distinguish the
expansive moment of first oil from discovery or invention as a moment of transformation
(Harman 2010). (Weszkalnys 2015, 633)
Here, it is important to draw attention to the difference between uncertainty and indeterminacy
that Karen Barad (2007) alludes to in her work with the epistemology of physicist Niels Bohr.
Barad argues that technologies of measurement are not independent of but rather part of the
phenomena they seek to understand. Barad, thus, moves from epistemological concerns to
ontological ones, arguing that in quantum mechanics, what is at stake is not that researchers are
uncertain about the nature of nature (an epistemological state) but that the nature of nature is
indeterminate (an ontological state) (Schrader 2010). Barad’s insights have been taken up by
anthropologies of toxicity and environment (Choy 2005; Murphy 2006), which point to the
complex entanglements between humans, bodies, politics, technoscientific assemblages,
chemicals, and non-human animals and the ontological indeterminacy of toxicity in these
relationships and the “excess of ecological events” (Whitington 2019, 19). In petroleum
exploration and geology in Turkey, there is an interplay between epistemological uncertainties
and ontological indeterminacies. A short encounter with Ismail Bey illustrates this point.
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The first day I met with Ismail Bey at his office in Ankara on August 2016, he
complained about the countless letters about “oil evidence” he receives from “random citizens”
every year. “Oil seeps are not indications of oil reserves,” he told me, before talking about the
intricate conditions that allow for oil reservoirs to exist underground:
There should first be a seal rock that traps oil and gas in, prevents oil from exiting the
reservoir rock, and allows it to accumulate. Next, there should be a reservoir rock, a
porous and permeable rock that has small pockets within it where oil can settle. Finally,
we need a source rock, a structure that is different in density, so that oil and gas can settle
above it. Oh, and there should also be migration patterns between them.
He raised his eyebrows. “So, as you can see, all of these factors have to be there in order for oil
to be present under the ground. And even if they are there, we might not be able to find the oil!”
he added, leading me towards a tiny illustration hanging in the corner of his office. “I love this
image. It’s an inside joke between us geologists. It captures the indeterminacy inherent to our
vocation.” I leaned towards the wall to see the tiny black-and-white drawing hung beside
geological maps of various regions of Anatolia.
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Figure 17 "Nobody's Perfect" Illustration at Ismail Bey's office wall. Author photo.

This little image contained all the geological conditions Ismail Bey had just mentioned,
but—just like southeast Turkey’s geology—the structure of the subterranean landscape was so
fractured, faulted, and folded that oil traps were distributed in uneven fragments. Here were the
events that would lead to the tragic outcome: despite the abundance of oil under the ground,
geologists and geophysicists’ interpretations fell short, since they had drilled down into the
wrong spot—perhaps the only spot that contained no oil. “$10 million, poof! But nobody’s
perfect after all, huh?” smiled Ismail Bey. For him, this image revealed that interpretation was
always subject to indeterminacy when it came to petroleum geology. For me, it also implied that
there was always a space of non-knowledge at the limits of the evidence that geologists collect
through their tools of mediation and representation. This gap, this space of non-knowledge, is
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sometimes coded as “risk” in technical language. Constantly faced with these gaps in knowledge
and the inability of its mediating tools to fully represent the underground, geology owns up to its
affordances and calls its practice “interpretation.” This is linked to why Frodeman (1995) argues
that geology is an interpretative and historical science. Geologists and geophysicists like Ismail
Bey are the first one to accept this. Despite “technological advances” or brand new seismic or
modeling methods, the subsoil, its nature, workings, and history could not be fully known. And it
was not because the subsoil related to some kind of transcendence accessible only to God. The
subsoil, geo, or earth, for Ismail Bey and other geologists met, was framed in secular but
romantic ways, as having a material reality beyond human or technological attempts to grasp it.

Figure 18 Ismail Bey discussing exploration geology. Author photo.
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As Ismail Bey noted, “Finding a black cat in a dark room is extremely difficult and
characterized with uncertainties, conflicting interpretations, and constant speculation. But there
is also an ontological indeterminacy that is related to the “inherent excess of the earth” (Clark
2011, xxii). These forms of unknowability and uncertainty in geological science, and the
indeterminacy embedded in the forces of the earth are entangled with territorial and political
uncertainties, malleability, and aspirations in Turkey today. Contemporary forms of expansionist
and irredentist policies, energy sovereignty politics, and oil-related conspiracy theories are
generated through this relationship.
Conclusion
Starting with the widely shared statement that “geology is destiny” and geopolitical-determinist
narratives shared by pro-AKP circles in Turkey today, this chapter analyzed how contemporary
geopolitical debates and politics in Turkey reconfigured territorial pasts and imagined new
territorial futures through neo-Ottomanist, expansionist, and irredentist politics in the Middle
East. I argued that these irredentist notions of territorial expansion, which go hand in hand with
speculation and conspiracy theories about oil, are grounded in and incited by the nexus of two
registers of political-historical and geological-ontological indeterminacy. “2023” imaginaries and
aspirations of geopolitical power and oil wealth are linked to historical formations about territory
and sovereignty, which have deep-seated roots in the aftermath of World War I and the collapse
of the Ottoman Empire. Contemporary expansionist politics look back to this historical moment
and imagine a future of territorial sovereignty and geopolitical power during a moment of crisis
and war in the Middle East, at a time when the global hegemony of the US is believed to be
waning. Arguing that irredentist politics, or political ontologies, are intimately linked to
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historical formations, this chapter has shown how the post-World War I moment has been crucial
in revealing the fragility and malleability of territorial boundaries and political borders. The
Ottoman Empire’s defeat in World War I and its subsequent dissolution was followed by the
threat of total political annihilation, signified by the Treaty of Sèvres. And this treaty—
experienced in traumatic terms and perceived as a threat to the existence of Turkey—and the
political events that followed, shaped the political ontology and geopolitical imaginaries of the
Republic of Turkey in the following years, adorning them with a perpetual state of alarmism and
exceptionalism as a response to perceived existential threat from internal and external enemies.
Tracing the historical processes through which Turkey’s modern borders in Anatolia
were formed through the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 and debates around geology that led to the
placement of Mosul in Iraq, I examined how territorial formations emerged through geological
claims and uncertainties, and the fluidity of geophysical topography, which complicated legal
and political frameworks of territorialization. Taken together, these epistemological uncertainties
and ontological indeterminacies embedded in geological knowledge production and geological
matter fuel a constant sense of hope and disappointment that is projected onto the future, which
is appropriated by the AKP government as expansionist foreign policy and populist nationalist
discourses that revolve around oil. Brought together with geological uncertainty, these politics
produce the possibilities that not only rearticulate the past but also to imagine alternative
geopolitical futures and aspirations to redesign territorial and political arrangements in the
Middle East. The political actors examined in this chapter attempt to shape geology and their
own destinies at the same time, amidst the uncertainty and indeterminacy of political and
geological worlds.
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The following chapters develop many of the themes discussed in this chapter. Questions
about Turkey’s foreign policy, its relationship to imperialist and capitalist powers, and energy
and military sovereignty are examined through an analysis of debates among the Turkish left and
Kurdish left in relation to the privatization of TP and resource nationalism in Chapter 3 and in
relation to the Cyprus Issue and hydrocarbon resources in the eastern Mediterranean in Chapter
4. I end this chapter with a revelatory note from the history of the Mosul Question, which
connect to the themes of the next chapter.
Although present debates about Mosul’s “loss” revolve around whether the Turkish
committee succeeded or failed during Lausanne, Turkey’s very desire to annex Mosul is left out
of questioning. In these debates, it is assumed that the Turkish government wanted Mosul. Why
would any government not want more territory, especially if it is oil-rich? Yet, some sources
indicate that the Turkish committee in fact might not have wanted Mosul to be annexed to
Turkey. The reasons are related to the origins of the Kurdish Question. According to these
arguments, the Turkish government was concerned that the Kurdish population in Mosul and the
ongoing upheaval going on in the eyalet might further provoke the Kurds in the North, which
were already rebelling against the Turkish government at the time (Bora 2006; Içduygu and
Kaygusuz 2004; Shaw 2000). A talk Mustafa Kemal gave in İzmir, which coincided with the
Lausanne Conference, supports this point. In the talk, Mustafa Kemal mentioned the possible
negative effects of Mosul’s annexation to Turkey, noting the possibility of a Kurdish uprising
spreading to southeastern Anatolia (Perincek 1999, 95). Thus, with the Treaty of Lausanne,
Turkey’s aims were accomplished: keeping the territorial integrity of Anatolia while completely
eliminating Armenian and Kurdish claims and obtaining the maximum possible religious and
cultural homogeneity within these borders. Finally, this chapter has demonstrated that Turkey’s

90

official denial of Kurdish identity policy was developed through the debates over Mosul. This
policy of denial would shape the next decades of the Kurdish Question. Following the events
perceived by the founders of the Turkish nation-state as the traumatic dissolution of the Ottoman
Empire, loss of land, and foreign occupation, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, after which the
remaining land, Anatolia, was cast as the heartland of the nation, “a sculpted diamond that got
rid of its excess” (Sevük 1944, 70). But as the following chapters illustrate, this was a fragile
process that was constantly being destabilized by geological forces and the Kurdish Question.
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CHAPTER 2:
UNEVEN CONNECTIONS: SOCIO-MATERIAL RELATIONS AND
INFRASTRUCTURAL INDETERMIANCY IN TURKEY’S KURDISTAN

Introduction
On October 27, 2016, I met with Mehmet Tetik at the breakfast hall of the Kristal guesthouse of
TP’s (Turkish Petroleum’s) District Management campus in Batman. Kristal was a beautifully
refurbished building, less expensive yet more luxurious than most of the hotels in the city center.
TP’s campus Batman was frequently visited by politicians, business people, and local residents
of Batman for its restaurants and parks, which were opened to the public in the 2000s.

Figure 19 Kristal Park, Turkish Petroleum, Batman. Author photo.
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Mehmet Tetik was the Secretary General for Education and Organization at the Petroleum,
Chemical and Rubber Workers Union of Turkey (Petrol-İş). A 50-year-old Kurdish man,
Mehmet Tetik was born in a village near Batman and had worked at TP for years before
becoming a unionist. He now lived in Istanbul but frequently traveled to Batman and Ankara for
work. As we sipped from our glasses of black Turkish tea and took bites from our rich breakfast
plate—freshly baked bread, butter, tomatoes, black olives, sujuk, and fried eggs—, I realized that
my phone’s internet service was down. I could see the 3G symbol in the top left corner of the
screen, but none of my web browsers or applications seemed to be working. I restarted the
phone, but the problem persisted. Mehmet Tetik had the same issue, and we both assumed that
there had been a temporary problem with our service provider, Turkcell. We then tried to
connect to TP’s guest wireless network. Our phones seemed to be connected to the network, but
we were not able to go online. Suspicious, I called a friend in Istanbul, and she told me that her
connection was just fine. It seemed like there had been a total internet shutdown in southeast
Turkey only.
Mustafa and I assumed that the shutdown was directly related to what happened the night
before. The police had detained the co-mayors of Diyarbakır. A small army of police had
surrounded Diyarbakır’s town hall with armored vehicles and trucks loaded with water cannons.
Gültan Kışanak, a member of parliament before her election as mayor in Diyarbakır and the first
female mayor of the city, and Fırat Anlı, her co-mayor, had been taken into custody, charged
with supporting the PKK. Soon, new administrators or federally appointed “trustees” (kayyum)
close to Erdoğan and the ruling AKP would be appointed in the Diyarbakır municipality.
Kışanak was a member of the social democratic BDP (Peace and Democracy Party), a regional,
Kurdish, autonomous ally of HDP. Using emergency powers that had been in place since after
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the coup d’état attempt in July 2016, kayyums were installed in 82 HDP/DBP-run municipalities
in Turkey’s Kurdistan over the past months as the elected mayors had been removed due to
suspected ties to the PKK.46 HDP immediately reacted to detainments by releasing a statement
on Twitter: “Our peoples will not accept this, and they will exercise their democratic right to
protest. Against this attack that directly targets our will, we will exercise our democratic protest
right everywhere at 11:00. Resistance to tyranny is a right” (HDP 2016).
On the morning of Kışanak’s arrest, Mustafa Bey, himself an HDP/BDP supporter, like
many other Kurdish petroleum workers in Batman, hastily left Kristal to get in touch with the
HDP–Batman office. The current mayor of Batman was a member of HDP, and Petrol-İş had
close relationships with the party.
Everyday life in Batman was immobilized by the shutdown: credit card machines were
not working, so restaurants, shops, and markets were only accepting cash. Finding cash, though,
was also impossible because the shutdown had disabled ATMs and other banking activity. Mail
delivery had stopped, and pharmacies were unable to function because prescription systems
needed mobile internet infrastructure to work. When asked by an old man what was going on, a
young cashier, who seemed frustrated by the chaos at a grocery store in the city center’s famous
“Diyarbakır Street,” said that “Başkan has been detained,” with anger and pride. Başkan, or
“president,” “chairperson” in Turkish, was a nickname used to refer to Kışanak, given that
“Belediye Başkanı” means “mayor” or “president/chair of municipality” in Turkish. But the
word Başkan had so much more in it: an aura of respectability, charisma, and coolness. There
were a few attempts to protest what was going on, but the HDP building in Batman had been
barricaded by police and the elected mayor of Batman had already been removed in September.
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The state of emergency was extended for seven times and lasted for two years, from July 20, 2016 to July 18,
2018.
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Later that evening, I turned on the TV in my room, curious to see if the national media
would report what was going on. There was no mention of the shutdown. The state network
TRT’s news caption read: “HDP’s Hopes Shattered,” as the anchorwoman said, “After Kışanak’s
arrest, HDP called their electorate to take to the streets, but the people did not support the call.
Few people attended the protests in Istanbul and Diyarbakır.” The shutdown, it turns out, had
affected only southeastern Turkey, spanning from the provinces of Adıyaman to Van. This was a
regional shutdown, and the borders of that region were intentionally drawn. The shutdown would
continue for the next four days, affecting 6 million users, with no or little information from
government officials, who would later tell the press that the “outage was due to security
measures” (Hürriyet Daily News 2016). According to the constitution, the right to communicate
was not one of a non-derogable right, it could not be suspended under a state of emergency.
Turkey Blocks, an independent transparency project that validates reports of internet mass
censorship in Turkey, issued an incident report on October 27, stating that “scans detect 8
percent of Turkey's internet infrastructure to be unreachable” (Turkey Blocks 2016). The report
noted that:
Estimated 6 million citizens affected including those disconnected and others
experiencing related loss of service. Limited information coming from the region
indicates that banks and point-of-sale terminals have all been rendered inoperable due to
mobile and broadband internet shutdowns, with the incident ongoing as of early
afternoon. The blackout has affected both fixed and mobile internet operators, although
basic SMS and voice services remained usable. The incident bears similarities to
another internet blackout in the south earlier this year following the state’s removal of
elected officials in predominantly Kurdish regions of the country. (Turkey Blocks 2016)
In another report, Turkey Blocks stated that its analysts believed that the internet blackout was
implemented using Turkey’s new “kill switch” legislation, while the takeovers were justified
under Turkey’s OHAL (State of Emergency) measures, which suspended certain political and
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human rights following the July 15 attempted coup. Passed on June 11, 2016, the new
amendment could now “partially or entirely” suspend internet access due to war or national
security reasons (Resmi Gazete 2016).

Figure 20 Turkish Petroleum's Batman District Management Building. Author photo.

The next day at around noon, I visited Petrol-İş–Batman in their five-story concrete
building located next to TP’s District Management Campus. I sat with Mehmet Tetik and Baran,
a driver for TP. The internet shutdown was the talk of the hour. The purposefully regional
internet shutdown was experienced for Baran, Mehmet, and other Kurdish workers and
organizers as a manifestation of the already uneven relationship between the region they lived
and the western parts of Turkey. On top of histories of uneven development were practices of
“de-development” (Yadırgı 2017, xiii) and colonial violence. “The shutdown reveals how
terrified the state is,” Baran muttered. “But we’re used to mistreatment and discrimination here,
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right?” The shutdown also led to ironic outcomes, unintentionally contributing to the imaginary
of a counter-territory. “Which region is affected by the shutdown? It’s Kurdistan—the very
word they’re scared to death of.” Attempting to block Kurdish people’s right to protest and
communicate in a region it deemed unruly and whose partitioning from the homeland it feared,
the Turkish state’s suspension of communication not only showed the material and territorial
extent of state power but also brought Turkey’s Kurdistan into being as an alternative territorial
entity.47
Infrastructures have been central to the production of state power (Appel et al. 2015;
Harvey and Knox 2012), to promises of modernity and other temporal regimes, and to the
governance of relations between citizens, state, space, and non-humans. Technical systems
mediate social and political relations, shaping the very relationships they mediate (Hull 2012),
revealing the “recursive relation between the making of infrastructure and the shaping of
society” (Harvey, Jensen, and Morita 2017, 11). In conversation with Timothy Mitchell’s work
(2013), which depicts the relational processes through which oil infrastructures have shaped
political and social regimes, this chapter examines such relational processes that entangle
themselves with infrastructures and territories. I take oil infrastructures as central to the making
of uneven territories and counter-territories in Turkey. Finally, in conversation with Barry’s
(2017) work on the interference between infrastructural assemblages and the earth, this chapter
examines how the materiality of petroleum and the earth shape the relations between territorial
power and infrastructures and generates indeterminacy (Reeves 2017).48
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For an account of the role of another telecommunication infrastructure in producing territorial control in IsraelPalestine, see Tawil-Souri 2015.
48
In contrast to approaches that have taken the finished form of the infrastructural “thing” as the focus of
ethnographic attention, recent scholarship on the political lives of infrastructure has drawn attention to their open-
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Linking theories of the production of uneven space and territorialization with social
studies of infrastructure studies and temporality, this chapter examines the becoming and
unbecoming of Kurdistan as an “internally uneven colonial space” (Goswami 2004, 7).49 In
examining the territorialization of Kurdistan, this chapter builds on Gramsci’s writings on the
“southern question” (2005) and Lefebvre’s (1991) theorization of the production of uneven space
and state power. For Lefebvre (1991), space is a constitutive element of social relations.
Territorialization is also a process of space-making at the nexus of state power and capital.
Kurdistan emerged as a distinctive space through a process of uneven development following the
Ottoman Empire’s centralization efforts in the 19th century. The centralization of imperial state
power and later on its transformation into a nation-state aiming to homogenize sociospatial
relations “produced internal differentiation and fragmentation” (Goswami 2004, 33). Gramsci
examined how hegemony was constituted through spatial relations that are then naturalized. In
the case of Italy, the uneven capitalist development and the production of the South as an uneven
space was then naturalized, as southerners were racialized as “lazy, incapable, criminal, and
barbaric” (2005, 33) and the uneven spatial relations due to uneven capitalist development were
naturalized.

endedness and their unpredictable political effects (Anand 2012; Harvey and Knox 2015; Jensen 2010). Reeves
(2017) argues that indeterminacy is “intrinsic to the infrastructural form itself” (302). Hull (2013) argues that rather
than fixing relations, the mediation of documents often generate indeterminacy, this is “central to political
contestation within the bureaucratic arena” and “uncertainty is a pervasive component of actions and their
interpretation within the bureaucratic arena” (446–47). Using Simondon’s conceptualization of the “margin of
indeterminacy,” Fisch (2018) points to the entangled nature of humans and technologies which produce each other
and leads to the emergence of new forms of being, making infrastructures unstable and experimental interventions in
social and political life (Jensen and Morita 2016).
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See also Brenner et al. 2003; Elden 2009; Goswami 2004; Gramsci 2005, Lefebvre 1991; Smith 2008. For
accounts on how oil converges with or mediates promises of modernity, futurity, or development, see Weszkalnys
2014 and Limbert 2010.
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In what ways were the materiality of resources involved in the production of Kurdistan’s
territory? Brennen and Elden (2009) argue that, for Lefebvre, “national territory results from a
historically specific, mutually transformative articulation between the state, the continually
contested processes within it, and the land or soil that it inhabits, owns, controls and exploits”
(362). This chapter examines the uneven relations and territory politics through oil exploration
and its eventual discovery in Mount Raman by focusing on oil infrastructures. How do
infrastructures of and around oil figure in contestations and reconfigurations over territory and
space in Turkey’s Kurdistan? How are infrastructures embedded in the production of this uneven
space, and in what ways does their materiality or render these inequalities visible?
Following reports, memoirs, and letters of Turkish bureaucrats, travelers, and geologists
in 1940s and the everyday relationships between geologists, pipes, workers, paper, villagers,
wells, soldiers, roads, and technicians at the oilfields in the present, this chapter explores the
ways in which infrastructures have flourished around oil came to mediate various temporal and
territorial processes and imaginaries that are often concerned with central political questions
about state power, coloniality, and violence.50 Misused, sabotaged, and broken in unanticipated
or queer ways, infrastructures of oil have also generated a set of contradictory results
independent of the original intentions of their makers, generating counter-territorial or
deterritorializing effects. This chapter further illustrates how the Turkish state has attempted to
deal with the Kurdish Question after the formation of the Republic of Turkey. In the next section,
I outline the origins of the Kurdish Question through the centralization of the Ottoman Empire in
the 19th century as a story of the production of uneven space.
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See Stoler’s (2016) insights on coloniality in the historical present and Nixon’s (2011) discussion of slow
violence.
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The Kurdish Question and Uneven Development
Up until the 19th century, Kurdistan denoted a geographical expression in the Ottoman
Empire.51 With the Ottoman Empire’s integration into the capitalist world economy and the
growing inﬂuence of European nation-states, the Ottoman Empire’s “a-national and de-central
structure” (Yeğen 1996, 218) became more centralized. Kurdish polities, which were
incorporated and preserved to a certain degree by the Ottoman state were abolished as a result of
the centralization reforms of Sultan Mahmut II and continued by subsequent Ottoman reformers:
the reformers of the Tanzimat Era (1839 to 1876), Sultan Abdülhamid II (1842 to 1918), and the
Young Turks (Yadırgı 2017, 93). Mustafa Kemal and the founders of the New Republic resumed
and even accelerated these policies.
Centralization reforms in the Ottoman Empire marked the end of a period of de facto
consensus between the Kurdish tribes and the Ottoman palace, during which the tribes enjoyed
relative autonomy. The Kurdish tribes’ political power decreased dramatically, however, after a
series of administrative reforms in the first half of the 19th century. These reforms aimed at
destroying the autonomy of peripheries and centralizing the economy, politics, and
administration. These policies suppressed the power of local notables and destroyed the structure
of Kurdish emirates, bringing Kurdish lands under Ottoman control but also triggering the
feudalization of Kurdish society. The gap in authority that the dissolution of the emirates created
was filled by religious sheiks figures who mediated between the leaders of tribal confederations
and aşirets and Kurdish people (Yeğen 1996). It was only after the suppression of a Kurdish

51

Veli Yadırgı writes that “In the year 1150, the Seljuk Sultan Sanjar created a province of Kurdistan, with the town
of Bahar as its capital, and it comprised areas that are presently located in the predominantly Kurdish regions of
contemporary Iraq and Iran, namely, the provinces of Dinawer, Kermanshah, Shahrazur and Sincar […]. Yet it was
not until the sixteenth century that the geographical expression Kurdistan came into common usage to denote a
system of Kurdish fiefs generally, and not merely the Seljuk-designated province” (2017: 26).
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rebellion in 1857 that Kurdistan acquired a legal name: the Ottoman state established a new
administrative unit and titled it “Kurdistan Province” (Kürdistan Eyaleti) (Yadırgı 2017, 96-97).
With the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and the violent suppression of
multiple Kurdish rebellions, and the territorial order that characterized the new nation-state,
Kurdish tribal formations lost the little autonomy they enjoyed, and faced further assimilation
and repression policies. The new republic officially denied the existence of Kurdish identity
(Zürcher 2004, 172) despite acts of recognition of the demands of the Kurds during World War I
and the National War of Independence, during which Kurdish leaders supported the resistance
movement led by Mustafa Kemal. As the rulers of the new Turkish Republic or the CHP
(Republican Peoples’ Party) perceived Kurdish autonomy or language as a threat to the territorial
unity of Turkey, they violently suppressed the Kurdish rebellions that followed. In his politicaleconomic analysis of the Kurdish Question, Yadırgı (2017) writes that CHP followed three
policies in the following years: (1) forced deportation of Kurds from their lands, (2) assimilation
of Kurds into Turkish identity, and (3) the intentional underdevelopment of Kurdistan (2017,
168). It is in such a context that petroleum exploration and mining activities in Turkey’s
Kurdistan that had been halted during World War I and its aftermath were resumed by the singleparty rule of CHP.

Oil Beginnings: Ètatism and Industrialization
Following its founding, the Republic of Turkey focused its efforts on building a national
economy. Following a brief liberal time, the economic principles in the wake of the Great
Depression were characterized by etatist industrialization. Aiming to establish and run industrial
facilities, rapid economic development, and industrialization, the Turkish state worked with the
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Soviet Union and issued an “industrial program” as well as five-year industrialization plans—the
first of which was adopted in 1934—and state economic enterprises (SEEs). The first plan
sought to establish and operate state facilities in the textile, iron-steel, paper, land chemistry, and
mining sectors (Karaman 1998, 209). Under the five-year plan two large holding companies,
Etibank and Sümerbank, responsible for industry and mining were formed and state-owned
economic enterprises brought under the umbrella of these two holdings.
From this perspective, one of the main goals of the CHP rule in the 1930s was to expand
the infrastructures of transportation and communication. Crucial to this goal was the railway.52
The railway was significant for two main reasons. First, it would enable the fast and cheap
transportation of agricultural products from the peripheries to the centers of consumption in
western Turkey. The second purpose that the expansion of the railroad system would serve
concerned security. Railroads would ensure the transfer of military to areas of dissent, and the
telegram lines being built along the railroad would enable the center to be informed of
provinces.53 By 1940, in its Kurdish-populated eastern and southeastern territories, CHP rule had
successfully and violently suppressed the three main Kurdish uprisings54 and established the
“Inspectorates-General” emergency rule in its eastern and southeastern provinces.55
In such a context, Turkey resumed its first national oil exploration activities in 1925
under the direction of the state with geological surveys in Kurdistan. In 1926, the first petroleum
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See Schivelbusch (1986) for an account of how the introduction of railroads and trains radically transformed the
experience of time and space in the 19th century. For Schivelbusch, the railway destroyed the traditional relationship
between travelers and their environment and replaced it with a new experience of time and space.
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See Carey (2009) for a take on how the growth of communications, especially telegraph in the 19th century, “had
the practical effect of diminishing space as a differentiating criterion in human affairs” (171).
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The General Inspectorates were established with the Law on the Establishment of the First General Inspectorate
(Birinci Umumî Müfettislik Teskiline Dâir Kanun) of June 25, 1927. The scope of the First General Inspectorate
included Elazığ, Urfa, Hakkâri, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Siirt, Mardin, and Van. For a study on general inspectorates, see
Koçak (2003).
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law was drafted, giving the right to explore and manage all hydrocarbon resources to the Turkish
government. This meant that foreign oil companies were not permitted to operate in Turkey. In
1929, Cevat Eyüp Taşman, a Turkish mining engineer who had been working at a New York oil
firm at the time was called to Turkey to conduct hydrocarbon exploration. In 1933, the
Department of Petroleum Exploration and Management was founded. That same year, the first
deep well was drilled but abandoned when it was found to be dry. The railroad reached Elazığ in
1934 and Diyarbakır in 1935.
The same year, the Mineral Research and Exploration Institute was founded, and the
Department of Petroleum Exploration and Management was brought under its authority. With
the establishment of MTA, the Turkish state started setting up an extensive technoscientific
network of knowledge production and extraction dedicated to the seismic, carbon, and
mineralogical properties of the underground. Authorized to conduct exploration activities for
minerals and petroleum in Turkey, MTA geologists drilled several wells in the Raman region. In
1939, an MTA oil exploration team led by Cevat Eyüp Taşman set up a camp for exploratory
drilling in Meymune Strait near Mount Raman, near a 30-household village called İluh. In 1940,
Well #5 brought good news: the team had discovered trace amounts of oil. To celebrate this
national discovery, Prime Minister Refik Saydam decided to visit Raman. Saydam’s train
journey from Ankara to Diyarbakır, the only location from which to reach Batman, took five
days.56
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The camp could only communicate with the capital Ankara in Diyarbakır, which also supplied all the necessary
equipment and food for the camp in Raman.
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Figure 21 Raman-8 Well today. Author photo.

Days of heavy rainfall had flooded the Batman River, a major tributary of the Tigris, and
“made it impossible” (BCA 1940) to reach Raman by car in the absence of proper roads or
bridges, and First Inspector-General Abidin Özmen had learned that an MTA employee’s
journey from Raman to Diyarbakır had taken a very, very long 15 hours. Sayman had to wait
another day in Diyarbakır. He finally made it to the drilling camp in Mount Raman the following
day, and his observations at the camp with Cevat Eyüp Taşman immediately made the front
pages of national newspapers, announcing the good news. İluh’s population slowly started
increasing— from 320 in 1935 to 600 in 1940—and was renamed Batman in 1940. In 1942, a
small pilot refinery was bought from Romania and established in Meymune. In 1943, the railway
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finally reached Batman, which had recently become a sub-district of the province of Siirt
(Bayındırlık Işleri Dergisi 1943). With the emergence of a technosocial constellation of oil,
experts, railroads, and migrants, a town was slowly coming into being. Oil’s slow discovery
became entangled with the various emergent infrastructures, such as railways, bridges, tanks,
roads, and pipelines.
The emergence of oil and oil infrastructures took place against a backdrop of aspirations
of modernity and progress while also producing ambiguity and anxiety. As the following section
examines, Turkish bureaucrats, auditors, politicians, and engineers feared the possible worlds of
connection that oil infrastructures might bring into life and the ways in which they might
destabilize existing forms of territoriality and power in Turkey.

Anxieties of Material Connection
In 1942, Cevat Eyüp Taşman met Memduh Şevket Esendal, General Secretary of the
then-single party CHP in Meymune.57 Esendal was there as a part of a five-week trip known as
the “Eastern Provinces Trip” in order to observe and strengthen the almost-absent party
organization in the region, which had been governed under the Inspectorates-General emergency
rule. The official reason behind the trip was to inspect agricultural areas affected by the notorious
sunn pest infestation, but more than anything, Esendal’s (and CHP’s) concern was the “Eastern
Question.” His report, in which he detailed his observations on the bureaucratic structure and
people in the region, was primarily concerned with how the Kurdish-speaking people of the
region could be Turkified.
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The single-party regime in Turkey was established de facto in 1925, continued throughout World War II, and
ended at the end of 1945.
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Taşman met with Esendal in Meymune, where a four-engineer oil exploration team had
been drilling exploratory wells in Raman. In his report, Esendal wrote that Taşman looked
“exactly like an American engineer,” but this was not meant as a compliment. He found
Taşman’s manners unlikable and the team’s work ethic a bit “loose,” but he also understood that
oil exploration took time. He visited the oil camp in Meymune but was disheartened to learn that
the oil produced there was for local use only. A few days earlier, he visited the drilling site in
Van with Van’s governor and was struck by the fact that the governor had never been to that site
and had only come at Esendal’s insistence. At the Meymune camp, he asked Taşman about
potential for oil in Van. “Taşman was very hopeful about its prospects but told me that pulling it
off would be a very expensive endeavor,” he wrote in his report. Lack of money, infrastructures,
and trained people worried him.
Esendal spent a night at the Meymune camp and the next morning, he changed his route
slightly to see the recently built railroad bridge on the Batman River. He thought that the bridge
was a mighty achievement that future Turkish engineers would be proud of. He was proud of the
highways, bridges, and railroads that had slowly begun to spread across the eastern provinces of
the republic and wrote, alluding to ongoing World War II, he wrote, “These are great works,
built with unthinkable difficulty, not to set nations ablaze and kill many people but rather to give
life to a nation” (44). The war and the bridge were, in fact, closely related. A 1941 report sent to
the Prime Minister’s office by the Railroads Construction Department indicated that the iron
ordered from Europe had not arrived due to the ongoing war and that the department had, thus,
decided to move on with the construction using reinforced concrete in the footing and arches of
the bridge instead (BCA 1941).
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Just a year after Esendal’s visit, İsmail Habib Sevük, a member of the parliament for
Sinop, a city on the northernmost edge of the Turkish side of the Black Sea coast, would visit
Batman to attend the official opening ceremony of the same bridge. In an article published in the
Ankara-based daily Yenigün, Sevük compared the bridge to the famous Galata Bridge in Istanbul
and celebrated the former’s superior length. He praised the mastery it must have taken to build
with concrete instead of iron and steel and on waters as turbulent waters as the Batman River’s
(Sevük 1946). “With this bridge, our engineers demonstrate innovations and discoveries” (ibid.).
In an article titled “Batman Bridge and Turkish Petroleum,” published in Cumhuriyet (1946)
Sevük likened his feelings in the face of the bridge’s greatness to 17th-century Ottoman explorer
Evliya Çelebi’s astonishment at the Malabadi Bridge:58
If the stone bridge [Malabadi] that spans the upper river is a wonder of the old times, the
bewildered faces of the Kurdish peasants gathered around the new railroad bridge signals
that this is a new wonder. After our train passes over the bridge and comes back, I briefly
speak to some of these peasants who know Turkish: Apparently, they were certain that
the Batman River would never let another bridge to be put over it, and they were feeling
sorry for the hard work and money spent in doing so. After the completion of the bridge,
they thought it would fall down with the first flood, but it didn’t. ‘Then it will fall down
when the train passes.’ When that didn’t work either… Be assured! Even those who
stared at the miracle of Christ, who resurrected the dead, were not as astonished as the
Kurds who stared at the passing of our train over this bridge. With their dilated pupils,
they witnessed in this miracle the Turkish state (1946, 2).
Batman Bridge, in Sevük’s articulation, was a “gesture” (Weszkalnys 2016) to an
imagined, civilizational past believed to have been corrupted over time. It was the
materialization of the Turkish state’s desired presence in its peripheries and its mastery over its
unruly populations and over nature. It embodied a promise. But there was a second one: Sevük
was surprised to learn that Batman had yet “another privilege bestowed upon it: The valley is a
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An arched bridge dating to the 12th century Artuqid Period, located on the Batman River on the border of the
Diyarbakır and Batman provinces.
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source of oil.” Later that day, the train stopped at Batman station, and a truck picked him up,
bringing him to the “upper well” 1,100 meters up Mount Raman. Sevük was captivated by the
view. For him, the “majestic” structure of the iron oil derrick was no less enchanting than the
Eiffel Tower.
The drill bit reached 994 meters deep. It needs to go down another 400 or 500 meters. I
ask in excitement: “Have you found any oil yet?” “Yes,” they say and take us to the
“lower well” area. Some wells have turned out to be barren, so they’re abandoned.
Number 1 has oil, but it’s mixed with water. The most fertile well is Number 5. It
supplies the fuel of all the vehicles here. Thank goodness I had seen Turkish oil. I want to
grasp it as if it is Zamzam [sacred water]. Yes, it’s very little for now. But even the
blooming of a single rose is the harbinger of the entire spring. In Raman, we witnessed
not the spring but rather the harbinger of our oil. Oil heralds the wealth of our entire
nation, and under Batman Valley lies the promise of this herald.
If Sevük’s writings were fraught with fragments of genuine hope, Esendal’s hopeful aspirations
were often interrupted by the other possibilities that might come into being through the
emergence of oil. In his flashes of the future—often while watching a landscape he regarded as
barren or empty—he imagined “a new way of living.” For Van, “when its shores are greened and
populated with people, these places will be as beautiful and wealthy as the shores of the Aegean
and Marmara seas,” (28) he wrote. He praised the ancient beauty of the landscape, which had
been shaped by humans in the past but neglected in the past few centuries. These ruined
places and soils that will come to life through human intervention made me so hopeful, so
enlivened that I found myself as enthusiastic as in my youth and started thinking about
what I could do to bring the railroad here as soon as possible (32).
Kürzot was an area famous for its oil seeps and for this reason it had been one of the first areas
where exploratory drilling was conducted in Turkey (Lokman 1946). In 1937, MTA started
drilling operations in the area, but the attempts had been unsuccessful until then. The MTA was
using the noncommercial oil to supply fuel to boats on Lake Van. Once Esendal returned to
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Ankara, his spirit withered away. He remembered failures in finding commercially viable oil in
Kürzot.
To whomever I said, “We can produce some petroleum, there is oil there, even if just a
little bit”, my words were received with indifference and deemed unimportant. No one
wants to believe in the happiness of finding oil. Some friends stayed silent, as if to say,
“Maybe it will happen, but who will do it?” To be honest, I am not as fervent as I had
been before this trip. Gürzot is too far away! There are oil seeps, but can it be extracted?
How to find someone willing to take on this task? Why would some guy go and search
for oil way out in the boondocks? (42).
Esendal’s report was filled with instances in which a longed-for future flashed in the
present: a future perfect tense of modernist development and infrastructural progress. However,
his words were also saturated with a loss of motivation, fatigue, and hopelessness.59 He depicted
the mechanism of bureaucracy that had lost—or never had—its passion, given that it had been
only 19 years since the founding of the republic. It portrayed bureaucrats as sticking to their old
habits, not internalizing the principles of the republic, and who are slow and lazy (Önen 2011,
179).
I cannot do anything; no one can do anything. None of these men around me have the
passion for these to-be-resurrected places. . . This place is regarded as exile by civil
servants, who counted down the days before they would escape from it. It was given the
name ‘The East’ and was known as the worst place in the homeland. Officers sent here
tingle with fear.
Esendal not only individualized underdevelopment, but also ignored the uneven relationship
between Turkey’s East and West. For Esendal, the “Eastern Question” was one of linguistic,
physical, and political differences, but there could be solutions to it. He suggested the building of
schools in the smallest villages to enable the assimilation of Kurds through Turkish-language
education. Another solution was the resettlement and relocation of populations from the
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country’s western or northern regions. Esendal’s report, among others written during the same
years, marked the beginning of a new colonial logic of state power that focused not (exclusively)
on the use of violent force and coercion but rather on assimilation, a logic that continues to this
day. However, for these state officials and partisans, material power of infrastructures in
engendering movement, connectivity, and, therefore, change was as important as the symbolic
force of education and language.
Esendal and Ulutan’s writings were situated in a larger sociological framework in which
eugenics, positivism, and civilizational discourses deeply affected the Turkish elite. Arguing that
Kemalists implemented a colonial-civilizational logic upon Kurdistan in the early days of the
Republic, Zeydanlioglu (2008) argues that “in the absence of direct Western colonialism, the
Kemalists took on what I call the “White Turkish Man’s Burden” in order to carry out a
civilizing mission on a supposedly backward and traditional Anatolian society enslaved by the
retrograde influence of Islam” (4). Zeydanlioglu adds that “Kemalist discourse constructed
Kurdistan, the hidden and invisible “Orient” of Turkey, as a region of dissent and banditry, ruled
by superstition and in need of a heavy dose of civilization” (9-10). Civilizing practices were
backed by the “Turkish History Thesis” which defined Turks as “the creator of civilizations”
(Cagaptay 2002, 70) in Asia, Mesopotamia, and Anatolia and denied the existence of Kurds as a
separate ethnic group but instead cast them as people who had forgotten their Turkishness.60
“To abolish Kurdishness, we need roads,” wrote the First Inspector-General Abidin
Özmen in 1936. “The construction of these roads will allow the entry of material and spiritual
progress remedies into the first Inspectorate-General region and will tightly connect this region
to the homeland permanently” (Özmen 1936). In his report, Özmen also highlighted the
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importance of the physical presence of infrastructures and artifacts of bureaucracy—like
buildings, signs, or poles—even if they were small or merely symbolic and nonfunctioning. His
concerns were not merely about the function of infrastructures, but also about their spatial and
aesthetic force.
“Turkey is not the owner of the East yet. Good governance, returning people their selfrespect, and merging with the people will make the state the owner of these lands,” wrote auditor
Burhan Ulutan in a report to President İsmet İnönü in 1947. The report was based on his visits to
Van, Hakkâri, Diyarbakır, and Siirt. Entitled “Some Notes on East Anatolia,” the auditor’s report
highlighted the importance of expanding Turkish education and boarding schools in the area and
the development of “scientific” theories that prove that Kurdish language and ethnicity have
Turkish origins. Yet, he also observed that the “people simply hate the gendarme in particular
and military units to a certain extent.” He had heard from official sources about several incidents
in which gendarme and soldiers inflicted arbitrary treatment and cruelty on the people, stripped
them, and even sometimes slaughtered them. “It is not true to claim that these are isolated,
accidental incidents,” he noted. For him, the biggest responsibility belonged to the state and its
officers, who made the people live the life of a “bad colonial administration” by limiting its
appearance to security forces. Without courts, judges, roads, bridges, schools, doctors, hospitals,
and agricultural engineers, how could an administration claim to be serving the people?
Ulutan may have been the state official who most sensed the uneven and colonial relation
of “the East” with Turkey. The remedy, though, were the experts and infrastructures that would
bring better governance and connect the East to the center (and the center to the East). Esendal
had put his faith in infrastructures as well. Excited by the oil potential in Van, he wrote about the
prospect of extending the railroad line to the eastern peripheries. However, he was extremely
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suspicious of the possible outcomes of some infrastructures. Referring to Turkish ethnicity as the
“natives” of the region’s urban areas such as Van and Diyarbakır, he wrote, “In the future, I think
that the provinces of Van will develop and be populated. The natives of Van will disappear. As
soon as the train reaches Van, the villagers around it will migrate there. This means that the town
will be invaded by Kurds. Just like it has been happening in Diyarbakır” (Özmen 1936, 45). For
Esendal, therefore, the railroad signaled a double-edged sword, embodying racist nationalist
fears as well as an optimism of a modernist rhetoric of technological development.61 Read
against their grain, Esendal’s comments foreshadowed another possibility: the unintended or
contradictory effects of modernity’s infrastructures. They sensed the creative and uncontrollable
affordances of techno-social infrastructures that might come to exceed the original intentions of
their makers.62

Oil Discovery, Again
In 1946, hopes of commercial oil discovery were finally realized when Cevat Eyüp Taşman and
his team found traces of oil in Well #8 and Well #9. In 1948, following an official ceremony
attended by President İnönü, oil production began. Years later, Necdet Egeran, one of the
geologists who was instrumental in the discovery, narrated İnönü’s arrival in Batman in the
following words:
İnönü came to visit the Raman-9 well. I wanted him to see the crude oil to pour out of the
valve. I opened the valve. The engine was working non-stop. A few drops poured out and
İnönü immediately said, “Turn it off! We don’t want to go to waste. I’ve seen enough!”
(TPAO 2004, 25)
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As production started to increase, the capacity of the test refinery was found to be inadequate.
MTA workers dismantled the small test refinery on Meymune, and trucks brought it to a new
designated location only four km south of the Batman railroad station. There, the pieces of the
refinery were reassembled with the addition of new equipment brought from an MTA storage
facility in Diyarbakır. The new location was part of a vast tract of land recently bought from the
General Directorate of Treasury. With the construction of a new pilot refinery, Batman started to
slowly blossom. Small shops, hotels, and restaurants began cropping up around the railroad
station. In the meantime, in 1948, the director of MTA was meeting with representatives from
the Marshall Aid Commission and making a case for the pressing necessity of economic and
technical assistance in advancing oil exploration and production in the region.63
In the autumn of 1948, Niyazi Acun, a journalist who had developed close ties with highranking members of the ruling CHP, joined the Minister of Economy, Cavit Ekin, on a trip to the
Southeast in order to celebrate the discovery of commercial oil in Raman. In the articles he wrote
during his 15-day trip to the East, Acun did not even once mention the word “Kurd.” In the
“remote villages” he visited, everyone seemed to be so happy for the arrival of the convoy, so
thankful to the republic, so proud of the oil discovery, and so hopeful for the prosperity and
civilization ahead.
But even in that state of bliss, there were some things he just couldn’t ignore. Saddened
by the “backwardness” of the villages they passed, Acun referred to the “neglected” status of
them. “There are two roads to Raman. The first is the railroad. The second is ‘God’s road’ that
has shortened the lives of the eagles of Raman—the dirt roads that pass by farmlands” (1949).
Acun was exhausted by the bumpy trip. He tried to imagine the difficulties that engineers had to
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face transporting all that heavy equipment countless times on these roads. As they drove away
and away from Diyarbakır, the road got bumpier and messier. He watched the “misery of the
villages far from civilization, neglected for 25 years.” He found the muhacir64 villages in much
better condition than “the rest,” which “displayed a scenery of haplessness and the Middle
Ages.” He was shocked by the “primitive” conditions of farming. “No one has seen such
poverty,” he wrote, “because no road passes through their villages” (Acun 1949, 279). And they
had become prisoners of their “miserable and primitive lives.” But there was hope for change:
The oil found in Raman was, for Acun, the greatest source of hope that would actualize the
government’s plans for the “development of the East” (287).
Raman’s oil was already changing the landscape. With the oil refined in Meymune, the
entire road from the train station to the mountain had been paved with asphalt; this impressed
Acun (305). In a few years, the same engineers would be installing a water pipeline from the
Tigris River to Mount Raman, which would be the first modern modification of the Tigris. Acun
could not help but imagine how the Tigris, this ancient river that humans were not yet benefitting
from, would look in the near future. As pipes carried water to the camp, engineers of Raman and
their families would sunbathe on the shores of the river and enjoy swimming in its silken waters
(365).
Passing through the farmlands and ditches, when Acun’s convoy finally arrived at the
Batman River, they stopped. The journalist looked around, hopelessly searching for a bridge.
There was one, far away. “‘That’s the railroad bridge,’ the driver said. I froze with bewilderment
when their driver told him that they were going to pass the river with a raft. ‘What era is this?!’”
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Muslim immigrants who, with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Republic of
Turkey in 1923, emigrated from the Balkans, Black Sea, Caucasus, etc. and settled in various regions in Anatolia.
They were granted the expropriated possessions and lands of Armenian and Greek subjects, who had been deposed
or exterminated.
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he thought and wondered why no one had thought of building a bridge for the cars before (280).
Each car was put onto a raft one-by-one and crossed to the other shore. The whole process took
almost two hours. “One of the reasons the East lags behind is its lack of roads and bridges.
Civilization cannot reach places where roads and bridges do not exist,” he would later write
(280). His words echoed those of the Minister of Education, Tahsin Banguoǧlu, who asserted
that same year, “As you know, our eastern provinces are backward in terms of civilization and
economic development. A primary cause is the scarcity of means of transportation. The first
condition for assessing land productivity and for establishing civilized institutions and facilities
in these regions is building roads” (Banguoǧlu 1948).
In Meymune Camp, Acun was particularly impressed with the security of the area that
once had been the “bedrock of tyrants and bandits.” Cleansed of such social ills, the people were
thankful to the state, while heroic engineers were able to work on these mountain lands day and
night without interruption. Hearing the hum of the engines, shaking hands with engineers who
worked tirelessly for the welfare of the country, witnessing the illuminating powers of electricity
and even smelling the rotten egg-like scent of crude oil gave him untold pleasures (Acun 1949,
283). “Yet,” he wrote, “in contrast to the peace and security of the camp established, the danger
of scorpions, snakes, and mosquitos have unfortunately not been eradicated.” He assumed that
the smell of oil had disturbed the creatures, since they were not as readily visible as they had
been (289).

A Town Emerging
The post-World War II moment in Turkey witnessed the transition to parliamentary democracy
and the end of CHP (Republican People’s Party) rule in 1945. In the 1950 elections, the DP
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(Democratic Party) enjoyed a landslide victory and won a majority in the National Assembly,
with its leader, Adnan Menderes, becoming prime minister. This period also witnessed Turkey’s
political and military integration into the Atlantic Alliance. These changes powerfully shaped oil
exploration and production. In 1951, a year after DP’s victory, Marshall Aid arrived in Turkey.
In 1954, the Turkish government enacted its first Petroleum Law, prepared by Max Waite Ball,
an American geologist and lawyer.65 Intending to attract international investment, Ball’s
Petroleum Law opened up oil exploration to both domestic and foreign private companies,
creating royalties attractive to the major oil companies and allowing them low taxes and dutyfree import of equipment. İsmet İnönü, then-leader of the opposition CHP, argued that the
concessions that the law provided to foreign companies brought back the notorious
“capitulations” of the Ottoman era’s decline and dissolution period (Yeni Ulus 1954, 1).
However, the ruling DP ensured that the Petroleum Law took effect, which allowed Mobil, Shell,
Gilliland, Amoseas (Chevron/Texaco), Esso, Tidewater, Bolsa Chica, Gulf, and Tennessee
entered Turkey and start prospecting (Lokman 1963, 68–74). In the same year, the TPAO
(Turkish Petroleum Corporation) was established as the state-led, national oil company of
Turkey and took over all the rights and responsibilities for hydrocarbon exploration and
production activities that had belonged to MTA (Mineral Exploration and Research Institute).
Soon after, a large-scale construction project began on the land bought south of the station.
Modeled by American construction/site plans and executed by American engineers from the
Parsons Construction Company, a modern petroleum refinery (TÜPRAŞ Batman Oil Refinery)
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Ball received his degree from the Colorado School of Mines in 1906 and law degree in 1914 from the National
University School of Law before serving as the Chairman of the Oil Board of the US Geological Survey, a lawyer at
the US Bureau of Mines, chief geologist at Royal Dutch Shell, and director of the U.S. Oil and Gas Division in the
Department of the Interior. In 1950, Ball became a consultant to the government of Israel and drafted its first
petroleum law in 1952.
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and a complex that would house the employees of the new company was built. Batman’s
population reached 1,400 by 1950 and 5,000 by 1955. In 1957, Batman became a district center
and a municipal authority was established. Batman had quickly become a boomtown, attracting
experts, politicians, musicians, and filmmakers from Istanbul and Ankara.
The discovery of oil fields went hand in hand with the reconfiguration of “the East”
region as an integral yet undeveloped part of the Turkish territorial imaginary. For state officials
and Turkish people in urban centers, the only exceptions to this geography of underdevelopment
were the pump jacks mushrooming throughout the region and the newly built and vast TPAO
campus in Batman, which hosted its refinery, offices, living quarters, athletic fields, parks,
guesthouses, and a ballroom—time portals to modernity in the midst of “primitive
backwardness” (Milliyet 1955).
In 1955, Ümit Deniz, who was a journalist and a crime fiction writer, wrote a piece
entitled “Oil Civilization Emancipated Desert from Being a Desert.” In it, he narrated his
experience in Batman, with purple prose and remarks on his astonishment at the technological
wonders of the burgeoning oil industry in Batman:
Instead of the Orient, what I saw was a gleaming, electrified, grand city. The driver
reacted to my amazement: “Wherever Turkish engineers go, you find the utmost
comfort.” The thousands of lights of the newly established petroleum refinery call to
mind a familiar scene, living quarters with hot water and air conditioning allowed you to
forget that you were hundreds of kilometers far from cities, from civilization. Turkish
Petroleum runs this place. [. . .] They are the ones who transformed the desert in Batman
into paradise. (Deniz 1955)
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, visitors from Istanbul and Ankara were both shocked and
fascinated by its “civilization”—an emergent entanglement of extraction, infrastructures,
terraforming, and energies—, but this rhetoric of civilization could not be sustained without its
others. Journalists of the time made a habit out of contrasting the glamor and modernity of

117

Turkish Petroleum’s refinery and site complex in Batman with the rest of the region. The
building of highways, especially in the eastern provinces of the nation, was explicitly framed in
terms of forays into foreign territory and “eliminating the spirit of resignation, scant living,
separatist differences, backwardness, and sectionalism” in these dark corners of the nation
(Tütengil 1961).
The first time I met with Mehmet Tetik, he told me about his Uncle Celal and gave me
Celal’s memoirs. Below, I present a montage made of his memoirs as well as several of our
phone conversations. Celal’s experience of growing up in the rural provinces of Siirt and his
journey to first Batman and then to Diyarbakır and Istanbul through the 1950s and 1960s provide
a counterpoint to the narratives of inspectors, auditors, and other bureaucrats I have examined so
far, revealing the ways in which oil’s emergence and uneven sociospatial relations were
experienced by Kurdish people during this time.

T is for…
In a village called Tılmerc,66 only a few kilometers from the emergent city of Batman, a Kurdish
boy named Celal was born. This was 1946, the same year Cevat Eyüp Taşman discovered
economic oil in Raman. Tılmerc was a particular village: First, the railroad passed right through
the village. Second, Tılmerc was only 2 km from Batman Military Airbase.67 Growing up, four
things would come to Celal’s mind when some mentioned the state: military service,
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Tilmerc was originally an Armenian village that dated back to the16th century. Temel notes that after the 1915
Genocide (he does not use the term “genocide”, but “tehcir” or “Ferman’i Fela”), three Armenian families were left
in Tilmeric.
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The base was renovated after the US-Turkey agreement in 1982 to make the base available for US tactical aircraft
activity within NATO forces. This allowed them to patrol Caucasus, Turkey, and Iran without having to refuel. The
base was then used for aid delivery and rescue missions in Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War amid anti-war
demonstrations in the Batman city center. Turkish police opened fire on demonstrators and heavily injured six
people.
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gendarmerie, watchmen, and tax. In accordance with the assimilation strategies proposed in the
reports I have focused on here, the government decided to build a primary school in the village
that same year. At seven, he registered for the school along with 13 boys and 5 girls, who, like
himself had surnames that started with T.68 Major surnames of the village residents were
Temel
Terece
Testik
Tendik
Teksut
Tenik
Tekin
Tetik
Tesik
Temli
Tenha
Terkek
Teleke
Tilen
Tibik
Titiz
Tikik
Tikit
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“With the exception of two students,” Celal Temel notes (81). Those who had surnames that began with a
different letter were those who settled to the village at a later date. See also Öktem (2009, 7).
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Tigiz
Tidit
Tidim
Tirman
Tirki
Tikrik
Tikiz
Tinkaz
Tiz
Tim
Tugran
Tunc
Turhan (2007, 15)

These surnames were given in 1936 as a part of the Turkish state’s mass social engineering and
assimilation efforts.69 Since their village had a name that started with a T, the officers had
conveniently decided to give all of its residents a Turkish-sounding surname that started with the
same letter. Most of these names did not have any meaning at all; they were made up.
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As Öktem (2009) notes, “A number of district centers in the Southeast, that by then had become largely Kurdish,
were renamed during the administrative reorganization of the eastern provinces in 1936. It was also during this
phase that another topos of a specific Republican vision was established, namely the effort to extend its vision of
time and space beyond its borders. The reference to historical regions such as Armenia, Kurdistan or Lazistan – the
official name of the eastern Black Sea province of Rize until 1921 – was forbidden and a ban imposed on the
importation of maps containing these terms” (31).
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Tılmerc’s primary school introduced Turkish to Celal. He and his friends struggled to
understand their Turkish-speaking teacher and memorize the Student Oath, which they recited in
their broken Turkish at the beginning of every school day:
I am a Turk, honest and hardworking.
My principle is to protect the younger to respect the elder, to love my homeland and my
nation more than myself.
My ideal is to rise, to progress.
My existence shall be dedicated to the Turkish existence.70

Celal envied senior students who spoke Turkish better than him. Turkish, for Celal and his
classmates, signified a necessary tool that would lead them to modernity and civilization (83). It
also meant, along with education, becoming a “big man,” not having to be a peasant or a farmer,
but become a civil servant. His teachers told him he had to learn Turkish for a better future, to be
able to graduate from a high school, even a university. His teachers also asked their students to
speak only Turkish in the village. They had “spies” who would snitch any student who spoke
Kurdish (107). By the time Celal got to the 5th grade, there were only two students left in the
village school: Celal, and his friend Ahmet Testik.
He met his beloved teacher, an 18-year-old Kemalist man, Kenan Akin, the same year.
Kenan had high expectations for Celal and Ahmet. He often invited the children to his house.
Celal was introduced to commodities such as toothbrush, toothpaste, radio, pen and nylon shirt in
Kenan’s house (88). In the spring of 1959, Kenan drove Celal and other children to the movie
theater in Batman, 5 km from their village, where the children saw their first movie: an American
Western. A few months later, Celal and Ahmet, the grandchildren of the two former imams of

70

I grew up reciting a revised version of this oath. Leyla Neyzi translates the oath differently: “I am a Turk, upright,
diligent. My law is to respect my elders, protect those younger than myself. To love my country and nation more
than my own self. My ideal is to rise up and go forward. Let my being be sacrificed for the sake of Turkish
existence!” (Neyzi 2011, 417).
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the village, graduated primary school. They were the third and fourth graduates of the village
school in its 12 years of history.
In 1959, Celal started at the junior high school located on the TP site.71 With this, Celal’s
new life in Batman began. He often visited the newly urbanizing sub-district to see his aunts who
lived in the town. In Batman, he first encountered electricity as an illumination tool, asphalt
roads, and oil pumps. Most of the students at school were the children of bureaucrats, engineers,
and workers who worked at the Turkish Petroleum Corporation and Batman Petroleum Refinery.
They all lived in TP housing, but he and Ahmet had to walk for an hour every day from their
village to the school. Celal thought that their teachers appreciated their efforts and sacrifice, and
this encouraged them for an education and a better future even more (132).
They would sometimes, however, ride to school in a green jeep they called the “NATO
Jeep,” which was used by Petroleum Office employees working at NATO’s fuel tank station,
which neighbored their village. The jeep picked them up, because an employee at the station had
a daughter who went to school with Celal. The NATO jeep was a lifesaver, especially on snowy
days. Their classmates, those children of engineers who sometimes used to belittle them as
“peasants” or “Kurdish,” would envy Celal and Ahmet when they saw them arriving in such a
flashy car (137).
Celal experienced the contrast between his school or his classmates’ houses—equipped
with radiators, air conditioners, high ceilings, wide windows, lawns, pools, and parks—and his
village. There, homes were made of mud and brick, and the bathrooms were outdoors; they used
wood for heating, and kerosene lamps were luxuries. Stark class discrepancies were obvious
within Batman, too. Inequality was marked by the path of the railroad, which divided Batman in

71

Temel notes that the school had 150 students, and it was located near the housing units.
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half. South of the railroad was the TP site. North of it was the crumbling village of İluh and the
makeshift buildings that extended out around it. The differences were striking.
The contrast between the TP site and the rest of Batman was one of the first comparative
lenses through which Celal and his friends encountered inequality. Eventually—perhaps to keep
out the boys who were not as lucky as Celal—fences that had surrounded the TPAO site were
replaced by a two-meter wall. Those who did not attend the middle school at the TPAO site
wondered who lived, what took place, and what grew inside those walls. From then on, their sole
task became trying to climb over it in the weekends.72 If they succeeded, they would run to the
soccer field or the outdoor swimming pool and play there until a security guard caught them and
chased them out, yelling that they did not belong there.
Oil’s exploration and its eventual discovery, the establishment of TP and ultimately the
infrastructures and urban formations that oil production generated in Turkey’s Kurdistan
exacerbated and made visible a set of uneven relationships for the rural children who lived
around these spaces shaped by oil’s expectation and arrival. They also gave these children
something to aspire to: a better life, a better place to live, a better education. Despite the Turkish
state’s efforts to assimilate these children—making them palatable citizens through education in
the official Turkish language, history, and culture—, the relational dynamic between oil
infrastructures and political-socio-spatial relations defied the state’s attempts to contain or
incorporate Kurds into the nation-state space, realizing Esendal’s anxieties about the undesired
effects of infrastructural connectivity.
Celal graduated from middle school with distinction. He moved to Diyarbakır, the “Paris
of Turkey’s East,” for high school. In the 1960s, Diyarbakır was an emerging, lively hub of
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intellectual, social and cultural events, discussions, and publications. It was here in Diyarbakır’s
crowded teahouses and between classes that Celal was introduced to socialist and Marxist ideas.
In 1964, Celal studied law at Ankara University and became a member of TIP (the Workers’
Party of Turkey), which would unite hundreds of Turkish and Kurdish socialists, marking a
crucial moment in Turkey’s political history. In 1969, Celal broke away from the Turkish
socialist movement and became one of the founding members of DDKO, part of a Kurdish
popular movement that asserted the uneven and colonial status of Kurdistan in relation to
Turkey.
Infrastructures of oil mediated the formation of Kurdish subjects as political subjects,
equipping them with social-material tools around which to articulate unevenness. The
possibilities these infrastructures created and the ways they connected people to other people, to
spaces, and to languages gave an entire generation of Kurdish rural residents futures to aspire to
and the tools to analyze and critique the capitalist logic and colonial violence that had dedeveloped the region in the first place. The mediating power of modernity’s resource
infrastructures enabled a generation of Kurdish intellectuals to emerge who pointed out the very
uneven and violent nature of the Turkish nation-state’s infrastructures. Oil infrastructures moved
Kurdish children from rural areas and villages to schools in urban centers, instilling in them hope
for a better, “modern” life, one that they would later reflect upon and critique. They made visible
the classed and racialized inequalities of everyday social life in Kurdistan, giving them the
means to diagnose and criticize these material and symbolic structures of inequality and violence
and to theorize Turkey’s relationship to the world and Kurdistan. The trajectory of the Kurdish
movement and its relationship to oil in the 1960s and 1970s is examined in the following
chapter.
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The next section turns to the present and examines relations between engineers, oilfields,
bureaucrats, military, and Kurdish villagers in Diyarbakır. I examine the material-social
economy of negotiations and collaborations through which territorialization takes place in the
oilfields Turkey’s Kurdistan as well as the ways in which the misuse and sabotage of the artifacts
and infrastructures that mediate these uneven relationships enable forms of deterritorialization in
the present.

Socio-Material Relations in Oilfields
In Diyarbakır’s Gêl (Eğil) province, near a village called Sarıcak, there is a petroleum
production station, owned and operated by TP. It the station neighbors a modest camp, with a
transformer box, a kitchen, offices, beds, tank farm, administrative buildings, workshops,
pipelines, and a resting area. Right outside its main entrance is a gendarmerie station command, a
reinforced concrete building enclosed with barriers and a Turkish flag.
In 2016 and 2017, Nedim Usta, or Chief Nedim, was the chief technician of Sarıcak.73 He
was a tall man in his 40s with long black hair, something not very common in Turkey’s
petroleum industry. He was sort of an eccentric figure, loved and respected by his coworkers,
due to his laid-back attitude, unconventional way of administrating things, and the jokes he
cracked from time to time. He was from Batman, but he started staying on the second floor of the
main office at the camp in Sarıcak when he became chief technician. There were two petroleum
engineers who rotated between Sarıcak and other camps, and they spend a few hours a day in
Sarıcak, ensuring that everything is in order. But the engineers would almost always be younger
and less experienced than Nedim Usta. I visited Nedim Usta fairly often. We sat in his office and
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Usta is the Turkish word used for “master”, “artisan”, “craftsman,” “workman”, or “pro.”
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chatted about everyday politics, oil, and İzmir. He loved İzmir and hoped he to move there
someday. “Sea, rakı, poetry,” he said, “that’s all I want from life.”74
On one of those days, between tea and smoking breaks, Nedim Usta received a call.
Tarik, the production engineer working that day, was sitting across from Nedim’s desk, checking
well logs. The muhtar (village chief) of the nearby Özekli village was calling. He had brought a
young man with him. Apparently, the young man had been accused by the gendarmerie of
stealing oil/propane for his trucks. “What did he do exactly?” I asked Tarik. “He cut one of the
pipes that passes through the village and pulled it directly to his truck. He was going to sell it in
the black market.” “And he was caught?” “Oh yeah, we informed the gendarmerie about the
damaged pipe, and they found him in a day. What a big fool!” Tarik cackled. “But you know
what pains me when things like that happen? The guy that steals to oil/propane in order to sell it,
I don’t feel bad about that. But the oil that keeps leaking through the pipe that was cut after he is
done loading up his barrels? I feel bad about that. This wealth belongs to all of us; it shouldn’t go
to waste like that. By the way, the barrels are probably ours, too.”
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Rakı is a very popular anise-flavored alcoholic drink that is often served with meze and seafood in Turkey.

126

Figure 24 Entry to Sarıcak Camp.

The gendarmerie questioned him and called Nedim Usta after he had confessed to
damaging the pipes and stealing the propane. The muhtar, in order to prevent them from pressing
charges against “the boy,” had called TPAO Sarıcak camp and begged for their mercy. Nedim
Usta had asked the muhtar to bring the boy over. Three men arrived after the call. The muhtar (a
40-year-old man in a suit), the boy’s father, and the young man, who was a tall, shy man in his
mid-20s, his head bent over, and his eyes fixated somewhere on the floor. Nedim and Tarik
shook hands with the three men. Then the muhtar shook my hand and welcomed me to Eğil,
before taking a case of eggs from the young man’s father’s lap and handing them over to the
Sarıcak camp’s server, who had entered the room with a tray of tea glasses.
As the young man stayed silent, muhtar explained how inexperienced, shortsighted, and
stupid the young man was, that he had no ill intentions, and that he had just thought he could
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score some easy money. The young man’s father spoke in Kurmanji (a Kurdish dialect) for a few
minutes, and he replied in turn. The father was saying how grateful he and his family would be if
his son could be forgiven for his crime, that he would never do such a thing again, and that he
did not wish his son’s future to be ruined. Nedim Usta said he understood what was at stake, but
that they should also understand that the young man’s behavior had caused a lot of damage to
them—to them as employees responsible for the smooth and safe functioning of the production
facility and pipelines. Tarik intervened and said the young man’s behavior had caused damage to
them as a (national) oil company and, thus, to the nation. What was stolen belonged to “the
homeland.” Nedim Usta glanced at me, his eyes filled with a spark of ridicule, and I smirked.
Something in this long and repetitive trail of dialogues felt ritualistically bureaucratic.
When something like what the young man did happened, these next steps that I had been quietly
listening to had to have taken place as well: The gendarmerie had to catch him, the muhtar had to
intervene, Tarik and Nedim had to be called and begged for mercy, Nedim and Tarik had to
reluctantly say they could do something about it, the young man, his dad, and the muhtar had to
visit the camp, as Nedim and Tarik played hard to get, the young man had to express remorse,
and other intermediary steps, until the matter was settled amicably and hands were shaken once
again.
These set of ritualistically bureaucratic dialogues that were accompanied by the ritualistic
servings of tea every 15 minutes and the sounds of teaspoons being stirred were embedded in a
network/constellation of uneven and distributed relationships constituted by everyday
negotiations, collaborations, and favors. In between the second and the third glass of tea, for
example, the muhtar reminded Tarik and Nedim that they had always been good neighbors to
TP’s Sarıcak camp and their employees. They had never spared them hospitality and had always
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been generous in sharing their food. They had always been loyal watchmen. Whenever they
spotted a fire, they had immediately informed the authorities. This wasn’t the case with other
villages, as they surely knew, the muhtar added. “Thank you, muhtar, thank you. We know, and
we appreciate it a lot. But we have also been good neighbors to you.” Nedim said. “Of course, of
course!” the muhtar replied at once. “But you know, this is oil you are dealing with, and it’s very
messy, very damaging for our soil, crops, animals. Some villages would rather have the fire keep
going.” “No muhtar, no. You’re wrong. A fire is never good, not for you, not for me. Look at
what this young man has done by damaging our pipes: he caused financial damage to TP but also
to your soil, right?” The muhtar nodded.
Nedim preserved his reluctant attitude (something like compassion, a hierarchical helping
position). He said he would do his best to help them out, since they were neighbors and
neighbors always need each other, through thick and thin. But, he added, he could not promise
anything, since the young man had broken the law, and the law of the state was law of the state,
in the end. He was going to do his best, though, and try to pull all the strings he had. As they
were leaving, the muhtar thanked Nedim and Tarik twice, the father thanked them both three
times, and the boy, lifting his head, perhaps for the third time, thanked them both once.
Once they left, I asked Nedim about the fires the muhtar had mentioned. “Yes,” he said.
“In some areas, there is no TP personnel. No one would notice the fire until the morning. But
often a villager spots the fire and lets others know. If we have good relations with them, they call
the gendarmerie or the fire service. This is one of the reasons we try to keep up the good
relationships with these villages—for surveillance and security assistance.” Nedim then picked
up his desk phone and dialed the gendarmerie station and asked to talk to the “commander.” “Hi
Hasan commander, how are you doing?” he said. And in a warm, even fraternal tone:
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You’re aware of the incident with one of the boys from the Özekli village and our pipes?
Yes, that one, commander. Well, yes, they were here with the muhtar. We have talked
and smoothed things out. He won’t be annoying you or us again. He promised. The
muhtar promised, too. They were all very sad and remorseful.
I could hear the commander’s voice at the end of the line, but not what he was saying. “All right,
thank you, commander, thank you. We appreciate it,” said Nedim, stirring his tea. “How are you
otherwise?” he asked, as he leaned back, crossing his legs and smiling. “Ah, thank you for
reminding me, commander,” he said. “I will ask a man to send them over to you first thing
tomorrow. Yes, good afternoon to you, as well.” Nedim hung up and blinked at me. The matter
had been resolved. The commander was going to drop the charges, which were probably not yet
official anyway.
The relations between the engineers and mechanics at Sarıcak oilfield, and Kurdish
villagers in neighboring villages were characterized a temporally distributed economy of
everyday acts of negotiation, favors, and gift-giving. Rather than being crimes that disrupted
everyday social order, sabotage and theft were, thus, acts that sustained this socio-material
economy of people, pipelines, oil, and bureaucratic artifacts in the oilfields of Turkey’s
Kurdistan. “This place is always like this, busy with people asking for things, complaining about
things,” Tarik said, after hanging up the phone. “We’ve received eggs today, at least; we can
have omelets tomorrow morning.” Nedim cut in. Tarik smiled and turned to me, “If you read the
letters that we receive every single day, you’d see what I’m talking about,” he told me.
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Figure 22 Pipelines, drilling rigs, fields, and roads in Diyarbakır. Author photo.

Socio-Material Relations of Negotiation, Collaboration, and Reciprocity
Ten minutes and another tea later, I was in the adjacent office, looking at 10 giant paper folders
lined up on a desk. These letters were stored in giant folders in an office closet. These are letters
of complaint or request written by the residents of neighboring villages. The letters sent to the
Sarıcak camp had first been faxed to the TP District Management Director and then stored in this
office. Some of them were complaints mentioning their damaged soil by pipeline leakages or
bursts. Some of the letters were supported by sketches of the lands and properties that had
supposedly been damaged. Many letters asked for monetary compensation in return for the
damage that TP had caused.
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Figure 23 Folder of letters in Sarıcak. Author photo.

Below, I present fragments of those letters sent by villagers:
A pipe from the TP Sarıcak-Pirinçlik pipeline that cuts across my cotton field has been
leaking. I demand my damage to be calculated and I be compensated accordingly. (July
12, 2017, Ilbas Village, Yenişehir, Diyarbakır)
My land, which is located in Diyarbakır’s Kuruçay arable field, had wheat planted there,
which has been damaged by the fire caused by the high voltage transmission line that
belongs to TP. I request my damage to be compensated and the future risk of fire to be
eliminated. (June, 28, 2016, Sur, Diyarbakır)
Due to the explosion of the pipeline between South Kayaköy and Şahaban production
camp in May 2013, the yield for that year and the ensuing years were affected, according
to landowners. The yield has been affected and the landowners have suffered losses. We
signed the report on February 20, 2015. (Muhammed Akif Inan, Diyarbakır Production
Manager, Petroleum Engineer)
Production pipelines have invaded my vineyard. I haven’t been compensated for the
damage that might be caused by this. (Mehmet Çevik to TP District Directorate Batman.
June 7, 2017. Kayaköy, Eğil)
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Other letters were about injured or dead animals. Some brought up their cows, calves, or goats,
who had drunk contaminated water or from oil wells. Some of the letters had reports from a
veterinary doctor attached, confirming that the animal had actually died from the reason stated in
the letter.
My calf that jumped in the mud pit that belongs to Maltepe-3 well (Sarıcak camp) has
sustained injuries. It is still alive, but we are not sure what’s going to happen after this. I
request my damages to be reimbursed if it dies. (May 22, 2017, Kayakoy, Eğil,
Diyarbakır)
My cow drank the oil from the well that belongs to your fields in Maltepe Yatir. As the
attached vet report indicates, my cow is sick. I don’t know if she will live or die, but I
request my damage to be compensated for the loss that might occur. (May 17, 2017,
Kayaköy, Eğil, Diyarbakır)
My calf was hurt after getting into the Well-31 mud pit that’s been left and is owned by
the TP Sarıcak camp. My calf is alive at the moment, but her future is indeterminate. In
the event that she dies, we request that TP compensate us for our damage. (May 22, 2017,
Eğil, Diyarbakır)
My five-year-old and eight-month-pregnant Simmental cow has died from poisoning
after eating the waste left near Well-32. The veterinary examination confirms that toxic
material has been detected in my cattle’s stomach. I request Turkish Petroleum Batman
compensate me for my losses. (March 22, 2017, Eğil, Diyarbakır)
The following report was attached to the above letter:
The waste that the TP Sarıcak facility left near Well-32 has been eaten by animals. As a
result, Mehmet Çevik’s one (1) pregnant cow has perished, and after examinations, “oil
well residue” and other foreign objects have been found in its stomach. (Veterinary
Physician, March 20, 2017)
Other letters contained requests for artifacts, infrastructures, and technical assistance. In Nedim
Usta’s words, “What else could you want from engineers and craftsmen, after all?” These letters
requested extra or unused pipes, waste, industrial oil and gasoline, barrels, wire, barbed wire,
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cables, and iron tubing. Other letters requested services, infrastructures, and other kinds of
artifacts. They asked for technicians to help build things for their village—a new mosque, a new
funeral house, or asphalt for the village roads:
We need 8 scrap tubing pipes for the gazebo we are building at the funeral home in the
village. (May 23, 2017, Akalın village muhtar, Eğil, Diyarbakır)
Our village has needs, such as a school, a mosque, and a funeral home. We have oil wells
and pipelines in our village. We have been helping you to the best of our abilities so far.
We ask you to do the same and assist in us in these matters. Needs: 40 armchairs and 80
tables for the funeral hoem. 200 meters of wire netting for the school. 3 shelves, 3
faucets, and 200-meter cubes of wall tiles and 80-meter cubes of floor tiles for the
mosque. (November 24, 2014, Alcik village muhtar, Diyarbakır).
Nedim Usta told me that they usually accommodate most of the requests, unless they are
too extravagant. “We have to keep them happy,” he said. These letters pointed to the complex
web of relations between oil production sites and camps and the Kurdish villages around them.
Yet it wasn’t only neighbor villagers that asked for things from TP. Almost a third of the letters
were requests related to other state offices, written by military officers, school principals, imams,
or hospital personnel. Schools asked for equipment: copy machines, chairs, landline phones.
Gendarmerie commands and outposts asked for security infrastructure: surveillance cameras, fax
machines, or the installation of power lines from the main transformer box located at Sarıcak:
Our school educates 100 people in Diyarbakır’s Eğil district, Düzlük neighborhood. For a
month, the water tank that stores drinking water has been in a rotten condition, causing a
scarcity of drinking water and also problems for cleaning and maintenance in our school.
We need pipes for the new location of the water tank. Considering your sensitivity to
education, we kindly request four large pipes and your assistance in building a new
location for the water tank. (March 14, 2016, Feyzi A., principal, Düzlük Elementary
School)
Our school is located far from the district center and no renovations have been done in
our school since it was built and there has been major depredation in our buildings. I
kindly request assistance with regard to the following issues in our school: (1) building a
garden wall instead of the damaged barbed wire in the school garden, (2) replacing the 12
class doors, (3) repairing all the broken window glasses, (4) painting the exterior and
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interior walls, (5) repairing the electrical wiring, (6) 1 photocopy machine. (Kaya
Neighborhood muhtar)
The twenty bags of cement that the Özekli village gendarmerie office has demanded have
been transferred to the car that the gendarmerie has charged belongs to the citizen named
Ali K., with the plate number 07 ABP 08. (May 1, 2015)
Our commandership is in need of a tower in order to set up a machine gun and establish
firing superiority during a possible attack. This tower is planned to be built near the
outpost station. I kindly request the equipment and personnel needed to build this tower.
(Gendarmerie Sergeant Major D., August 26, 2017)
These letters point to the socio-material economy through which complex relationships of
everyday collaboration, negotiation, and dependence were constituted between TP’s engineers,
chiefs, mechanics, pipes, wires, villagers, and so on. Examining the “active role of documents in
the flow of bureaucratic processes” (Hull 2012, 32), Matthew Hull describes paper as “graphic
artifacts” (1) that shape governance in Islamabad. For Hull, forms of sociality gather around
these artifacts (21), but the materiality of artifacts also shapes these forms of sociality,
governance, and the discourses the mediate: graphic artifacts help constitute the scales at which
they operate, including the boundaries between state and society, individual (22–23). In Sarıcak,
paper artifacts—letters of complaint and request—not only shaped the social relations they were
mediating, but also linked the materiality of oil and infrastructures to modes of territorialization.
As I demonstrate in the following section, not all letters of complaint and request were
compensated. While all letters were faxed to the district management in Batman, they were
handled unevenly, as some TP engineers differentiated between the villages of Diyarbakır and
Batman. The socio-material economy of negotiation, complaint, and favors, thus, mediated not
only the uneven relations between oilfields and villages, but also the uneven scales of
differentiation within Kurdish villages.
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To demonstrate this point, I move to Garzan Production field in the Kurtalan district of
Siirt, which is located 150 km east of the Sarıcak oilfield in the Eğil district of Diyarbakır. This
section captures another fragment of the everyday socio-material relations in the oilfields of
Turkey’s Kurdistan, one that is very different from the ones I examined in Sarıcak.

Garzan Field: “Anti- and Pro-State Villages”
Ozan Bey is the chief engineer at the Garzan production field in Batman. He is a wellspoken, hardworking production engineer in his mid-40s. Since 2010, he has been the chief
engineer of Garzan, where oil was first discovered in 1951. Garzan is an old field, with 30 wells
with medium gravity and production of around 1,700 barrels a day. Garzan oilfield was the
second commercial oil discovery after the Raman-8 well and following this discovery, TP set up
lodging and a camp in Garzan, which remained active until the early 1990s. Ozan Bey made sure
all the wells were working properly, intervened when there were problems with wells, pipes, and
workovers and enhanced recovery techniques. The ongoing water injection project, for example,
increased the pressure in the well and increased production. In other wells, they did hydraulic
fracturing and injected a gel-like liquid into the wells.
One day in March 2017, I was in a car with Ozan Bey and Şeyhmuz Usta, the chief
worker of the Garzan field. We were on our way to check on the workover rig, which usually
traveled between well to well to perform maintenance or treatments on oil wells in the Garzan
field. Ozan Bey was driving the pickup and telling me about the pipeline system. “Our pipelines
here are built aboveground; they transfer the petroleum from the wells and then all of them
connect to the main pipe, which links to the Garzan camp. In Garzan, they are separated from
their gas and water, and they are stored in those huge tanks and then transported to the refinery in
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Batman.” Pipes were everywhere, cutting through fields, villages, and roads. “Ozan Bey, this is
the pipeline that burst yesterday,” Şeyhmuz Usta spoke from the backseat. He was pointing to a
pumpjack near a green field; a black liquid had leaked all around it. Oil pipelines were made of
carbon steel, and eventually, bacteria breeds on the bottom of the pipe, producing sulfur and
accelerating the corrosion process. “Ah, yes. They burst over time, because petroleum is a liquid
with many chemicals in it. They corrode the pipes over time.” Sometimes the coating of the pipe
was damaged and sometimes microbial corrosion on the exterior of the pipe resulted in ruptures,
spilling barrels of oil along with toxic substances like sulfur into the soil. “Is that someone’s
field?” I asked. “Yes, he is the one who called us yesterday. We always compensate; we always
pay for the damage we cause,” he replied, looking around the road. Then he suddenly slowed
down, looking at something on my side of the road. There was a tractor in an empty field. In the
back, two wellheads were visible. “What the hell? Who is doing this?” asked Ozan Bey. “I think
it’s Sait Ağa’s tractor,” said Şeyhmuz Usta. “I can’t believe this. Two months ago, this guy asked
for three or four pipes. New pipes. We wrote to the head office and got permission. Then the guy
comes and asks for 30 pipes! I said, ‘No offense but we cannot give you 30 pipes.’ And now he’s
plowing the field!” “What’s the crop?” “Pistachios.”
Ozan Bey was complaining that PERENCO had spoiled the villagers around the oilfields
in Diyarbakır. PERENCO, the mid-sized Anglo-French oil and gas company that is the largest
foreign oil producer in Turkey today. Before 1993, many of the fields in Diyarbakır belonged to
Shell, who discovered the oilfields in the late 1970s. After Shell left, the fields were transferred
to PERENCO. However, according to the petroleum law, the license of a firm expired after 40
years, and TP would take over the fields with expired licenses.75 TP also took over the
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Production licenses are granted for 20 years and can only be renewed twice for 10 years before being transferred
over to Turkish Petroleum.
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relationships that Shell and PERENCO had developed over 40 years. For Ozan Bey, PERENCO
had money and had “given everything that was asked” to the villagers, who had grown used to
their methods:
We are the state; we have to do everything by the book. There should be paperwork, and
things take time with us. With PERENCO, they got used to things getting done instantly.
They need a pipe; they’re given a pipe the same day. Their soil is damaged; an engineer
pays them the same day. With us, they have to file a complaint letter; we have to fax it to
Batman. It takes days. The villagers do not understand the difference. They want things
to be the same way they were with Shell or PERENCO.
Ozan Bey thought that Diyarbakır people made a fuss about everything, constantly
complained, and asked for compensation. “The villager in Batman isn’t like that.” There were
other categories that Ozan Bey operated with and classified the villagers. “There are traitor
villagers and pro-state villagers” he said to me one day, as we were driving back to Batman in
his car. “The traitor villagers are PKK supporters, HDP supporters, BDP supporters.” He called
himself a “nationalist” and that usually meant that he was associated with the far-right MHP
(Nationalist Movement Party). MHP’s supporters were Turkish, Turkish-Islamist, Turanist, or
Pan-Turanist nationalists, vehemently rejecting Kurdish cultural and political demands, and up
until very recently, their approach towards Kurds of Turkey oscillated between denying their
existence as a separate ethnic group and racist discourses. Ozan Bey’s desk in his office reflected
his political views, with a Turkish flag, the coat of arms of the Ottoman Empire, and a portrait of
Mustafa Kemal.
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Figure 24 Ozan Bey’s Office. Author photo.

“Who are the pro-state villages?” I asked. “They are the ones that became village
guards.” “Cakilli, for instance” he said, pointing to a barren hill ahead with small brick houses,
is a pro-state village. When villagers want something, they fill out a request form, or
write a petition. I have to fax those papers to Batman, but I always add my notes on them.
If the request is written by someone from a pro-state village, I add a note, ‘the camp chief
has approved this request.’ If the request comes from a traitor village, there is no note.
Then it becomes clear to the directorate and their requests are usually not fulfilled.
“How about this village?” I asked, pointing to Beşiri village. “They’re pro-HDP, their village
chief has been removed, and a kayyum [trustee] has been appointed. Same thing happened to
İkiköprü village.”
At the workover well, we were invited into a barrack, which turned out to be a nice
dining room. A shepherd’s salad, bulgur rice, meatballs, and lentil soup arrived immediately, as a
young engineer entered the “room” and welcomed Ozan Bey with great respect. He was in his
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late 20s and had been there for only a year. He had graduated from METU. He told me that he
had “not worked at a field where they had had good relations with the villagers.” Ozan Bey
laughed. “Give ’em an inch, and they’ll take a mile,” he added. He told us that a villager had
asked for a piece of protective coating pipeline for the minaret of the village mosque. “We said,
‘Sure,’ and gave it to him. The next week, he asked for cement. A month later, he said he was
entitled to the shares of the oilfields on his land. Then, he told us that we cannot operate our
tankers there. Can you believe the guy?” the young engineer said. Ozan Bey jumped in, “This is
a state company; this is the state. How can he threaten the state?” he said, rhetorically. How
could he prevent your tankers from operating?” I asked. Hamit Usta: “He blocked the road. He
parked his tractor in the middle of the road. And the gendarmerie doesn’t intervene. I don’t
understand. The state is being passive.” “When was this?” asked Ozan Bey. “A year ago, or
longer, maybe.” “It’s the solution process. Let’s see him try something like that today. Our state
will intervene.” Hamit Usta nodded, with a smile that intentionally revealed the lack of sincerity
in his approval. Şeyhmuz Usta replied, “Well, they’re right to be resentful. The company can at
least fix the roads they damage. Or build a park, a school. Something.” The young engineer had a
new memory: “Two months ago, someone stole the rotary table from the drilling rig a few
months ago, right, Ozan Abi?”
Ha-ha, true. Well, we called the village chief, and told him that maybe when the kids
were playing, they accidentally ‘took’ a piece. The chief acted like he had no idea what
was going on. Then I told him that if they needed iron, they didn’t need to worry about
that, and we’d be happy to give them five pipes. The next day he called me, telling me he
has found the rotary table. We sent the pipes, and the table came back. This is how things
work here. It’s not about loving your nation, your company, your soil—it’s all a
transaction.
“Well, but we do damage their village roads, their soil,” Şeyhmuz Usta murmured.
Yes, but we do the same things in the gas fields in Thrace. Does anything like this
happen? Are our wells protected there? I leave my engine unattended for an hour, I come
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back, and it’s gone—it’s gone! Who does that to the petroleum company of its own
country? I understand if we were Shell or Mobil. This is TP. This is Turkey, the Turkish
state, the nation.
“Well, that’s why,” the young engineer said. Şeyhmuz Usta: “But they feel like they are not
included in this nation.” Just when things started to heat up, Ozan Bey spoke, surprising me:
That’s actually right. Our trucks drive through their roads four times a day, destroying
them. They have their elderly, their sick; they need to go to the hospital, to the city. I call
the general directory, or Batman, they tell me, “Not our problem; that’s not our road.”
Come on! Of course, the guy thinks that he is not a first-class citizen, his village is not
important, and we don’t care about fucking up his road. A month later, he blocks it. And
he resents us.
The chief of Yeşiloba village, Hüseyin, would say similar things to me in a month later—about
how when a pipe ruptured, TP would pay for two years of damage, but the effects of the toxic
spill in soil would last much longer than two years, unmeasurable by law and the compensation
required. Springwater sources were also polluted by the oil pipe explosion, never to be fixed
again. The camp in Garzan had connected its water sources to their villages. Now, the only water
source the village got was the “grid water” from Garzan, which delivered 2 tons of water per
day, not nearly enough for cultivating the land and raising animals. Not only was a third of the
village occupied by TP now, but because of the afterlives of toxicity, the village population was
down to 15 houses. “We should have been 200 otherwise,” Hüseyin ended his story. In other
stories, children or animals playing had accidentally eaten the jelly-like liquid that turned out to
be a toxic substance used in production. In other stories, tobacco fields turned to mush; tobacco
fields turned black. In yet other stories, dogs, sheep, and goats fell into oil wells, dying, breaking
their legs, or getting poisoned. In others, spills ruined lentil fields, wheat fields, cotton fields for
years. Some told me that the toxic byproduct water was stored in a well that had been out of use
for a couple of years, but the water seeped into their soil, damaging crops and groundwater.
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The socio-material economy of negotiation, collaboration, and favors described in the
previous section was, thus, entangled with not only uneven relations between and within oilfields
and villages, or engineers and villagers, but also economies and processes of slow violence
(Nixon 2011) and toxicity. In this relational economy, making oil infrastructures operate as
“ontological experiments” or “emergent systems that produce novel configurations of the world”
(Jensen and Morita 2017, 618). Decomposing and bursting oil pipes, bacteria and chemicals,
fields and cattle, toxicity and territory were all integral to the bio-socio-material economy. Acts
of deterritorialization or counter-territorialization in such an economy were enacted through
various instances of sabotage, misuse, and rearrangement of infrastructures, creating a relational
ontology of territorialization and deterritorialization. Borehole pipes, for example, were used and
reused for almost anything, as the letters also suggested. Barrels were also widely used and
reused. Sometimes preserved as they were, other times repainted, they decorated village houses,
were used for storage for food or animal products, and in between districts, they functioned as
barriers in police and military checkpoints or even in place of orange traffic cones. Oil barrels,
here, became technologies of territorialization. They also became technologies for
deterritorialization. The protection barriers built around oil wells were sometimes broken into or
cut, used for another construction project by the villagers. And sometimes, they were “misused”
as shooting targets. Almost all of the dark green painted metal cages placed around the wells in
Diyarbakır had been riddled by hundreds of bullet holes. Infrastructures of oil—barrels, pipes,
cages—and the organic and inorganic matter of oil itself—water, bacteria, sulfur—literally
splashed onto the entire geography and geology, being sabotaged, misused, and broken down,
spilling, decomposing, and seeping into human and animal bodies and plants (purposefully and
not), undoing already existing territories and creating new ones. One day, when I asked Nedim
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about what the countless bullet holes on the caged oil wells meant, he said, “It’s just target
practice. It’s also a way of saying ‘I was able to shoot a thousand bullets in this space, and not
one of you were able to stop me.’ You know what I’m saying?” I nodded. Nedim looked pleased
about something.

Figure 25 Well cages misused as shooting targets. Author photo.

Conclusion
This chapter presented an account of how the emergence of oil and oil’s infrastructures
generated territorial effects Turkey’s Kurdistan during the 1940s and 1950s, as exemplified by
(1) the state’s internet shutdown that ironically brought the territorial notion into Kurdistan into
being temporarily, (2) the emergence of an oil complex that renders class inequalities that
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operate along spatial lines more visible in Batman, (3) Kurdish villagers’ acts of sabotage,
complaint, or reappropriations that created forms of relationality in oilfields, and (4)
infrastructural relations that are sedimented into larger practices of mobility and connection,
which contributed to the creation of the conditions of emergence of the Kurdish movement.
Roads, pipelines, and other artifacts became entangled with anxieties over connectivity
and the political-territorial effects that the connections that roads, pipelines, or telegrams could
enable The city of Batman’s emergence as an uneven geography, TP’s enclave, and other
infrastructures that unevenly connected urban and rural space rendered inequality visible and
material along ethnic and classed lines, visible to a generation that had been drawn to this and
other urban centers of Kurdistan. The infrastructures that oil’s exploration, expectation, and
extraction generated in Turkey’s Kurdistan mediated time and space in unexpected ways that
challenged the Turkish state’s colonial politics, creating the conditions of possibility for the
emergence of a generation of Kurdish intellectuals and political activists in the coming decades.
Finally, I examined the contemporary socio-material relations between workers and engineers at
oil fields that are lived around racialized and uneven relations of everyday negotiation,
complaint, use, misuse, sabotage, and collaboration, creating uneven socio-material relations
with territorial and counter-territorial effects. The next chapter analyzes the ways in which oil
and resource nationalism became central to both how Kurdish political subjects articulated their
demands for justice and the trajectory of the Turkish left. I further examine how these political
ontologies were based on particular notions about the nature, geography, and territory of
Kurdistan.
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CHAPTER 3
BANDITS, HEROES, NATURE:
RESOURCE NATIONALISM AND THE EASTERN QUESTION

If you ask the village chief
He’s our roamer guardian
If you ask the farmer
He’s insane
If you ask the villager
He's a poor fellow
If you ask the children
He’s the lion of lofty mountains
If you ask the nameless
The government knows him
If you ask the gendarmerie
He’s the state’s clash in the mountains
If you ask the profiteer
He’s a roadside looter
If you ask the robber
He’s the state's impotence
If you ask the right-wing
Fuck the bastard
If you ask the leftist
“the edict belongs to the Sultan, the mountains to us”
Koçero Homeland Poem, Hasan Hüseyin Korkmazgil (1998)
The Last Bandit: Koçero
In March 2017, I was at the camp in Raman Oilfield, listening to the story Hamdi Usta,
a Kurdish well site technician, was telling me, with the mild smell of rotten eggs in my nose.76
The story was about an incident that happened to Mehmet Gönhan, one of the former directors of
TP at the Garzan oilfield camp in 1960:
Mehmet Bey was smoking a cigarette in his container at the Garzan camp when he heard
the sounds of rifle shots—two or three. It was Koçero, the infamous bandit of the region,
who had raided the camp. He told Mehmet Bey to get in the car and drive and scared for
his life, Mehmet Bey complied. After some time, he told Mehmet Bey to stop. He turned
to him and said, “You will hire the poorest man in the village.” Mehmet Bey was
76

Hydrogen sulfide—a lethal gas that is released during oil production—smells like rotten eggs to humans.
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relieved. “Of course. You should’ve told me this before; there was no need for this
ceremony.” They went back to the lodging quarters in Garzan. Mehmet Bey was wary all
night. At dawn, someone tapped his little window. It was Koçero. “I stood watch at the
camp all night. Now my mission is complete, take care of yourself!” he said, and left.
This was his way of thanking Mehmet Bey.
His nickname having been derived from the Kurdish “koçer” or Turkish “göçer,”
meaning nomad, Koçero was a legendary bandit who lived in the mountains of Siirt from early1950s to 1964, when he was killed in a gunfight with the Turkish armed forces. Up to the
present, various stories about Koçero—his adventures, villagers’, teachers’, engineers’, or state
officers’ encounters with him, his successful attempts to escape from the ambushes of the
gendarmerie, the reasons he became a bandit, and the circumstances surrounding his death— did
not cease to circulate in Turkey’s Kurdistan, and especially in the topographies he was active:
Batman, Siirt, Van, and Diyarbakır. Naturally, oil figures heavily in stories about Koçero.
Koçero turned to a mythical figure in the 1960s, and he meant different things to different
people. In this chapter, I am not interested in determining the historical-sociological significance
of banditry in Turkey’s Kurdistan, but in the political ontologies that competing depictions of
Koçero were entangled with.77 Focusing on the conflicting portrayals of Koçero provides an
entry into the ways in which oil and the “Eastern Question” were configured by different
political actors-blocs in Turkey during this period.
In his essay on the “Southern Question” in Italy, Gramsci argued that differences that
were due to uneven capitalist development were naturalized and racialized, while the left-north
failed to demystify these notions and form alliances with the southern working class (2005).
Turkey’s “Eastern Question” shared some of the aspects of Gramsci’s account. As the previous
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One of the most famous and criticized analyses of banditry belongs to Eric Hobsbawm, who defined bandits as
“primitive rebels” (2001; see also Hobsbawm 2017. For a historical-sociological analysis of banditry in Turkey, see
Özcan (2014).
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chapter demonstrated, the emergence of oil and oil infrastructures in Batman were entangled
with uneven development but also de-development strategies of the state, which cast Kurds as
“backward” or “primitive” through a colonial logic in which oil’s emergence played a strategic
role. I argued that infrastructures’ mediation and misuse inverted those logics in different ways,
helping to deterritorialize or counter-territorialize the colonial-state-space and imaginaries, and
enabling the conditions for the emergence of the Kurdish freedom movement.
This chapter focuses on the early beginnings of the Kurdish movement, where oil
played an important role in its emergence and mobilization. It examines how questions about
development, inequality, and difference, or the “Eastern Question” were articulated or mediated
through oil. Gramsci criticized the Italian left’s inability to form alliances with the southerners
due to their privileging the perspective of the industrialized working class and embracing
“orientalist” worldviews towards southerners. By examining the Turkish left’s “national oil
campaign,” this chapter analyzes how the Turkish left failed to recognize the political difference
of Kurdistan and the Kurdish demands of sovereignty due to the national logic of its position. Oil
was configured as national oil, and the “Eastern Question” was cast as a problem that would be
solved through national economic remedies and development. The Turkish left’s depiction of
Koçero in the 1960s reflected a similar case: While the Turkish state cast Koçero as a petty
criminal and outlaw, he became a mythic figure of justice and political rebellion against the state
for Kurds. The Turkish left, on the other hand, configured Koçero as a heroic symptom of
“capitalist undevelopment” and refused to recognize the political demand of freedom embedded
in the mythical figure of Koçero, and thus the political character of Eastern Question.
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Koçero: Kurdish Hero
Depicted as a tall, large man with a bushy mustache, Koçero, or Mehmet İhsan Kilit (his
official name), has been a mythical figure for the Kurdish residents of the region since his rise to
popularity in the mid-1950s. Kilit was born in 1933 in the small village Helin (Silim) of the
district Silvan of Diyarbakır, belonging to the Elîkan tribe (Özkan 2014, 213). According to the
story told by his relatives and townsmen (Çapın 1962, 3), Mehmet was an 18-year-old land
laborer from the nomadic village of Helin (Özkan 2014, 213). When his wife was sexually
abused by Halil, the son of a powerful aga, Mehmet decided to move his family far away from
the aga, warning Halil not to follow him or his family. In 1951, when Halil’s corpse was found
riddled with bullets, Koçero became an outlaw in the eyes of the state and a legendary bandit in
Kurdistan’s mountains for 13 years until his death in 1964. According to another widely
accepted story, Koçero took to the mountains after killing a TP (Turkish Petroleum) employer
who had scolded a young worker at the Batman petroleum refinery. Other stories claimed that
prior to the murder, Koçero had also been a petroleum worker.
The 1960s witnessed the proliferation of bandits in Turkey’s Kurdistan, but Koçero was
the only one to achieve such a legendary reputation. In Kurdish cities and villages, Koçero was
talked about as a mythical Robin Hood-like figure, who would protect their villages from the
assaults of gendarmerie or other malevolent bandits. Other stories referred to him as a
“communist bandit,” as a “brave, kind, brave and fair man,” and “king of the mountains.” Özcan
(2014) argues that
The image of Koçero, therefore, mainly represented the desire of the Kurdish peoples to
resist and revolt against the State. He might be, in his own actuality, at least a successful
smuggler and a thief; but the native population turned him into not only a symbol of
social resentment, but also a counter-myth that falsified the state’s self-imposed image of
invincibility. (219–20)
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Figure 26 Cover of the biography of Koçero, written by Koçero's relatives. (Kitapyurdu.com)

Koçero’s presence in the mountains was a materialization of the fresh memories and
ongoing acts of state violence—massacre, assimilation, forced migration, and more—in
Kurdistan, to which Koçero embodied a rebellion. For the state officials, however, Koçero was
nothing more than a petty criminal that dared to challenge the authority of the state by taking up
arms and imposing his own law in the mountains of the Southeast. He was just a bandit that
dared to defy the almighty Turkish state, and there was nothing heroic in banditry. Against the
conviction of the Kurds in the region, national newspapers suggested that many petty and
“dishonorable” crimes committed in the region were actually the doing of Koçero, and the news
were backed by the state officials (Milliyet 1961).
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Figure 27 Akbaba magazine cover in 1962: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk Looking over Turkey with disdain.
(Cantek 2014)

Reporters and columnists who interpreted the “banditry epidemic” (Özcan 2014, 38) were
puzzled by the support that local people provided to bandits. Other opinion pieces mocked state
military forces when Koçero managed to evade the gendarmerie’s traps again and again and
expressed their awe in one man with a rifle being able to escape a whole army (Milliyet 1963).
Protected, sheltered, and fed by villagers, Koçero repeatedly escaped ambushes and attempts by
the Turkish military and gendarmerie to capture him, adding to his legend as an undefeatable
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figure with extraordinary and mythical powers. Despite his depiction as a criminal wanted for
robberies and murder but who eluded capture for over a decade, Koçero’s presence in the
mountains of Siirt damaged the Turkish state’s reputation as a sovereign power in “the East.”
Koçero became widely popular in the 1950s and 1960s. The state’s efforts were satirized in
newspapers and magazines as Koçero’s continued presence in the mountains of Kurdistan
exposed the inadequacy of the state in materializing its claims of sovereignty over its territories.

Figure 28 Akbaba magazine cover in 1996: "We will be a country where there is no fear." (Cantek 2014)
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The leftist community interpreted Kurdish banditry as a legitimate revolt against the
oppressive feudal structures in the East, which reproduced the myth of Koçero as a romantic hero
(Özcan 2014, 221). Left-leaning writers, artists, filmmakers, and politicians viewed Koçero as a
symptom of economic inequality and regional underdevelopment. In 1964, Yılmaz Güney—an
internationally celebrated Kurdish director, scenarist, and actor, who won the Palme d'Or at the
1982 Cannes Film Festival with his film Yol— made a film called Koçero: King of the
Mountains, in which he himself played the bandit. The film depicts Koçero as “the wolf of the
mountains,” the fierce enemy of tyrants, feudal landlords, and oppressors in the East and his
death as stemming from his Robin Hood-like ambitions: While trying to rob a small factory and
distribute the money to poor peasants, Koçero is ambushed by soldiers. Refusing to surrender, he
dies. Koçero: King of the Mountains made the bandit more popular than ever in Turkey, at the
same time cementing the view that the East was backward due to the oppression of the feudal
agas and the lack of state-led development.
In 1964, Koçero and a few of his men raided the Dodan Petroleum Production camp. As
usual, Koçero saluted the workers. He would usually be offered soup and tea, sleep for a few
hours in one of the barracks, and leave before sunrise. This time, to his surprise, workers started
shooting at him, and the gendarmerie were at the scene in a few minutes. The rest resembled
Güney’s storyline. The next morning, Koçero’s dead body, dressed in a gendarmerie uniform,
was found in the area and pictures of it published in every tabloid and national newspaper with
headlines: “The Easterner Bandit Wanted for Years Killed in Batman” (Hürriyet 1964). The
story of Koçero, the legendary bandit ended with oil, just as it had started. Following the
eradication of bandits following the death of Koçero and others, the villages of Kurdistan
witnessed the heavy presence of and oppression by Turkish gendarmerie forces or asayiş
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[internal security forces] of the Turkish state, which were tasked with maintaining “public
order.”

Figure 29 Güney’s film, Koçero (1964).

Written more than a decade after Koçero’s death, Hasan Hüseyin Korkmazgil’s poem
“Koçero: The Motherland Poem” (1976) captures the contested meanings of the legendary bandit
in the public imaginary: protector, nobody, criminal, and rightful insurgent. Sections of the poem
cast Koçero as a symptom of class inequalities and exploitation endemic to Turkey:
Koçero is inexhaustible capital to unjust regimes.
For coins to enter safe boxes
For soils to be exploited in the Middle Ages
For a huge country to remain in the dark
For beautiful-faced people to strangle each other
For factories to work and spit money
For shores to be plundered, forests to become farms
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For banks and monopolies to grow some belly fat
For companies to branch out, partnerships to plump
For this wind to blow this way
For this mill wheel to turn like this
For these sacks to fill up like that
Is Koçero’s helpless loneliness
Don’t take any offense, beautiful gentleman, ladies.
The legend of Koçero came to be so popular that, more than 30 years later, Korkmazgil’s poem
caught the attention of left-wing Turkish singer and songwriter Selda Bağcan and popular
Kurdish folk singer Ahmet Kaya in 1994. They turned parts of the poem into a song.
Koçero’s transformation into a popular romantic figure in the Kurdish regions of Turkey
was emblematic not only of the critique of class disparities and exploitation, but also of the
histories of perpetual state violence in the region. Yet, in the eyes of the Turkish left-leaning
intelligentsia, the usual suspects were still the feudal landlords. The history of collaboration
between the Turkish state and feudal landlords undertaken to obstruct insurgent mobilization in
Kurdistan, for example, was ignored by these analyses (Jongerden 2007; Yeğen 1996). The
history of state violence was also dismissed. The links between the economic disparity of the
region—“the East,” as Kurdish and Turkish activists called it then—and the particularity of its
spatial unevenness vis-à-vis the rest of the nation-state were finally voiced for the first time in an
unromantic if not systematic way by a new generation of politicized Kurds and organic
intellectuals in a series of demonstrations in the region. The Eastern Meetings of 1967 mobilized
a large number of Kurds in urban centers such as Silvan, Diyarbakır, and Batman, with oil
playing a central role in this mobilization.
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Figure 30 Bağcan and Kaya's Koçero single album cover.

The Eastern Meetings, Unevenness, and Oil
One of the prominent figures of the Eastern Meetings was Mehdi Zana, a member of the
TİP (the Workers’ Party of Turkey), a prominent Kurdish spokesperson and politician, who
served as the mayor of Diyarbakır from 1978 to 1980, when he was removed from power and
imprisoned during the third coup d’état in the history of Turkey.78 For Zana (2014), the origin of
the Eastern Meetings was nothing other than oil. In his memoirs, Zana wrote about the time
when Şelmo oilfield, which lies between Batman and Diyarbakır, was discovered in 1967 and
how the discovery triggered the popular mobilization:
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TİP (the Workers Party of Turkey) was a Turkish political party founded by a group of trade unionists in 1961. It
became the first socialist party in Turkey to win representation in the national parliament. It was banned twice (after
the military coups of 1971 and 1980) and eventually merged with the Communist Party of Turkey in 1987.
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Oil was found in Şelmo. Roads were crowded with oil tankers. As if suffering from
oppression and cruelty and being treated with contempt were not enough, my people’s
natural resources were being cynically plundered. I would ask myself, “Why can’t my
people own their own resources?” That question led to other questions. This was unjust.
One day, I met up with some friends at a café, and I told them my thoughts on Şelmo oil.
(Zana 2014, 93)
Zana urged his friends to occupy and “confiscate” the wells at the Şelmo oilfield, arguing that oil
in the region had brought nothing but harm to their people. He contended that “they were
stealing our natural resources and exploiting our people by making them work for low wages.”
Organizing a demonstration that placed oil at its center, Zana traveled to nearby towns and
villages for party propaganda to collect impressions and recruit members/participants for the
potential meetings. These efforts paid off. Thousands filled the meeting areas in Silvan, Zana’s
hometown and the location of the first meeting.
The Kurdish resentment that had been accumulating against the oppressive presence of
the Turkish gendarmerie in the region found its clear expression in the massive Eastern Meetings
held in the fall of 1967. The demonstrations, organized by the “Eastern group” within the TİP,
were held as a response to both to the increasing racist discourse of the national printed press
over Kurdish identity and to the gendarme’s oppression in the region in the name of fighting
banditry. The Eastern Meetings were the first of their kind to assert a causal relationship between
the underdevelopment of the region and the oppression of “Eastern” identity with slogans such as
“Civilization to the west, ignorance to the east, why?”
“We demand teachers, not gendarmes!”
“We demand schools, not military outposts!”
“Factories and highways to the west, commandos and military outposts to the east”
“We demand factories, not bazookas!”
“Jail, police station, oppression equal the East”
“The easterner shoots in war and is shot in peace!”
“We demand security of life!”
“Respect our language!”
“Down with exploitation and tyranny!”
“Caves for us, villas for them!”
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“Look at me friend, unity achieved only through equality!”
“One day, we shall laugh, too!” (Kürkçü 1988, 1129)
The slogans of the Eastern Meetings often referred to oil. At the Silvan meeting, Kurdish
protestors chanted,
“Petroleum is our blood!”
“From the minefield to the factory!”
“Oil, copper, chrome we have; a good life you have!” (Zana 2014)
In addition to the critique of feudal structures and landlordism in the area, these
demonstrations voiced popular concerns about the regional underdevelopment of Kurdish
provinces and constructed elaborate critiques that pointed to the reasons for uneven development
and economic inequality. At the same time, these meetings provided spaces for rethinking the
place of “the East” in relation to the rest of Turkey and patterns of uneven development and state
violence. Despite their call for economic justice and political rights, however, these meetings
remained within the development paradigm, demanding more development as an antidote to
economic and spatial unevenness. Further, as the motto “petroleum is our blood!” suggests, the
meetings did not put the fetishization of oil that was prevalent within Turkish nationalism and
Turkish left under scrutiny. In other words, protestors put into question the “naturalness” of
territory, but not the “naturalness” of resources.

The Kurdish Movement in 1970s
The Eastern Meetings constituted the origins of an autonomous Kurdish political
movement that would later materialize into DDKO (the Revolutionary Cultural Hearths of the
East). DDKO brought together Kurdish university students in Turkey’s urban centers by
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organizing a series of conferences on “fascism,” “socialism,” “culture,” “freedom,” and the
“Eastern Issue” in the early 1970s. DDKO’s publications made cultural assimilation and violence
visible and gave Kurdish youth and activists the tools to clearly and publicly voice popular
demands of freedom and concerns about unevenness for perhaps the first time in the history of
Turkey.
As I argued in Chapter 2, infrastructures of oil fueled the conditions of possibility for the
emergence of a group of Kurdish intellectuals, who effectively analyzed and critiqued the
oppressive and violent mechanisms of the Turkish nation-state project, global capitalism, and
coloniality in the 1960s and 1970s. Educated in the universities of Istanbul and Ankara, these
students and their circles generated an intellectual current that effectively highlighted Turkey’s
uneven links to the global economy and Kurdistan’s uneven relationship with the rest of the
country. These activists, writers, lawyers, journalists, and teachers analyzed the
underdevelopment of Kurdistan—which they referred to as “the East”—and argued that this was
the result of the state’s deliberate neglect of the region. Subsequently, Kurdish political
movements in the 1970s started to clearly assert that Kurdistan was a colony.
Magazines such as Özgürlük Yolu, Kawa, Rizgarî, and Jîna Nû framed Kurdistan as an
“internal,” “common,” or “international colony.” Engaging in heated conversations with Turkish
socialist and communist groups in the 1970s, these publications focused on the political and
economic appropriation and subjugation of Kurdistan—mainly by the countries that were also
ruling it—as well as the role that “imperialist” forces were playing there. Kurdish political
movements organized around these publications drew from national movements in the colonial
and Third World contexts and emphasized the “national oppression” that the Kurds were being
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subjected to in Turkey. These publications highlighted the realities of state violence, colonial
oppression, and called for national liberation and self-determination.79
Referring to the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which dismissed Kurdish demands for
autonomy, these literary and activist platforms theorized the ways in which Kurdistan had been
partitioned into four parts by Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey—and been left a fragmented country
after World War I. One of the most influential explorations of the colony thesis was posited by
Turkish sociologist Ismail Beşikçi, who described Kurdistan as an “inter-state colony” scrambled
by four states and in collaboration with imperial and capitalist powers following World War I
(2004). For Beşikçi, colonialism followed this partition, with each force colonizing the part of
Kurdistan that they controlled and taking over its natural resources. Building on dependency
theory, intellectuals described Kurdistan as a central region in the Middle East that had a wealth
of natural resources, notably rich oil reserves. (2004). In 1978, Kurdish intellectual and politician
Kemal Burkay (1995) asserted that
Capitalism [in Turkey], even if in an evolutionary form, has superseded feudalism to
become hegemonic. In Kurdistan though, the feudal structure perseveres. This situation is
undoubtedly fostered by the Turkish bourgeoisie’s colonialist mechanism in Kurdistan.
Kurdistan’s raw materials (in particular oil, copper, iron, chrome, and coal) are being
exploited; Kurdistan is the region that provides the cheap workforce for the west [of
Turkey]; the capital accumulated through the exploitation of the east flowed to the west,
and Kurdistan became a very convenient market for which the bourgeoisie to introduce
its products. (Burkay 1995, 5; quoted in Yadırgı 2017, 51)
In the 1970s, banditry activities in the Kurdish provinces appeared to be on the decline
due to daily military operations, regular state of siege announcements, and the establishment of

79

In late 1980s, the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), for instance, would argue that liberation, economic freedom,
and revolution in Kurdistan could only be achieved by defeating Turkish colonialism. PKK’s leader Abdullah
Öcalan would write: “It is Turkish colonialism that has seized political independence, that continues to fulfill its
function of annihilating the Kurdish language, history, and culture and destroying and pillaging Kurdistan’s
productive forces. This colonialism is externally supported by the imperialists and internally by the feudal
comprador classes. These three forces, which are connected through close economic ties, constitute the targets of
Kurdistan’s revolution” (Öcalan 1993, 121).
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commando units in rural areas. Repression by the commando units in the eastern regions and the
people’s resentment towards state security forces intensified in the upcoming years. In 1970, for
example, commandos opened fire on the people had started a fight following a football game
(Bisalman 1970). While recently politicized Kurdish youth were paving the way an armed
insurgent movement, Kurdish resentment towards state violence was slowly turning into an
autonomous national resistance that was no longer a pacifist one.
Ideas of mass organization, revolution, and armed struggle, thus, burgeoned in this era,
with oil playing a crucial role in the articulation of these ideological positions. The PKK would
later argue that Kurdistan’s colonial exploitation and national fragmentation could only be
overthrown by a revolutionary movement led by the working class. This was eventually
formulated in a rhetoric of armed struggle, which I discuss in Chapter 5. The Turkish state and
national media insisted on referring to the armed PKK guerilla forces as “bandits” in an effort to
degrade the movement and cast guerillas as petty criminals.
The Turkish left parted with the idea that Kurdistan was a colony. In the early 1970s,
socialist parties in Turkey viewed the Kurdish national question as a part of a national
democratic revolution in the “semi-colonized, semi-feudal, third world country” of Turkey
(TİİKP 1975, 33). They asserted that the Kurdish Question could not be one of colonialism, since
Turkey itself was considered to be a semi-colonized country in the first place. Towards the end
of the 1970s, guided by Leninism, the majority of leftist circles began recognizing the Kurdish
nation’s right to self-determination. At the same time, however, political actors in the left usually
objected to Kurdish leftists’ claims that Kurdistan was a colony of Turkey and that the Kurds’
struggle for liberation might be independent of the struggle for socialism in Turkey (Yeğen 2016,
165–66). This schism paved the way for a deep separation between Turkish and Kurdish leftists.
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By the end of the 1970s, the majority of Kurdish leftists were affiliated exclusively with Kurdish
parties or organizations. The following section examines how oil was elaborated in terms of
resource nationalism by the Turkish left.
Oil and the Turkish Left: The “National Petroleum Campaign” of 1965
The Turkish left’s discussions about oil in Turkey revolved around questions of
ownership, sovereignty, and imperialism. The disavowal of questions of colonialism vis-à-vis the
Kurdish Question were especially present in such debates. Motivated by the presence and
activities of international oil companies such as Shell and Mobil—as well as the privileges they
enjoyed—various segments of the Turkish left were united around the “National Petroleum
Campaign” of 1965. Debates over the privileges that the oil law accorded to foreign international
oil companies intensified during the 1960s, with particularly strong criticisms coming from the
left.
Among other state-owned institutions and companies, TP (Turkish Petroleum), as an
integrated oil company, enjoyed a significant extent of autonomy in the period following the
1960 coup and the “liberal” constitution the junta installed. In 1960, İhsan Topaloğlu, a chemical
engineer, became the general director of TP. In 1965, Topaloğlu applied to the Petroleum Office
requesting to drill a ninth oil well in Turkey. In accordance with the 1954 Petroleum Law that
aimed to prevent national oil companies’ monopolization over reserves, TP was allowed to drill
only eight wells at the time. When Topaloğlu’s request was declined, the debate around the law
turned into a feud between TP and the government, as the senate and the parliament were shaken
by heated discussions on the subject. The minister of energy and other DP (Democratic Party)
representatives called TP supporters “socialists” and “Soviet lovers.” At the same time,
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Topaloğlu called on the public to react, which triggered a “National Oil Campaign” that brought
together student organizations, unions, journalists, and intellectuals.
The greatest support of TP came from an influential leftist magazine Yön (Direction),
which transformed the debate into a foreign policy issue. For the Yön movement, nationalizing
oil and restricting foreign oil companies’ influence were the only ways to pursue an antiimperialist policy and achieve economic independence. In 1963, Yön writers claimed that the
government was acting as a spokesman for foreign companies and was fearful of scaring off
foreign capital (Avcıoğlu 1963). They criticized the “concessions and financial privileges” that
had been granted to these companies through the Petroleum Law, arguing that supporting the
national oil cause was the way to fight imperialism.
The campaign argued that the government represented the interests of giant international
oil companies like Shell and Mobil rather than “the people” and called on the public to use
national oil produced by the Petroleum Office, the distribution company of TPAO. The student
union of Istanbul Technical University asserted that the 11 foreign oil companies operating in
Turkey worked not to “discover or produce oil in the country, but to close their license permit
areas to such activities. Further they mark up the oil 35% over what they charge other European
countries” (Avcıoğlu 1964, 3). The same week, Yön published a call to “patriotic Turkish
drivers” to do their part for the national cause and buy their oil from the Petroleum Office,
“because it is a duty of Turkishness to use the oil that is blowing out from the bosom of the
homeland. Do not forget that by using your own, domestic resources, you will do the most
honorable service to your country and its economic progress goals. You will prevent millions of
liras from escaping abroad” (Avcıoğlu 1963, 3). With the joining of Middle Eastern Technical
University and national youth organizations, the campaign grew and within a few days, streets of
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Istanbul and Ankara were filled with signs like “Citizen, use domestic oil”, “Buy your oil from
Petroleum Office”, “No to Foreign Oil”, “Oil Shall be Nationalized”, and “To Hell with Foreign
Oil Companies.” Hundreds of students occupied base stations of Mobil and Shell; volunteered to
sell barrels of oil at the stations of Petroleum Office.
A primary figure in the national oil campaign was Muammer Aksoy, a prominent
journalist and legal and political scholar. He was born in 1917 to Numan Aksoy, a member of the
Ottoman Parliament. After studying law in Istanbul and Zurich, he joined CHP (the Republican
People’s Party), taught constitutional law at Ankara University, and was elected president of
the bar association of Ankara. A fervent defender of Kemalist reforms and secularist democracy,
he campaigned for the nationalization of strategic natural resources like petroleum, coal,
and borax.80 He argued that the Petroleum Law of 1954 had left Turkey’s “doors wide open to
foreign companies” and that ceding control of the country’s underground wealth did not comply
with the principles of economic independence: “With Atatürk’s directive,” Aksoy wrote in 1965,
“this nation has struggled very hard to break free of the tyranny of foreign companies in areas
such as mining and transportation” (Aksoy 1965, 3). For Aksoy, it was an enormous oversight to
abandon something so valuable as oil to the hands of foreign companies. Calling Shell and
Mobil’s prospecting activities an “oil exploration game,” Aksoy accused the companies of
obstructing oil discovery and production in Turkey. He wrote,
If foreign companies are a part of a trust (fund), two interests emerge, and they appear to
be in conflict. The more they discover oil in Turkey, the more they are going to be
deprived of their ability to sell oil to Turkey. Once they obtain the license to explore for
oil here, they ask “which amount of dollars will be higher: the one I gain after millions
of dollars spent on exploration, operation, production, transportation of the oil here or
the one I gain from selling oil to Turkey? If selling oil is more profitable than extracting
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Twenty-five years after his writings in support of the National Oil Cause, in 1990, Aksoy was murdered on his
way home in the capital Ankara. His murder would fuel further conspiracy theories in the 2000s.
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oil here, they will undoubtedly try to not find oil here, instead of finding. (Aksoy 1965,
4)
Yön writers argued that TP had been extracting 3,000 to 4,000 barrels of oil per day in the
western Raman oilfield. But Mobil, who had discovered oil in the same oilfield over which it
also held exploration permit—the writers claimed—had refused to start production due to the
low quality of petroleum and the poor conditions of transportation: “Therefore, Mobil is
unwilling to operate western Raman and by occupying the oilfield, it is not letting TP do it
either. These actions have cost Turkey at least 150,000 tons of oil” (Avcıoğlu 1963). Supporting
their arguments by comparing Mobil’s and the TP’s oil production data, they argued that foreign
oil companies took their profits away and seized Turkey’s foreign currency by selling oil for a
higher price. For Yön, this showed that Mobil was abstaining from producing the oil they had
discovered in Turkish territories so that they could keep exporting cheap oil to Turkey.
Mobil and Shell responded to these accusations of price inflation and make-believe
exploration by advertising in national newspapers—especially in the left-leaning ones, where the
debates were taking place. Mobil stated that it operated in “the service of the Turkish
nation/people” and was proud to do so (Milliyet 1965). The rest of the statement detailed the
number of wells it has operated since 1958 (42), the dollars it had spent on that, its production
volume, the barrels of oil it had transported to the Mersin Refinery (3 million), the reasons for
not producing oil in West Raman (“too heavy”), how much it had invested ($97 million), its
profit from the previous year (“a modest 2.3 percent”), the profits it had transferred overseas
($5.5 million), the tax it had paid (63 million TRL), and the number of its employees in Turkey
(1600).
Shell and Mobil, of course, were not in short supply of supporters. Some senators,
journalists, and engineers argued that long-established, experienced, and technically advanced
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Western companies had superior resources for successfully exploring for oil in an area where
geological conditions were not in favor of oil prospectors. “There is oil in Turkey, this is a fact;”
wrote Professor Ekrem Göksu, a petroleum engineer and the head of the department of geology
at Istanbul University, in a column in Milliyet, “but it is also a fact that it is not as easy to explore
and extract oil here as it is in Arabian Oilfields” (Göksu 1965a).
What Turkish companies had to do was to master their technical and commercial
methods and compete with these foreign companies, because scaring off international capital
would benefit neither them nor Turkey. For Göksu, attempting to expel foreign companies was
calling for a disaster, since—with the lack of competition and technological guidance—their
absence in Turkey would lead to the TP’s total failure in discovering oil. “The wells that foreign
companies do not operate are those that are not fertile enough. Because capital does not have any
religious or national attachments, it is only driven by profit,” Göksu asserted (1965b). “Thus, it is
impossible for foreign oil companies to obstruct oil exploration, discovery, or production. Such
long-established and well-respected businesses cannot be involved in shady affairs either. If
there is economically viable oil in Turkey, they will be the first to announce it” (1965a).
The campaign made it into the social realist films, which often portrayed workers,
migration, labor, and exploitation of the time. Atıf Yılmaz’s 1965 film Toprağın Kanı [Blood of
the Earth] centers around the question of national oil in Turkey, also reflecting the ways in
which the “Eastern Question” was received by the general public at the time. Set at TP’s Raman
camp, Blood of the Earth was one of the first films to be set in “the East.” It depicts an idealist
and patriotic engineer, who arrives in Batman to discover oil and, with it, hopefully bring
modernization and progress to the East. However, some oilfields in the camp are run by an
American company, whose interests are very different than the national interests of the engineer.
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American engineers in the film sinisterly obstruct oil discovery attempts as local leaders
collaborate with American engineers.

Figure 31 Blood of the Earth (1965).

The film revolves around the engineer’s fight against both “imperialists,” who do not want
Turkey’s dependence on them to end, and Kurdish feudal lords, who do not want the Kurdish
people’s dependence on them to end. The juxtaposition of the two local Kurdish characters in the
film is also striking, with the hardworking Hüseyin, who is hired as a technician to work at the
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petroleum refinery, and Hasan, who works for feudal agas in the smuggling business. Towards
the middle of the film, the protagonist petroleum engineer tells his son, “You always wonder
why I’m stuck in this goddamn place. I’m here for these people. Our petroleum will save them,
too.” The son replies, “We will leave, and they will stay here, huh? These mountain men, these
savages?” At the end of the film, as the attempts by the Americans and feudal lords to obstruct
oil discovery are thwarted and oil is nationalized, the ignorant, savage, and backward Kurdish
villagers become proper and modern subjects of the left-nationalist imaginary, as industrial
workers at oilfields form their unions and engage in collective bargaining. Blood of the Earth is a
perfect example of how the “Eastern Question” and oil figured in the Turkish left imaginary at
the time, buying into the premises of the National Oil Campaign and juxtaposing nationalTurkish interests with imperialist-American interests. In this imaginary, the East was also cast as
a feudal space in need of the development that national oil could bring.
In 1966, Blood of the Earth was announced that the film would be receiving the best
picture award at the 3rd Antalya Film Festival. On the day of the awards ceremony, however, it
was downgraded to second, raising a cloud of speculation and rumors. The theory that came to
be accepted was that an American jury member was disturbed by the anti-American stance of the
film and its selection as the best picture. According to the story, he had even argued that the film
could lead to the deterioration of US-Turkey relations (Kara 2015). Others suggested that the
reason behind the film’s demotion was not only its anti-American themes but rather its depiction
of deliberate obstruction of oil discovery in Turkey.
Decades later, two events reanimated speculations about the alleged obstruction of oil’s
exploration and extraction by foreign companies or states. On January 31, 1990, Muammer
Aksoy was murdered in front of his home in Ankara. The then-unknown militant organizations
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“İslami Hareket” (Islamic Movement) and “İslami İntikam” (Islamic Revenge) took
responsibility for the assassination. Renowned investigative journalist Uğur Mumcu, a student of
Aksoy’s, was also assassinated three years later. Born in 1942, Mumcu was
a Turkish investigative journalist for the daily Cumhuriyet, which Aksoy had also written for. He
studied law at the Ankara University and wrote for Yön. Mumcu was assassinated by a bomb
placed in his car outside his home. Both of these murders were attributed to secrets and
conspiracies around oil and other resources, which Aksoy and Mumcu claimed to have
uncovered.
The National Oil Campaign of 1965 exemplified how resource nationalism manifested
itself in relation to the phantomatic materiality of oil in Turkey. As in Bolivia (Perreault 2013) or
Ecuador (Valdivia 2008), resource nationalism in Turkey cast national sovereignty against
foreign involvement. Oil was configured as a fetish and the nation as devoid of political
difference, rejecting that Kurdistan can be considered a “colony” and disavowing Kurdish
demands for political freedom and sovereignty, demands that are related to but distinct from
economic ones.81 The National Oil Campaign configured power relations as a conflict within
nations, eschewing analyses of class inequalities and unevenness within nation-states. These
analyses were built on a nationalized analysis of imperialism and anti-imperialism, which
generated particular territorial notions that dismissed the assertation that Kurdistan was an
internal colonial space. Finally, different from the oil-rich states, which resource nationalism
scholarship tends to focus on, resource nationalism in oil has presented itself through various
forms of excess manifested through speculation and conspiracy theories about concealed the
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Arguing that geological knowledge was critical in territorializing the Bolivian state vertically with racialized
notions of national progress, Marston (2019) states that “anti-Indigenous racism was historically built into resource
nationalism through ongoing collaborations between earth scientists and various iterations of the Bolivian state” (2).
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presence of more oil, obstruction of its extraction and production, and murders by unknown
assailants.
In the final section below, I examine how Turkey’s Kurdistan was configured by
geologists at TP through an analysis of nostalgic and romantic stories about geological surveys
carried out the mountainous terrains of Hakkâri in the 1970s. These stories emerged in the 2000s,
during a period when both TP had lost its past glamor and hopes of discovering a major oil field
seemed to have faded. Before examining these stories, however, I first contextualize the
political-economic moment in Turkey from which these nostalgic narratives were able to
emerge.

Present Debates: Turkish Petroleum’s Privatization and the Turkish Left
Following its foundation in 1954, TP (Turkish Petroleum) gave rise to 17 major
companies, including petrochemical company Petkim, TÜPRAŞ Batman Oil Refinery, fuel
distribution company POAS or Petrol Ofisi, and pipeline company BOTAS. Until 1983, as an
integrated oil company, it was active in all sectors of the oil industry: exploration, production,
refining, marketing, and transportation. Privatization that started in the 1980s and accelerated
during the AKP period (2011-) caused drastic changes, transforming TP into a national oil
company involved in only the upstream sector (exploration, drilling, well completion, and
production).
In 1980, a military coup in Turkey led to the violent suppression of all social and political
activity. Following the coup, US-backed foreign policy was implemented, and economic reforms
to restore the “social order” and normalization were carried out first by the junta and then by the
civilian right-wing Turgut Özal administration. As Erik Zürcher notes, following the notorious
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“military coup of 1980, the power of the armed forces was used to suppress all existing political
and trades union formations, and to introduce a new economic policy, aimed at export-led
growth and a free international market, cutting wages and subsidies” (Zürcher 2004, 5). As was
the case in many other “developing countries” in the Global South, the 1980s marked the
beginning of a neoliberal political-economic rationality that transformed living conditions, the
market, and politics. In Turkey, the 1980 military coup-d’état paved the way for this wave of
economic deregulation and privatization by terminating the import-substitution model and
curbing the power unions and labor associations under the strong influence of the IMF and the
World Bank. The neoliberalization of the Turkish economy and the subsequent privatization of
state-owned industries began in 1980 and accelerated during the AKP era in the 2000s, which
witnessed a sharp withdrawal of the state from the economic scene, an all-out privatization of
state economic enterprises (Öniş 2011).
The AKP initially worked with the IMF to privatize both public enterprises and natural
resources, attracting a record rate of foreign direct investment and fashioning Turkey as an
attractive hub for global capital and a model for economic development, while depressing wages,
curtailing unions, and causing environmental damage. During AKP’s first ten years, all major
state enterprises—including major industrial facilities, energy utilities, ports—were privatized.
Due to increasing clientelism and patronage network that the regime started to implement, firms
that had close ties with the government bought these enterprises. In the meantime, AKP sought
to develop its own conservative “Anatolian” bourgeoise against the Istanbul-based liberal,
secular one by creating a network of patronage and an economic base for the regime to mobilize
the vote. It also collaborated with the Gülen Movement, which filled up police forces, schools,
and other key state institutions and helped AKP develop relationships and keep its power and
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control over the state apparatus. After breaking with this alliance following the Arab Spring and
the Syrian war, and the threat of the Kurdish movement, the AKP regime’s neoliberalist
tendencies shifted towards “corporate nationalism” (Madra and Yılmaz 2019).
Clientelism, an extensive patronage network, and Erdoğan’s relationships with numerous
business owners have provided the AKP government with a vast and reliable source of revenue,
thereby reducing its reliance on citizen support (Yildirim 2015). Deepening business-politics ties
radically changed political institutions, industry structures, and development prospects. In order
to build a patronage regime in energy markets, AKP manipulated regulatory institutions,
suppressed the media and advocacy groups, and immobilized the judicial process to insulate
itself from allegations of misconduct (Özcan and Gündüz 2015). The highly personalized and
opaque allocation of assets increased the power of business groups that enjoyed close ties with
the prime minister and key party officials.
Waves of privatization and the patronage regime that the AKP regime installed in the past
decades also affected TP. As the company’s ranks were filled by unqualified personnel due to
their political or religious ties to the party, the privatization of various companies associated with
TP, whose vertical organization was dismantled, left significant marks in the company culture
and structure. Petrol Ofisi was established on February 18, 1941, as a state-owned company to
import, stock, refine, and distribute petroleum products. In 2000, the company was privatized,
and in 2016, it was bought by an Austrian integrated oil and gas company. In 2005, the country’s
main state-owned petroleum refinery, TÜPRAŞ Batman Oil Refinery, was purchased by the Koç
Holding and Shell, and, in 2012, Petkim, the state-owned petrochemical company was purchased
by SOCAR. Petrol-İş (Petroleum, Chemical and Rubber Workers) Union has been at the center
of anti-privatization campaigns, campaigning against Petrol Ofisi, TÜPRAŞ Batman Oil
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Refinery, and Petkim. In the 2000s, the Petroleum Law changed as well. Since 1954, the right to
explore and produce petroleum in Turkey has either been exclusively owned or managed by the
state. In 2013, the AKP government put into effect a new Turkish Petroleum Law and removed
the preferential rights of the state petroleum company, TP in order to attract further foreign
investment. Even before a drop in oil prices in 2013, TP’s active drilling rigs count had already
been significantly diminished. Exploration and surveying activities suffered a major blow as
well. In 2016, unofficial sources speculated that the drilling, well completion, workover, and
seismic operations previously carried out by TP would be transferred to a newly founded
company. Unions took this as a further sign of the downsizing and weakening of TP, further
precarization of workers, and TP’s impending privatization. In 2016, the government hastily
created a “Sovereign Wealth Fund” and transferred the public assets of all the remaining state
enterprises—including TP—into the fund, accelerating speculation about the privatization of
what remained of TP.82
The dramatic transformation of TP generated a sense of nostalgia for the golden years of
the company among geologists, technicians, and other TP employees. These golden years, in the
narratives of exploration and petroleum geologists, usually centered on 1970s, when geological
studies in southeastern Anatolia were picking up momentum and numerous geology camps,
projects, and surveys were being carried out in mountainous geographies of eastern and
southeastern districts like Hakkâri, Mardin, and Siirt. Below, I present fragments from
geologists’ memoirs and interviews about events that took place during geological and seismic
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Structured through legislative decrees under the state of emergency declared after the coup attempt in July, the
Turkey Wealth Fund (TVF) is similar to sovereign wealth funds operated by oil-rich Gulf states, Norway, and other
countries with current account and budget surpluses from oil production, for instance. Yet, Turkey is far from
having a budget surplus. It has a chronic budget deficit. At a time when Turkey’s national income stagnated, a newly
established entity will use large chunks of existing public funds at the expense of other public institutions. The TVF
will be exempt from public audit and supervision and will function as a company (Sonmez 2017).
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surveys. These fragments often cast geologists in heroic terms, providing a juxtaposition with
Kurdish bandits who were and continue to be cast as heroes by the Kurdish people in the region.
Kurdish nomads, who were still active in the mountains of Siirt and Hakkâri at the same time,
often figured in the following narratives.
Heroes of Geology
Geologists at TPAO were “honest, hardworking, devoted, brave, masterful, and
respectful,” according to Us: The TPAO 1954-2006, An Almanac on an Era, a book published in
2000 on the 50th anniversary of the founding of the national Turkish Petroleum Company.
Compiled by a now-retired geologist, Halit Edip Özcan, Us includes detailed stories from former
TP employees. The book narrates the history of national petroleum endeavors in Turkey and
pays homage to the people who have contributed to it with stories about “Chief Hasan, who
could not be present in any of the births of his 13 children” because he was working for Chief
Mehmet, who had to leave his sick mother’s side at 3 a.m. to fix a broken pipe at an oil platform.
We’d been drilling the Habandere-3 well on a joint project with Shell. Our chief driller
was Ali Kaya. There was a problem at the well. It was quite late, and we were sitting in
the guest containers. Chief Ali, who hadn’t left the drilling platform since early morning,
entered the container. He sat down on the chair beside the table and fell asleep quickly.
Of course, he was still wearing his helmet. After a while, we heard a brake squeak, which
we did not take as an extraordinary sound. Chief Ali was suddenly startled and started
running towards the platform. He stepped up onto the platform. It turns out that the drill
string was stuck downhole and this was the reason for the braking sound. Chief Ali
wasn’t content even while he was sleeping; he felt responsible for his work even when he
was sleeping. Chief Ali never took his helmet off, until his retirement. (Özcan 2010, 112)
A senior geologist, Kayahan, referred to these geologists who worked at TP in the 1970s as their
“big brothers.” They were from an older generation of geologists and technicians, from which
my informants proclaimed to have learned a lot, and whose moral qualities are now nowhere to
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be found. “They were practically heroes,” Kayahan told me. For him, this golden era was
characterized by a distinct work ethic and responsibility that has been dismantled in the present.
When I asked Kayahan about what work meant to them, he said, “It wasn’t just work; it wasn’t
just money. It was about loyalty to the company, because the company was the republic.”
Histories of petroleum exploration are saturated with heroic narratives about “the quest.” Science
and technology studies (STS) has deconstructed the heroic and authoritative narratives and
histories of science, scientists, engineers, and other experts, revealing the complex webs of
performativity, partial knowledge, heterogeneous practices, and power relations embedded in the
production of expertise, authority, and technological systems (Law 1987; Bowker 1994).
Feminist STS scholars have examined how heroic narratives are linked to masculine images of
scientists and conceal women scientists’ work from the public eye, while men’s “work could be
cast as a heroic voyage to ‘conquer the earth’s secrets’” (Oreskes 1996, 100). Infrastructure and
media histories, such as undersea cable (Starosielski 2015), individualize achievements and
conceal the histories and operations of power at national and international levels.
For Turkish geologists, geological work was a sacrificial act for the greater good of the
nation and national progress (see Muehlebach and Shoshan 2012), while the sacrifices made for
one’s work were simultaneously sacrifices made for the republic. One sacrificed comfort and
valuable time that could have been spent with family and loved ones. Being an engineer at an oil
field required hard labor but it was meaningful and referred to a greater ideal.
Being a geologist in the Southeast was hard; it required hard work. For a well geologist,
for example, life at the well continues for 24 hours; there are no breaks. Motors of the oil
rig start to work and only turn off when the well is completed. You have only two friends
at the rig: the drilling engineer and the chief driller. And the book or the music player
you’ve brought along. It’s hard to leave home. You might be away for a month, even 40
days depending on the condition of the well. If you’re single, it’s easier. But if you’re
married, it’s very hard. Your small child might not recognize you when you return home,
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looks at your face with blank eyes. As soon as he gets used to you, you leave again. This
cycle goes on for five, ten years. More, for some of us… (Özcan 2010, 121)
In those golden days, geologists sacrificed the valuable time to be spent with family and
loved ones; sacrificed time and comfort. Being an engineer at an oil field required hard labor and
they were aware of the stakes, but it was meaningful and referred to a greater ideal. In another
anecdote, “legendary geologist,” Okan Özdemir was described as follows:
For us, he was an idol in well geology. Everyone would talk about his successes, his
work ethic, his incredible zeal, and desire for learning and improvement. During the time
he worked at the Suvarli well as a well geologist, he had a car accident on Adıyaman–
Gaziantep Road in the snow and broke his leg. But he went back to the field the next day
and started working. He insisted that he was going to complete the well he had started
drilling. (130)
In another story, the heroic efforts of geologists underscored the greatness of the corporation:
Our teams did seismic and geological surveys in the mountains even goats hardly
climbed. Seeing the things my company has accomplished despite the immense
difficulties they faced made me respect Turkish Petroleum and appreciate its importance
even more.
This story also attributed a kind of unattainable mastery over the geography of the region. In the
1970s, TP started forming teams to complete the geological map of southeastern Anatolia.
Teams were sent to Turkey’s most “remote” and “rough” terrains. A story about a geological
survey in Hakkâri went as follows:
In 1972, plate tectonics theory had changed geology in Turkey and allowed southeastern
Turkey to once again enter the radar of petroleum geologists and explorers. In 1974, we
formed a working group and made maps of the region, from the north of Adıyaman to the
Iran border, with great difficulty and sacrifice. We did 1:25,000-scale geological maps of
the region, as a result of geological surveys at altitudes of 4,000 meters and extremely
rugged terrain. Geologists would probably not be able to go to that terrain until terror
ends in the region, which makes the work done in the 1974 very valuable today (Ozcan
2010).
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As Oreskes (1996) notes, heroism has been “particularly manifest in the history of the
field sciences” (90). Critical studies of field sciences have examined the links between fields
sciences and colonialism (MacLeod 1997; Grove 1995; Grove 1998), as well as the ways in
which geology surveys were experienced as quasi-religious pilgrimages (Rudwick 1985;
Rudwick 1996), but also notions of “the field” in other sciences including anthropology (Kuklick
and Kohler 1996; Kuklick 1997; Stocking 1983); and marine science (Oreskes 1996) as the
scope of the “field” has expanded to extreme environments and vertical spaces of the
atmosphere, deep ocean, the subsoil, caves, and outer space. These practices are entangled with
notions of nature, passion, emotion, and sexuality (Keller 1984, Traweek 1988). Writing about
the affective plethora and “passion” that situates narratives about field sciences and self-image of
scientists, Oreskes (1996) remarks that,
the scientist as a heroic individual, dedicated to the quest for knowledge against the
bulwarks of ignorance and the powers of darkness and superstition. He, too, believes in
the powers of reason, but his commitment to it is deeply passionate, and his actions may
require great physicality. The image of a heroic competitor has played at least as
important a role in science as that of the dispassionate observer. (102)
Associated with male sexuality, field science is cast as a struggle to “unveil the secrets”
and “penetrate the depths.” Feminist studies have revealed the links between patriarchy,
knowledge, race, and notions of nature (Haraway 1991, Merchant 2008, Plumwood 1991).
Turkish geologists’ narratives of Kurdistan’s nature and physical geography encompassed
romanticism:
The work in the Hakkâri area was one of the best months of my life. We were on steep
mountains, unique beauty of the region. We walked for kilometers on snow, Cilo
mountains, in the middle of August; we tried to swim in the freezing water of the
beautiful Sat lakes.
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Other stories highlighted the scenic beauty of the region and the sacrifices of the geologists
together:
One day, our helicopter could not land at the 4,150-meter altitude across Resko Hill and
left us 1,000 meters lower. We were three geologists and a cameraman. We had to climb
the steep hill, and it’s July. The cinema machinist from Batman started whining in the
first few minutes, trailing behind us, slowly. We were exhausted while climbing the hill
in the under the sun but were astonished by the view before us once we reached the top. It
was a turquoise lake surrounded by snowdrops; it was a corner from eden. The mountains
of Hakkâri are perhaps the most beautiful natural areas in Turkey.
Another story added an element of danger to the mix:
The biggest geology camp in TP’s history was established in 1977 in Yuksekova. We
were going to finish the 1:25,000-scale geological map and we were supposed to do this
by crossing the Cilo mountains where there are no roads with a helicopter rented from the
army corps command in Erzincan. One day we set out to the terrain to work on the east of
Zab River, south of Mount Samur and Pirincli village, at a mountain called Mount
Mehmet. We are supposed to start from there and follow the 5–6-km. long ridge. In the
morning we went to the east of the ridge, looked at our maps, and decided that it was
walkable. Thinking that we were moving away from the helicopter, our team leader,
Dursun, told our colleague Remzi to turn back and walk back to the helicopter and meet
us the green field visible behind the ridge. We would meet up there. Remzi did as he was
told, the helicopter took off and landed on a field 5 to 6 km away from us. After a few
kilometers, the road thinned, going downhill with a sharp cliff on our right and on an
absolutely smooth, slippery surface like an ice rink. There are no plants, nothing to hold
on to if you slip. We formed a single line and started walking very carefully. I was behind
everyone else, and my shoes were slippery. I tried to shout at them, but they didn’t hear
me. Now, both sides were a cliff. I sat on the cliff like I was sitting on a horse. Friends
saw me and tried to console me, saying “We can’t come there, and a helicopter can’t land
there either. You’ll be fine, just light up a cigarette and calm down.” I did what they said
and then reached them slowly creeping inch by inch. That was the first time I asked
myself why I had become a geologist.
Geographers, environmental historians, and anthropologists have examined the social
production of notions about nature as pristine or untouched, notions of “wilderness” and revealed
the sexual and gendered inequalities, histories of colonialism, and other relations of power and
violence that such depictions conceal or naturalize (Cronon 1996; Raffles 2002), showing how
nature and society are interconnected rather than opposed, and have political and material space-
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making effects (Castree and Braun 2001; Latour 2004; Massey 2005; Whatmore 2002). Rather
than a “virgin” nature to be penetrated by the male hero/scientist, however, in the heroic
depictions of the geologist in histories of geological surveys in the 1970s, Kurdistan figured as a
volumetric topography of steep hills, valleys, cliffs, and mountains that is impossible to master.
Unmasterable and, thus, unknowable in its totality, geologies and geographies of the region
demanded geologists compromise and accept the impossibility of mastery and the non-human or
inhuman excesses that Earth contains. There was, however, one aspect through which the
geographies were rendered “unspoiled”—through the absence of PKK guerillas in the mountains.
These notions of nature and geography were entangled with particular encounters with nomadic
Kurds that generated colonial sentiments or anxieties over the absence of state sovereignty in
these terrains. A story about a night spent on Mount Herekol depicted an unexpected encounter
with Kurdish nomads:
We were doing fieldwork on Herekol Mountain, near Pervari.83 Every morning, the
helicopter dropped us off at the mountain and picked up us in the evening. That day, the
helicopter dropped us in a very rocky, steep, deep valley. It was July, and the temperature
is 25°C during the day and 3°C at night. Night fell, and we heard the sound of the
helicopter approaching. It kept circling above but couldn’t see us, no matter what we
did. It eventually just took off. We were stranded there without food or coats near where
outlaws, bandits, and animals like wolves, coyotes and bears ran wild. It was getting dark
and really cold. The sampling assistant boy who was with me started crying, and I told
him not to worry. We started gathering firewood from our surrounding area. At around 10
p.m., we lit a fire to warm up. But it was only able to warm our front sides, not our backs.
And we don’t have anything to eat with us. After a while, sounds started coming. The
assistant boy ran off and hid behind a rock. Two horsemen appeared in the darkness and
stood beside us. In half broken Turkish and half Kurdish, he asked, “What are you doing
here? Don't stay here. There are bandits and animals around here; it’s very dangerous.”
We nodded. They gave us bread and cheese and set off. Half an hour later, we heard
indistinct noises from afar. Five minutes later, a group of 100 nomads showed up. The
group’s leader, an old man called Haci, told us that there is a flat field half an hour away
from us. They were heading the same direction, and the helicopter could pick us up from
that spot in the morning. Haci shared his food with us. I was wearing a raffia sun hat that
day. One of the men from the group of nomads approached me, took my hat, and put it on
his head. Then another man did the same, and another, until they all started laughing at
83

Xisxêr in Kurdish. It is a northeastern province of Siirt.
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each other, making fun of the way they looked with the hat on. I was very moved. How
naïve, how pristine, how unspoiled these people were! Their faces didn’t have a trace of
stress. Haci asked me what I was holding in my hands. “This is a thermos, to keep your
water cold,” I said. I poured some on his hands; he was surprised. But he was an
honorable man. He did not ask me to give the thermos to him. In the morning, Haci told
us to wait for him if the helicopter did not arrive. Then Haci and his group took off, and
after a short while, the helicopter found us. I was struck by how someone who did not
know us showed so much care and concern for us.
Herekol, which was brought up in Introduction, would become a main PKK base and remain
inaccessible to petroleum geologists—or any Turkish state officer—for decades. As geologists
who nostalgically depicted the geological surveys of the period often expressed in the 2010s
when the war between the Turkish state and the PKK had resumed, the PKK did not exist in the
golden years of the 1970s. The period that became an object of nostalgic and romantic longing
was thus also when the region constituted a pristine geography not yet stained by “terrorism.” In
another story, chief borer Ahmet mentioned an encounter with Kurdish locals:
We were in Sason. Bandits came to the drilling rig. They were six people, and they were
all armed. They took me somewhere else. A man, their leader, offered me food and tea
and asked me to hire one of them. I told them I wasn’t in charge, but I could talk to my
supervisors. Then they drove me back to the rig. That night, I kept hearing rustle sounds.
I later learned that they guarded the camp all night. We helped those villagers a lot. They
would crop tobacco, and we would allow them to use our water pump. If someone got
sick, we would take them to the hospital in our Land Rovers.
The practices of the geologists enacted a particular territorial imaginary that was based on a
constellation of Kurds, geological practice, and Kurdistan’s nature. In her work on Chinese
geology and nationalism in the 20th century, Shen (2014) notes that against conceptions of
science as a coherent unity, Chinese geology was saturated with everyday and unexpected
problems that stemmed from the character of geology as a field science, as geologists, whose
science defied the strict controls of the laboratory and required direct contact with often
inaccessible and inconsistent physical environment (4).
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As the stories about geological and seismic surveys depicted the physical environment of
Kurdistan as an inhuman, lawless, and romantic space that was nevertheless not yet spoiled by
the emergence of an organized armed resistance movement, and depicted Kurds as ignorant,
lawless, undeveloped but goodhearted people that needed the patronage or knowledge of
geologists. These stories further cast TP as a national company with great affective investment
and geologists as heroes of field science. In the end, the results of the studies, geological surveys
and camps were published in Yeryuvari ve Insan magazine by Doğan Perinçek (1979), and later
in the Bulletin for Turkish Petroleum Geologists (TPJD) (1990). They also led to the creation of
the geological maps of southeastern Anatolia that are still used by TP and MTA.
Conclusion
From stories of the bandit Koçero to the early political mobilization of Kurds in the
1960s, oil came to serve as a powerful resource that mediated popular economic and political
problems and demands in Turkey. While the Kurdish movement in the late 1960s and 1970s
articulated the uneven development, demands of justice, and political freedom through
recalibrating the relationship between oil and power in Turkey’s Kurdistan, in the visions of the
Turkish left, oil generated resource nationalism. Resource nationalism concealed uneven spatial
relationships and state violence and, thus, shaped the Turkish left’s interpretation of the Kurdish
Question. Imbued with contradictions, oil thus enabled the emergence of political and social
imaginaries while foreclosing others. The next chapter demonstrates how the Turkish left found
itself in solidary with the ultra-nationalist right in their support of the Turkish military vis-à-vis
the Cyprus Problem.
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CHAPTER 4
A SEA OF POTENTIALITY:
GEOLOGY, EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN GEOPOLITICS, AND HYDROCARBON
EXPLORATION

Geologist
this world is from an incense in my palm
epochs smoke without humans
wrap me away from myself
disappeared mountains
echo me all alone
I step down from the ladder of earth
elevate to deep mountains
I flow away in the traces of old rivers with sand
My eyes go blind
(Bülent Ecevit 1976)
Introduction: Disputed Waters
In May 2017, a seismic vessel owned by Turkish Petroleum sailing in the offshore of the
Mediterranean shores of Turkey’s south shoreline was approached by a Cypriot coastal guard
boat. The name of the seismic ship was Barbaros, named after the Ottoman admiral Barbaros
Hayrettin Pasha, or Hayreddin Barbarossa, who established the Ottoman marine dominion over
the Mediterranean Sea during the 16th century. Over radio communication, the Cypriot guards
declared that the Turkish vessel had violated the EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) of Cyprus and
asked the vessel to leave the area. After the Cypriot boat’s repeated warnings remained
unanswered for some time, the crew in the dock of the Turkish seismic vessel responded by
playing a peculiar music over loudspeakers: An Ottoman janissary band march, or the “mehter
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march.” While another crew member recorded the event through their phone, with a sound
characterized by a shrill sound combining bass drums, horns, bells, the triangle and cymbals, the
song, “Ceddin Deden” (Ancestor Grandfather) played through the transmitter:
[Look at] your ancestors, your grandfather, your descendants, your father
[Look at] your ancestors, your grandfather, your descendants, your father
The Turkish nation has always been valiant.
Your armies, many times, have been renowned throughout the world.
Your armies, many times, have been renowned throughout the world.
Turkish nation, [O] Turkish nation!
Turkish nation, [O] Turkish nation!
Love [your] nationality passionately,
Overwhelm the enemies of your motherland, those cursed ones shall taste abasement.
Overwhelm the enemies of your motherland, those cursed ones shall taste abasement.
The eastern Mediterranean energy prospects stirred a wave of geopolitical disputes over
territorial rights and the delimitation of the maritime borders in the eastern Mediterranean. In
December 2011, the US oil firm Noble Energy announced the discovery of massive amounts of
gas deposits in the EEZ of the southeastern Mediterranean Sea, which has been an area of
dispute since 1974, when Turkey’s invasion of Northern Cyprus divided the island into two
separate countries. A few months later, Turkey began its own gas exploration in the region,
exacerbating conflicts with Greece and Cyprus over who was entitled to the hydrocarbon
resources beneath the seafloor and where maritime boundaries lie. The disputes were, for
Turkey, interlocked with the Cyprus Issue, while mediating questions and politics of territory
and sovereignty. Disputes over oil exploration rights became means of asserting geopolitical and
sovereignty claims and vice versa. In the following months, Turkey expedited its seismic
exploration and exploratory drilling in the region, causing a backlash from Greece, Cyprus, and
the EU. The EU threatened to impose sanctions to Turkey if it did not stop drilling in the eastern
Mediterranean. “Turkey’s relationship with the West suffered a fresh blow,” wrote the New York
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Times in July 2019, as the EU decided to suspend contacts between high-level officials and to
pull financial aid in response to Turkey’s gas exploration in Cypriot waters. The EU
sanctions came just days after Turkey’s relationship with the US severely deteriorated with the
first shipment of the Russian-made surface-to-air missile system S400 to Turkey, which has been
a member of NATO since 1952. These events raised concerns over Turkey’s aggressive
international politics in the West, as its commitment to the Atlantic Alliance came to be
questioned. This chapter demonstrates that rather than being exclusive to the character of
Erdoğan or AKP’s politics, the political ontologies that characterize current disputes have longer
history, situated in the Cold War period and related to questions of energy and technology
sovereignty.

Figure 32 Barbaros Hayrettin and a Turkish military ship in the Mediterranean Sea in November 2017. (AA
2017).

The previous chapter examined how questions of sovereignty, nationalism, and
oil/resources have converged through the “National Oil Campaign” pursued by the Turkish left,
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in its search for independent energy and international politics in the postwar period during the
pro-American right-wing DP (Democrat Party) rule. Chapter 3 also examined the ways in which
the Turkish left failed to respond to demands of Kurdish sovereignty and questions about the
colonial-uneven space of Kurdistan, where Turkey’s oil reserves are found. This chapter shifts
attention from Kurdistan to the Cyprus Island and offshore Mediterranean, which has become a
space of resource potentiality. As the “mehter march” incident and Barbaros seismic ship
exemplified, the territorial disputes triggered by hydrocarbon discoveries brought into being
discourses of nation (“milli”) and authenticity, especially in relation to resources, energy, and
technology. This has also led to the intensification of expansionist and chauvinist politics backed
by a particular mixture of neo-Ottomanism and anti-imperialism, which often align with
isolationist, xenophobic, and racist discourses.
Video of the “mehter march” incident was uploaded YouTube the following day and
quickly made it to the headlines in Cypriot, Turkish, and Greek press. Immediately, president of
the Northern Republic of Cyprus, Mustafa Akinci condemned the act, saying, “There is a need
for peace songs in the eastern Mediterranean, not the beat of war drums. The UN must act as a
conductor. Instead of war drums or janissary marches we want peace songs and ballads of
friendship in the eastern Mediterranean.” This event occurred right after Cyprus’s government
spokesperson Nikos Christodoulides stated that Turkey is attempting to create “grey zones” in
the eastern Mediterranean, and to harm sectors of the Cypriot economy Yet, one could argue, the
Mediterranean had long been a space of “grey zones,” of conflicting, contested, territorial, and
sovereignty claims.
This chapter examines these claims and visions and traces them back to the Cyprus Issue,
when political claims of territory and sovereignty became entangled with geological claims and
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often conflicting political visions. Claims and disputes over territory, sovereignty rights, and
resources were enacted through intersecting geopolitical and physical formations, boundaries,
and properties of the sea, rocks, and other inorganic materials. Turkey, specifically, used
geophysical properties of the sea or land in order to justify its territorial claims. Examining the
political debates around the Cyprus Issue reveals that the current discourses of “nation” and
“authenticity,” which became more significant under AKP rule, can be traced back to the 1960s
and 1970s. The Cyprus Issue, which occupied public discussions and politics from the 1950s to
1970s, revolved around questions of territory, resources, and resource infrastructures, echoing
the current patterns of (1) expansionism and chauvinism and (2) resource-technology nationalism
in Turkey’s politics. Anti-imperialism, anti-communism, and anti-Americanism formed an
uneasy constellation in Turkey during the crises surrounding Cyprus, pulling contending
ideological camps into their gravitational force and creating interventionist, expansionist, and
chauvinist politics, which are also displayed by the AKP government today. This longer view of
Turkey’s interventionism demonstrates that, despite the recent alleged “failure” of the “Turkish
Model” for the “New Middle East,” its regional activism is not a new development. It is
embedded within a much larger expansion of Turkey as not only a regional power but a global
“emerging power,” whose roots date back to the 1950s and the emergence of the Cyprus Issue as
a national issue.

Background
The period in which the Cyprus Issue emerged was characterized by a liberal, free-market
economy, large-scale American aid and strong American influence in Turkey. It was also a
period of mass migration from the countryside to towns and cities, modernization of agriculture,
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explosive growth of population, growing trade deficit and debt, inflation, and Turkey’s
incorporation to the world system through complying with an IMF package that included
devaluation, and an end to artificial pricing and to subsidies as well as to import and export
restrictions—all measures aimed at complete incorporation into the capitalist world system. In
these years, Turkey became a solid, albeit peripheral, part of the political and military structures
of the US and its allies. This was a major break with the Kemalist foreign policy of cautious
neutralism. The main dynamics of Turkish politics and foreign policy after 1945 were the
“threat” of the Soviet Union, the struggle against communism, and Turkey’s entry into an
alliance with the West. As Cyprus became a “national cause,” Turkey’s non-alignment strategy
shifted. The Cyprus Issue significantly impacted and shifted Turkey’s foreign policy and internal
dynamics, the effects of which are still being felt. First, the crisis went hand in hand with the
emergence of anti-Americanism in Turkey.84 Second, the crisis brought forth the idea that
Turkey needed to have other allies outside the Atlantic Alliance. Third, it brought nationalism
center stage and foreshadowed the rise of Islamist politics. Finally, the crisis sparked concerns
about the need for developing national-indigenous military and transportation technologies and
infrastructures, which were first mentioned in Chapter 1, in my account of the symposium on
oil’s discovery in Adıyaman.
Since it fell outside the borders of the 1920 National Pact, Cyprus also remained outside
the scope of Turkish politics and foreign policy, which had pursued a nonalignment policy—
until the end of World War II. This changed through the 1950s. Cyprus, an island with a
84

There was another incident that fueled anti-Americanism, the “poppy crisis.” US-Turkish relations, which had
been shaped by the Cyprus Issue since 1964, faced a new challenge following a 1967 crisis, which was the
cultivation of opium poppies in Turkey and the American reaction to it. Pressure from the US caused the Erim
administration to ban poppy cultivation in 1971. This contributed to anti-American sentiment and a decrease in
American prestige in Turkey (Bölükbası 1988, 173). The ban remained in effect until the CHP (Republican People’s
Party)–MSP (National Salvation Party) coalition government, led by CHP Chairman Ecevit, revoked it on July 1,
1974 (174).
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Christian-Orthodox majority and Muslim minority, was under the Ottoman rule starting in 1571.
In 1878, the island was occupied by the British Empire and annexed in 1925. Initially, the
“Cyprus dispute” was seen as a conflict between the people of Cyprus and the British Empire
regarding Cypriots’ demand for self-determination. Cyprus gained its independence in 1960,
with Turkey, Greece, and Britain signing as guarantor states, which allowed these countries to
use military means if Cyprus’s constitution were compromised. The island was considered to be
composed of a Greek majority and a Turkish minority. As the definition of the dispute shifted
from a colonial dispute to an ethnic one between Turkish and Greek islanders due to Britain’s
reframing of the issue, the years following Cyprus’s independence witnessed violent conflicts
between these communities and even civil war. Assuming a protective role, Turkey delivered
annual relief aid to Turkish Cypriots, and provided military training and support (Dodd 2010,
67). This relationship framed Turkey as an external agency intermittently intervening through
supervision and occasional force. Turkey considered the wellbeing of the Turkish Cypriot
minority a national concern and the Cyprus island a crucial geopolitical strategic place (Nevzat
2005). A public narrative of Cyprus as a “lost territory,” with references to the history of the
Ottoman Empire, or the Treaty of Lausanne, became entangled with fears of the Greek ideal of
enosis, which aimed to annex Cyprus to Greece (Nevzat, 2005; Bilgin 2007; Uzer 2011).
Concerned that the current government was no longer supportive of enosis and, accused
of being a communist government, Greece staged a coup d’état in Cyprus in 1974 and appointed
a notorious Greek Cypriot militia fighter who had openly propagated a plan of ethnic cleansing
against the Turkish minority in the 1960s. In response to the coup, plans of unification, and the
threat of ethnic cleansing, and pleading its guarantor rights, Turkey invaded the island on July
20, 1974—claiming that the action was in compliance with the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee—,
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taking control of the north and dividing Cyprus along what became known as the Green Line,
cutting off about a third of the total territory. While the junta regime collapsed, and the
government of Makarios returned to power. The Turkish Cypriots established an independent
government for what they called the TFSC (Turkish Federated State of Cyprus). Within a month,
Turkey had occupied a third of Cyprus, literally creating a new state on the island. In 1983, the
TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) was established in the north of the island,
controlling 36 percent of the island’s territory. TRNC has since remained a de facto state that is
economically dependent on Turkey, denounced by the UN Security Council as legally invalid,
and recognized only by the Republic of Turkey.

From Geology to Geopolitics
In Turkey’s nationalist territorial imaginary, Cyprus was cast as yavruvatan, meaning
“infant” or “baby homeland” and Turkey as anavatan, meaning “motherland.” Geology and
geological claims were entangled with these territorial imaginaries and infantilizing logics of
relationality. As I present below, the geology of Cyprus was reconfigured as a part of Anatolia,
and thus “naturally” belonging to the Motherland. The rhetoric of anavatan and yavruvatan,
which retained its power in public discourse in Turkey until around 2003, emerges in part from
the dilemma of describing Cyprus as both a part of “oneself”—both the people and the
territory—and separate. In this rhetoric, not only do Turkish Cypriots become “ethnic brothers”
(soydaşlar), but the territory of Cyprus itself is described as having a kinship with the “mother”
and desiring “unification.” These views were fervently voiced by right-wing nationalists and
were not challenged by the Turkish left, who, like its stance in relation to Kurdistan, supported or
kept silent following Turkey’s occupation of the island. The few critiques of Turkey’s Cyprus
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policy from the Turkish Labor Party and the Communist Party of Turkey were attacked by
politicians and media, accused of acting against “national interests” and making communist
propaganda (Özkan 2015, 15).
Cyprus entered the radar of Turkish nationalists in the 1950s. The Turkish official
position became taksim (“division”) or the annexation of parts of Cyprus to Turkey. The
political argument that Cyprus is Turkish and, therefore, part of Turkey was accompanied by a
“geopolitical mythology” (Hatay and Bryant 2015, 32) prevalent from the 1950s through the
1970s. It was asserted that Cyprus is a part of Anatolia—not Greece. These claims were
naturalized and legitimized by referencing geography and geology, which were then translated
into geopolitical discourses on Cyprus’s “strategic importance” against communism. Defenders
of Cyprus’s annexation to Turkey—proponents of “the Hatay model,” as it was called—also
claimed that the National Pact, which had excluded the island, had no validity when it came to
Cyprus.
One of the public figures who were most committed to the Cyprus Issue was Peyami
Safa, a conservative and nationalist thinker, columnist, and novelist. He regularly wrote about
Cyprus in the 1950s and 1960s in newspapers and magazines. In Milliyet, he wrote, “Cyprus is
Turkish. Meaning, as geology and geography indicate, the island is a continuation and an
indivisible part of Turkey (Anatolia)” (Safa 1958). For Safa, geological evidence proved that
Cyprus was naturally a part of Turkey. Again, in Milliyet, he wrote:
I dragged up geology, ransacked political geography, researched history, pulled
ethnography to shreds, explored reason, but I just couldn’t understand this political
delirium: the relation of today’s Greece to Cyprus! I examined all the Greek claims, and I
haven’t encountered a single dignified piece of evidence. The romantic inflation of these
claims is full of imagination and air that attempt to cover the lack of evidence. (Safa
1959a)
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For Safa, the shape of the Karpas Peninsula resembled an index finger pointing towards the Gulf
of Alexandria, expressing the island’s desire to unite with its motherland. In another article, Safa
wrote, “Cyprus is both geological and geopolitical continuation of Anatolia. Geological, because
it has detached from Anatolia during the third geological era. Geopolitical because it has
remained under Turkish rule for centuries” (Safa 1959b).
In 1948, a group of Turkish Cypriot and Turkish writers, academics, and politicians
founded Yeşilada Mecmuası (Green Island Magazine), which served for more than three years as
the main publishing vehicle for a pan-Turkist agenda that showed that Turkish Cypriots were
blood brothers and that Cyprus was an extension of Anatolia. The magazine featured Turkish
Cypriot academics and writers, such as Fikret Alasya, Derviş Manizade, and Nevzat Karagil, as
well as Turkish nationalist writers and poets such as Nihat Atsız and Behçet Kemal Çağlar. The
magazine set out to prove not only the identity of Turkish Cypriots and their “brothers” in
Turkey, but also that Turkish Cypriots were as Kemalist as Turks in Anatolia.
In Yeşilada’s second issue, published in 1948, the journal’s founder, declared that the
National Pact no longer had any validity with respect to Cyprus, explaining that “at the time the
National Pact was ratified, the scourge of communism with imperialistic ambitions did not exist”
(Karagil 1948, 12). Another figure, Ahmet Emin Yalman naturalized geopolitical visions of
Cyprus by turning to the island’s geographical proximity to Turkey as an argument for
annexation: “Why would the acquisition of this island extending right into the Gulf of
İskenderun, and only 70 kilometers to Anamur [a city on the Mediterranean coast of Turkey], be
considered as a step towards imperial ambition?’” he wrote in 1948. By this logic, as Cyprus was
a “geographical extension” of Anatolia, its annexation by Turkey—rather than its union with
Greece, nearly 600 miles away—was a scientific inevitability. Long before, the “argument from
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geographical proximity” had insinuated itself into Turkish nationalist discourse, which dubbed
Cyprus the yavruvatan of Turkey. In the June 1949 issue of Yeşilada, Manizade referred to
Cyprus as “an adorable baby in the arms of Anatolia” (1949, 3; quoted in Özkan 2015, 11).
Claims about the geological unity of Anatolia and Cyprus was first voiced in 1955 by the
geographer Fatin Rüştü Zorlu at a London conference organized by Britain to discuss political
and military matters affecting the eastern Mediterranean in the aftermath of Britain’s refusal to
grant self-determination to Cyprus. Following the conference, Turkish Prime Minister Adnan
Menderes described Cyprus as “the mere continuation of Anatolia” and the “main elements of
Anatolia’s security” (Ayın Tarihi 1955, 170). That same year, during the parliamentary
discussions, the deputy Sinop İncedayı stated that Cyprus “is geographically a part of Anatolia,
and it had been a Turkish land for about three and a half centuries” (TBMM 1955, 288–90;
Özkan 2015). Cyprus’s geological affiliation with Anatolia became a widely accepted matter in a
few years. In 1957, conservative writer and politician Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti wrote: “For
geologists, Cyprus is a part separated from Anatolia. This is a scientific fact. Let’s look at the
map: Cyprus is virtually pointing at the Gulf of Alexandretta. In this way the green island seems
to be saying ‘I broke off from there; I want to be back there” (Serdengeçti 1957, 82, quoted in
Bora 1995). A schoolbook on Cyprus’s history written by an author from Turkey and published
in 1959 asserted that
The island is, in every sense, in the mouth of the Gulf of Alexandretta between Turkey
and Syria. This shows us that at one time the island was connected to Anatolia. While
Anamur on the south coast of Turkey is 70 kilometers away and Syria is 100 kilometers,
Greece is 600 kilometers. (Metin 1959, 11)
In 1958, “Jeolojinin ve Tarihin Işığında Kıbrıs” (“Cyprus in light of Geology and History”), an
article published in the journal Türk Düşüncesi (Turkish Thought) by Füruzan H. Tökin, asserted
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that Cyprus had crucial military importance in the war against communism. In the event of a war
with Russia, support from the Western powers would need Cyprus to be under Turkish rule
(1958, 72). In 1969, the six-day First International Congress of Cyprus was held in Ankara.
At the event, the “Turkish side” sought to scientifically corroborate the Turkish
government’s demographic, geographical, geological, and other scientific political-territorial
claims, with papers entitled “The Relationship of the Island of Cyprus with the Mountains of
Southern Anatolia” or “A Geographical Introduction to Cyprus History” (1971). These papers
argued that the flora and fauna of Cyprus were similar to that of Alexandretta and that the first
human inhabitants of Cyprus arrived from Anatolia (Erdentug 1971). Geographers and
archaeologists such as Afif Erzen, Cemal Arif Alagöz, and Cevat Gürsoy backed these claims,
asserting that Cyprus is geographically akin to the Anatolian Peninsula and could even be said to
be a smaller version of Anatolia (Gürsoy 1964). Gürsoy argued that Cyprus was a “continuation
of the Taurides”, while Alagöz cited geographer Raoul Blanchard’s work to claim the same.
Alagöz wrote that Cyprus constituted a “geographical belonging and dependency example
despite political separation” and highlighted its similarity to the case of Kastellorizo Island,
which was located “2.5 km from our southwest coast” (Alagöz 1971).
Geographical characteristics translated into geopolitical importance. “Cyprus has a
strategic location that can control the entire Middle East,” wrote Gürsoy (1971). “Jets that take
off from Cyprus can reach Cairo or the Suez Canal, and the Soviet border is an hour away.”
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Figure 33 Cyprus as a "geostrategic island." (Gürsoy 1971).

In the compilation entitled Kıbrıs ve Türkler (Cyprus and the Turks), geography professor
Gürsoy concluded that “due to its historical rights and security considerations, it is impossible to
imagine Turkey relinquishing Cyprus” (1964, 7–19). In 1985, claiming that Cypriots are not
Greek, Ismail Hâmi Danişmend wrote that “Cyprus island is our Anatolia’s piece that has been
thrown to the sea; a ‘material and spiritual part’ of it” (Danişmend 1985, 291, quoted in Bora
1995).
The presumed geographical and geological connection of Cyprus with Anatolia and the
region was pervasive in the post-Cold war period. The idea that Cyprus was geologically part of
Anatolia appeared to provide a self-evident argument for Turkey’s claims to the island. Cypriot
writer Mustafa Haşim Altan (1997: 3) asserted that Cyprus was cut off from Anatolia due to a
“geological accident” and argued that Cyprus’s military and geopolitical importance was related
193

to its natural affinity with Anatolia. Academic articles supported the geological claims of
politicians, lobbyists, and geopolitics experts. Turkish geographer Cevat Rüştü Gürsoy’s made
the following comment under the “Cyprus” entry in the Encyclopedia of Islam:
Many scientists consider the island within the Taurus Mountains’ system and that
Besparmak or Kyrenia Mountains are the continuation of the Nur Mountains, a mountain
range in the Hatay province of south-central Turkey, which runs roughly parallel to
the Gulf of Alexandretta. Troodos Mountains are the continuation of Keldag, or Jebel
Aqra, a limestone mountain located on the Syrian–Turkish border. (Gürsoy 2002)
The 1st North Cyprus Underground Resources Symposium held in 2008 linked the
island’s relationship with Anatolia to the Neolithic age, through a stone: obsidian. The
symposium brochure stated that “Obsidian, which is not native to Cyprus, it arrived there from
the Taurus of Anatolia, which is 70 km away from the island. By the archeological findings, we
know that the inhabitants of Cyprus crossed to Anatolia on small boats” (JMO 2008). In 2016, an
Aydinlik writer repeated the claim that Cyprus is an inseparable part Anatolia: 2. 5 million years
ago, at the end of the Pleistocene epoch, [Cyprus] was a peninsula attached to Alexandretta. With
the melting of glaciers, the peninsula was submerged underwater and broke away from the
mainland. Yet, Anatolia’s extension Cyprus has not detached itself from us geopolitically,
despite the seawater in the middle” (Gürdeniz 2016).
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Figure 34 "Cyprus is the geological continuation of Anatolia." (Gürsoy, 1969)

Others linked Cyprus’s geological history to Noah’s flood. The Turan Strategic Research
Center, a nationalist think tank, argued that the island “is an Anatolian land to its core, which
broke off from the mainland Anatolia’s Gulf of Alexandretta following the Flood (17,000 BCE)
and drifted to its current location” (Sinaci 2010). The essays were grouped into subsections such
as “Geographical Location and Geological Evolution” and “Geo-Strategical Positioning and
Importance.” In the latter section, the realist political scientist Nicholas J. Spykman’s theory of
the rimland and Alfred Thayer Mahan’s Influence of Sea Power upon History (1890) were often
cited. According to these views, Cyprus was key to Turkey’s access to open seas, while
providing an ideal air force base. Sinanci, the author of the essay, described the island as an
“unsinkable aircraft carrier” (Sinaci 2010).
195

In an article, Professor Ulvi Keser called Cyprus “Anatolia’s natural extension” and
argued that it had broken off from Anatolia during the second [Paleozoic] and third [Mesozoic]
geological eras (Keser 2006). Keser then linked geographical proximity to culture. For Keser,
“the historical fabric of the island, its population, cultural values, social life, language, traditional
ways of living, and its geophysical properties above and below the ground all revealed that the
island was in fact a part of Anatolia.” He continues, “An island which is that close to Turkey
cannot be geographically, culturally, historically, and socially different than Anatolia as well… It
is also known that Cyprus’s inhabitants came to the island from Anatolia” (Keser 2006). An
academic article published in the journal of Eylul University School of Law argued that “Cyprus
is a natural extension of Anatolia. It is known that Cyprus cut off from Anatolia’s Hatay region
during the depressions that occurred in the second and third geological eras” (Keser 2006).

The 1964 Crisis and Its Aftermath
A major international crisis involving Cyprus, the US, and Turkey took place during the
height of the Cold War in 1964. US-Turkey relations reached its lowest point after the Turkish
government attempted to occupy the island and violence between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot
communities broke out in December over President-Archbishop Makarios’s efforts to alter the
constitution to strengthen Greek Cypriot’s governmental authority. Turkish Prime Minister İsmet
İnönü responded by having the air force make demonstration runs over Cyprus and threatening
an invasion if Makarios did not back down. After rumors started spreading about Turkish troops
and vessels gathering near the port of İskenderun—the nearest large port to Cyprus on the
Turkish coast—for a possible invasion to protect the Turkish Cypriote community on the island
from the Greek Cypriote majority, US President Lyndon Johnson sent a harsh letter to İnönü
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warning Turkey to abandon its plans for intervention in Cyprus at the threat of losing NATO
protection from a possible Soviet intervention (Johnson and Inönü 1966). Johnson warned
Turkey that if it intervened in Cyprus without consulting with the guarantors and its allies, he
would not permit the use of military equipment donated by the US in any invasion.
The letter was leaked to the press and caused a wave of anti-Americanism and
disillusionment with NATO. Johnson’s letter was met with “shock and disbelief” in Turkey, as
a CIA cable noted at the time, “Johnson's letter has done more to set back US-Turkish relations
that any other single act,” the cable said (CIA 1964). Following an emergency cabinet meeting,
İnönü wrote a reply to Johnson, stating that the US’s position revealed the necessity of becoming
more independent of the US in international relations. The exchange led to a meeting with the
two leaders in Washington on June 21, which led to Turkey postponing its military intervention
plans to Cyprus, only to carry them out anyway ten years later in 1974, resulting in the de facto
separation on the island.
The crisis urged Turkey to shift its foreign policy and its allies. When the US Special
Envoy to Cyprus, Cyrus Vance, came to Turkey in late 1967 to convince the Turkish government
not to intervene in Cyprus, thousands gathered at the airport, forcing Vance to land at a military
airbase for security reasons. When the US Sixth Naval Fleet visited Istanbul in 1968, there were
many protests, and some American sailors were thrown into the sea by university students. In
1969, the protestors burned the car of the US ambassador in Ankara. The event also led Turkey
to start searching for other allies. In 1969, Turkey participated in the first Islamic Summit
Conference held in Rabat, Morocco, and joined other Islamic states in condemning Israel’s
occupation of Jerusalem and other Palestinian territories in the Six-Day War in June 1967. This
all ran parallel to the rise of Islamist politics in Turkey.
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The major part of the debate over the Cyprus Issue, however, revolved around oil. During
the 1964 crisis, when it was rumored that the Turkish military was going to occupy Cyprus.
Rumors started circulating that the ATAŞ refinery in Mersin, which provided fuel for Turkish
fighter jets had halted production, blaming it in the oil crisis going on at the moment. ATAŞ was
operated by Shell, and nationalists started arguing that the halt was an attempt to thwart Turkey’s
plans to intervene in Cyprus. This was interpreted as a sign that Turkey should own its own
refineries, extract its own oil, and produce its own technology. Production in the ATAŞ refinery
was disrupted once again in 1974, when Turkey actually intervened in Cyprus, making the
Cyprus Issue one of the key moments for the articulation of resource and infrastructure
nationalism in Turkey.

The Occupation of Cyprus
In 1973, presidential elections took place, with Bülent Ecevit’s center-left CHP
(Republican Peoples’ Party) becoming the winning 33.5 percent of the vote, against 2.5 percent
won by Süleyman Demirel’s JP (Justice Party)—a 15 percent decrease for JP. No party had an
outright majority, so coalition or minority governments were inevitable. After drawn-out
negotiations, a cabinet was formed in January 1974 with a surprising coalition formed between
Ecevit’s CHP and Erbakan’s MSP (National Salvation Party). Both parties in this marriage of
convenience nevertheless distrusted European and American influence as well as big business—
a cautious embrace of the capitalist regime of the Atlantic Alliance and its sociospatial order.
The coalition had only been in power for a few months when the Cyprus crisis broke out.
Ecevit became a national hero overnight by successfully handling the crisis and the invasion of
Cyprus. Concerned that the current government was no longer supportive of enosis and facing
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allegations that it was a communist government, Greece staged a coup d’état in Cyprus in 1974
and installed Nikos Sampson, a notorious Greek Cypriot militia fighter who had openly
propagated a plan of ethnic cleansing against the Turkish minority in the 1960s. He immediately
proclaimed that a full unification with Greece was imminent (Hitchens 1997). In response to the
coup, plans of enosis, or unification with Greece and the perceived threat of civil war and ethnic
cleansing, Turkey intervened in Cyprus. Pleading its guarantor rights, Turkish troops carried out
the “Peace Operation” and landed in Northern Cyprus on July 20, 1974 and established a
bridgehead around Kyrenia. During the operation, the ATAŞ refinery stopped production,
causing fighter jet and ship operations to be suspended or delayed. The ships had to sail all the
way to the western shores of Turkey and get their fuel supply from the Tüpraş Oil Refinery in
İzmir. According to some commentators, this delayed the “Peace Operation” by five days. In a
short period of time, the Petroleum Office, then owned by the Turkish State and operated under
TP, intervened and supplied fuel to Turkish fighter jets. In an almanac published by the
company, the events of 1974 were narrated as such:
Our office has not only successfully met all domestic and private fuel and mineral oil
needs in the country, but also continued this success during the Cyprus operation. Our office has
supplied all the needs of our military forces at the right time and right place. We have made sure
that the Peace Operation, which has been carried out to end our kins in Cyprus in accordance
with international agreements and the motto of “Peace at Home, Peace in the World,” is
successfully carried out (Petrol Ofisi 1975).
Two days later, a ceasefire was agreed upon, but when communal violence on Cyprus
continued, the troops began a second offensive on August 14, during which about 40 percent of
the island was brought under Turkish control. Within a month, Turkey had occupied a third of
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Cyprus, and refusing to leave, literally creating a new state on the island. In 1983, a formally
independent TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) was proclaimed by the nationalist
and pro-annexation wing of Turkish Cypriots. TRNC has been recognized by only Turkey. In the
eyes of the vast majority in Turkey, Ecevit had successfully protected the rights, and perhaps
saved the lives, of the Turkish minority in Cyprus, but internationally the action isolated Turkey.
The US declared an arms embargo, which was only gradually lifted after 1978. In reaction, the
Turkish government shut down a number of American installations. The US Embargo
exacerbated anti-Americanism in Turkey and sowed the seeds of Turkey’s divergence from the
Atlantic Alliance. The Cyprus operation and the US embargo also bolstered arguments for
Turkey to nationalize its oil companies, to search for and discover its resources on its own, and
to build its own oil refineries and defense technologies. The Cyprus occupation and US embargo
marked Turkey’s entry into Middle Eastern and North African politics in order to look for other
allies than US-Atlantic bloc. As Turkey’s occupation of Cyprus required continuous logistic
support and the embargo created serious shortages, the Turkish government decided to find new
suppliers and economic resources to maintain the military, and countries in the Middle East
entered Turkey’s radar for the first time since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey’s
relations with Libya, for example, developed during this period when Gaddafi offered military
aid to Turkey, and a petroleum agreement was signed between the two countries.
While finding new suppliers, Turkey realized that it needed to develop an indigenous
defense industry, so it established state-owned enterprises in the defense industry in the
following years. A year later, in 1975, the ASELSAN corporation was founded to produce
military radios and electronics for the Turkish Armed Forces. It eventually became Turkey’s
largest defense company. Specializing in military electronics and battlefield communications

200

systems and equipment, it later became a major exporter of military equipment. HAVELSAN
was founded in 1982 by the Turkish Air Force to provide maintenance for the fighter jet radars
owned by the Turkish Air Force radars; it later expanded into designing and planning “critical
defense systems” for the Turkish military and other buyers. In 1988, ROKETSAN, a
weapons manufacturer and defense contractor company, was founded. Framing themselves as
“indigenous-national research and development” companies, these companies would become
central to the counterinsurgency methods against the Kurdish guerillas during the war between
the PKK and the Turkish state in the 1990s. In the 2000s, under the AKP government,
ASELSAN, HAVELSAN, and ROKETSAN exported military products to the Global South by
forming “associated companies” in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates.
These “indigenous” industries became the stuff of conspiracy theory in the 2000s, with
ASELSAN occupying the central stage. The unusual number of deaths of ASELSAN engineers,
who allegedly worked at “highly strategic encryption and decryption projects” sparked the
attention of media and fueled speculations in the public. These deaths were ruled suicides or
accidents by police and autopsy reports. In August 2006, machine engineer Hüseyin Basbilen
was found dead with cut marks on his wrists. In 2007 three AELSAN engineers were found
dead, two of apparent gunshot wounds and the other of injuries sustained from jumping from his
apartment. All three were ruled suicides. Newspapers wrote that they had been working on highclassified projects, such as developing national tanks and modernizing F-16s. More ASELSAN
engineers died in the following years, with their deaths being deemed accident by electrocution,
car accident, LPG (liquefied petroleum gas) poisoning, and suffocation in 2008, 2012, 2015, and
2017.
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Those who believed in the conspiracy theories about the deaths of engineers asserted that
the deaths were too easily and quickly ruled as suicides, that they were not well investigated, and
that when they were, investigations were done under a veil of secrecy. They argued that
ASELSAN was working on top-secret military projects that would make Turkey stronger and
less dependent on the US and NATO. Others asked that if these deaths had been suicide, why did
they seem to be happening so seemingly systematically? Were the reasons related to the work
culture at ASELSAN? Others were highly skeptical, dismissing accusations of suicide, arguing
that these theories ended up exaggerating ASELSAN’s importance. “I have a friend who worked
there for years,” a young engineer from TP told me. “It’s just like one of those bulky and
bureaucratic places where nothing exciting gets done.” For him, these theories contributed to the
schizophrenic self-image of the populist, nationalist government of the time. For others, the
whole thing was nonsensical. The engineers who had died were in no way close to working on
top-secret projects. My interlocutor thought that the dead engineers had been entry-level or lowlevel employees and that “they were only calibration engineers.” Actual ASELSAN engineers,
for him, “laughed at those rumors and conspiracy theories about CIA or NATO trying to block
Turkey’s rise to power.”
Calls for a national-indigenous military and energy industry were supported by the
Turkish left, which had led the “National Oil Campaign” discussed in the previous chapter. With
the exception of TKP (the Communist Party of Turkey) and TİP (the Workers’ Party of Turkey),
leftist politics mostly stood behind the official Cyprus policy of Turkish administrations. Up to
1958, TKP opposed Turkey’s politics and stood in solidarity with AKEL (the Progressive Party
of Working People) and supported enosis as the only defense against US and British
imperialism, making the island into a war base in the region. In 1958, TKP abandoned their pro-
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enosis stance and started arguing for an independent, unified, and equal republic in Cyprus. TKP
also stood against Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus in 1974. For the rest of the Turkish left,
Cyprus became a national cause in which anti-imperialism met resource nationalism. TİP
initially held a National Pact stance, arguing that since Cyprus remained outside of the borders
delineated in the National Pact, annexation could not be an option, and Turkey had no rights over
Cyprus. However, in the years leading up to Turkey’s military intervention in 1974, TİP
switched its policy and started arguing that Cyprus’s protection could be viewed as a second
“War of Liberation.” For TİP, intervening in Cyprus would be tantamount to fighting Western
imperialism, NATO, and the US During Turkey’s military intervention in 1974, TİP supported
the government. The journal Yön, which was the most active platform during the National Oil
Campaign, for example, approached the Cyprus Issue as a national cause and strictly opposed
Enosis, linking the Cyprus Issue to US imperialism. Especially after the 1965 crisis, Yön started
arguing that NATO and the US restrictions during the Cyprus crisis had revealed that the
Atlantic Alliance represented a Sevres-like regime upon Turkey (Çamlı 1965). Yön used the
embargos to criticize Turkey’s economic dependency in the US and how that jeopardized its
sovereignty and independence in its foreign policy decisions (Çamlı 1964b).

Legacies of the Cyprus Issue
The Cyprus Issue brought into being three political-ideological trends in Turkey that have
continued into the present crisis regarding the discovery of hydrocarbons in the eastern
Mediterranean. The first was interventionism. Turkey initially followed a strict non-alignment
politics after its founding in 1923, in line with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s principles. This position
was crystallized during World War II, when İnönü successfully maintained a neutral stance and
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avoided entering the war. The crisis in Cyprus marked one of the first steps in Turkey’s foreign
policy trajectory towards independent interventionism. Having sided with the US and committed
to the anti-communist camp with its contribution to the Korean War and the Baghdad Pact,
Turkey had become a pillar in American-led order in the Middle East, especially after the 1979
revolution in Iran. Turkey’s position in the Cyprus Issue was built upon these currents, as
demands for a unified Cyprus were cast as communist ideologies by the Turkish right, while,
despite its alliance with the US, Turkey intervened in Cyprus in 1974, jeopardizing its position in
the Atlantic Alliance.
The second trend that crystallized during the Cyprus crisis was anti-imperialism. During
the last half of the1960s and 1970s, calls for a fully “independent Turkey” grew louder and
louder, with greater concern over Turkey’s dependence on the US and NATO. At the same time,
protests against the bases and the prerogatives of the American servicemen and their immunity
from prosecution, evoking memories of the notorious system of capitulations and economic
concessions facing European states during the last century of the Ottoman Empire. These events
took place in a context of rising cost of weaponry, and higher pay for the officer corps made
Turkey more dependent on foreign financial assistance. In 1969, historic mass demonstrations
against the visiting ships of the US Sixth Naval Fleet took place, placing the Turkish left at the
center of the anti-imperialist struggle. Turkey, which had taken a nonalignment position during
the Bandung Conference in 1955, shifted its foreign policy through the Cyprus crisis, and started
rebranding itself as a nation-state allied with other postcolonial states and self-determination
movements throughout the world. Finally, the Cyprus Issue brought nationalism at the center of
Turkish politics and transformed it from an official ideology to a banal, popular ideology. The
Cyprus Issue’s becoming a “national cause” popularized nationalism for the first time in
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Turkey’s history. Neither right nor left-wing movements could isolate themselves from the
currents of nationalism. In this period, nationalism was also coupled with the coexistence of antiAmericanism and anti-communism. Anti-Americanism also emerged for the first time in such a
strong force in the public culture.

Hydrocarbon Discoveries
The discovery of hydrocarbon reserves in the eastern Mediterranean, recast the sea as a space of
resource potentiality. The discovery of hydrocarbons has redefined what the ancient
Mediterranean Sea means, what it encapsulates, envelopes, and promises. A feature article in
Offshore Technology, for example, wrote the following in 2017:
Unlike the Gulf of Mexico or the North Sea, the Mediterranean Sea has always been
better known for its stunning climate, cuisine and a booming tourism trade than offshore
oil and gas. But as ‘easy oil’ becomes an increasingly rare prospect and as productivity in
mature regions such as the North Sea continues to decline, exploration firms are pushing
their search for hydrocarbons into deeper waters and in territories that previously hadn’t
been considered. In that context, oil and gas resources in the Mediterranean have become
more attractive in the last decade, pulling in investment like never before. (Lo 2017)
“The topography of Cyprus and the surrounding area makes it a fascinating location for
geologists but a challenging one for hydrocarbons explorers,” according to a 2014 PRIO (Peace
Research Institute) report. The resources are sometimes located in very deep waters, even at
depths of over two kilometers, making it “technically difficult, risky, and expensive to carry out
exploration in the area. However, technological advances, combined with high international oil
prices, which tend to encourage oil and gas companies to invest, prompted new exploration at the
beginning of the 21st century” (Gurel, Mullen, and Tzmitras 2013, 1). These discoveries also
meant that the states of the eastern Mediterranean, Israel, Cyprus, Egypt, Lebanon, and Turkey,
who have historically been resource-poor and heavily dependent on other countries such as

205

Russia and Ecuador for oil and gas, could potentially benefit from these resources, and even
become exporters in the future in a time where “energy security” was one of the most popular
buzzwords of policy and governance in the world.
Some thought that the gas discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean would serve as an
impetus for peace and cooperation, and a catalyst for the resolution of a number of the region’s
conflicts, most notably the Cypriot one. In numerous reports, the US-based think-thank
organization Atlantic Council, which has been heavily invested in the region’s issues, for
instance, expressed that the discovery of significant natural gas deposits in the exclusive
economic zones of Israel and Cyprus and the alleged deposits of the Levant Basin may provide
an additional energy source outside the former Soviet space and the Middle East proper and
therefore contribute to the diversification of Europe’s natural gas suppliers. “Hydrocarbons that
remain in the ground are of use to no one” (Gürel, Tzimitras, and Faustmann 2014, 2), a report
by Peace Research Institute (PRIO), asserted in 2014.
These triumphant narratives about overcoming natural barriers, technological progress
and extractivism in the eastern Mediterranean was all over the media during the news since 2009,
when Israel discovered gas at the Tamar field. This discovery was “dwarfed” by the subsequent
discovery at the Leviathan field in 2010. The same year, the US Geological Survey stated that
exploratory drilling near the coasts of Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey had
unearthed vast reserves of natural gas (Schenk et al. 2010). The US Geological Survey estimated
a mean of 1.7 billion barrels of recoverable oil and a mean of 122 trillion cubic feet of
recoverable gas in the Levant Basin Province (Schenk et al. 2010, 4). “Energy experts”
speculated that once developed, the Tamar and Leviathan fields could satisfy Israel’s electricity
needs for the next 30-40 years and even allow it to become a net energy exporter. The discovery
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of the Zohr field in Egypt’s EEZs in 2015, further exacerbated the possibilities that the
Mediterranean Sea held. With such triumphant discoveries of large amounts of gas, the eastern
Mediterranean quickly became an ocean space of resource potentiality (Weszkalnys 2015) that
attracted giant international oil companies to the Mediterranean.
This change in the story for countries who have historically been heavily dependent on
primary energy imports, however, was accompanied by new geopolitical tensions, alliances,
conflicts, and claims that involved a constellation of nation-states, de facto states,
private/international oil companies, the EU, and the US. One of the most significant areas of
contention has been linked to gas exploration and the eventual gas discoveries of Cyprus. In
2011, Noble Energy discovered the Aphrodite field in Cyprus, and seven years later, in February
2018, Italy’s ENI and France’s TOTAL announced Calypso, in the Cyprus government’s Block
6, which appeared to be an extension of Zohr’s geological formation. These additional volumes
of gas promised Cypriots a major step toward realizing the dream of “becoming the energy hub
of the eastern Mediterranean.”
The territorial dispute between the Republic of Cyprus (Cyprus) and Turkey has been
over the extent of their exclusive economic zones (EEZs).85 Turkey’s claims partly overlapped
with Cyprus’s EEZ blocks 1, 4, 6, and 7. Turkey also supported Northern Cyprus’s claims in
blocks 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 12, and 13, including seabed within a few kilometers of the Aphrodite gas
field. In addition to the blocks contested between Northern Cyprus and Turkey, the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus issued exploration licenses also in the disputed blocks. Turkish
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UNCLOS made a division between “territorial sea” and EEZs: Territorial waters, or a territorial sea, is a belt of
coastal waters extending at most 12 nautical miles (22.2 km; 13.8 mi) from the baseline of a coastal state. While
states held full sovereignty over their territorial seas, the EEZs became designated areas of ocean space between 12
to 200 NM from shore in which states retained sovereign rights to exploring and exploiting mineral and living
resources.
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Petroleum also begun conducting oil and gas exploratory drilling off the shores of Northern
Cyprus. Turkey condemned drillings off Cyprus as an “unacceptable” violation of “the
inalienable rights” of the Turkish Cypriot people. In April 2018, Turkey positioned a seismic
research vessel off Northern Cyprus. In such a politically rife context, “energy analysists” started
to question whether energy companies would commit the billions of dollars needed to develop
Cypriot gas in the absence of a deal to remove the political risks. Turkey’s seismic ships
continued to conduct research in the eastern Mediterranean in 2018 and 2019, as the
governments of Greece and Cyprus urged Turkey to “stop its aggression” and stated that Turkey
was jeopardizing regional security and violating Cyprus’s sovereignty (Ahval 2019).

Conclusion
The discovery of hydrocarbon reserves in the eastern Mediterranean triggered new waves
of territorial and geopolitical disputes in the region, on the backdrop of the historical territorial
contestations that are entangled with imperial-colonial and Cold War histories. As Turkey’s
offshore hydrocarbon exploration activities generate performances of sovereignty, expansionist
and neo-Ottomanist rhetoric, Greece and the EU have condemned Turkey’s “illegal actions.” The
standoff has highlighted the fragility of Cyprus, the EU’s most easterly member and the bloc’s
only divided state. As regional powerhouse, Ankara has long argued that areas of Cyprus’s
maritime zone, known formally as its exclusive economic zone, fall within the jurisdiction of
Turkey and the war-partitioned island’s Turkish Cypriot community. These actions have been
analyzed as Turkey’s drift from the West or NATO and attributed to the ideology of the AKPErdoğan regime. This chapter illustrated that the territorial imaginaries and political ontologies
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that characterize current disputes have a long history, situated in the Cold War period and related
to questions of energy and technology sovereignty.
This chapter explored how the territorial constitution of Cyprus and geopolitical
imaginaries that accompanied it were entangled with the materialities and imaginaries of geology
and oil. Examining the emergence of Cyprus as a national issue in Turkey and as a “baby
homeland” in relation to the “motherland” during the Cold War, this chapter analyzed the ways
in which geographical and geological imaginaries have been a part of territorial claims and
geopolitical arguments in relation to Cyprus. Nationalist writers, politicians, geographers, and
archeologists have argued that Cyprus is the continuation of Anatolia’s Taurus region,
naturalizing political claims for Cyprus’s annexation to Turkey. Thus, territorialization was
enabled by a new geo-spatial configuration. The Cyprus Issue also marked the first significant
shift in Turkey’s foreign policy as well as emergence and reconfiguration of often conflicting
ideologies in Turkey. Anti-Americanism’s emerged during this period, especially after the 1964
crisis. The rhetoric of anti-imperialism was also “hijacked” by the Turkish right-wing
nationalists during this period. The Turkish left mostly supported Turkey’s official policy in
Cyprus, which was framed as a “national question.” As the ATAŞ refinery crisis demonstrates,
resource and technology nationalism played a major part in the Turkish left’s silence regarding
the Cyprus Issue, entangled with anti-imperialism. Resource and techno-nationalism was also
entangled with conspiracy theories regarding indigenous military-technology companies’
employee’s suicides. Turkish left’s analysis of the Cyprus Issue resembled its stance towards the
Kurdish Question. In both cases, a naturalized and fetishized correlation between oil-geology and
political-territory was formulated and framed as a national question, rather than recognizing the
centrality of state power in producing uneven relationships and spaces.
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CHAPTER 5
Territories of Warfare:
Violent Entanglements in Oilfields and Battlefields

Batman is Batman lêblê gulê lêblê gulê lê lê
It is Batman, Batman
Heart of pearl, small mouth, black eyed, jewels on its head my dear
It is the Batman of Kurds
It is petroleum, petroleum, lêblê gulê lêblê gulê lê lê
It is petroleum, petroleum
Heart of pearl, small mouth, black eyed, jewels on its head my dear
Petroleum of the Kurds lêblê gulê lêblê gulê lê lê
Petroleum of the Kurds
Heart of pearl, small mouth, black eyed, jewels on its head my dear
It is the Batman of the brave lêblê gulê lêblê gulê lê lê
They are all like lions
Heart of pearl, mouth is small, eyes black, jewels on its head my dear
It is the rose of Kurdistan, lêblê gulê lêblê gulê lê lê
The rose of Kurdistan
Heart of pearl, small mouth, black eyed, jewels on its head my dear86
Translations and Negotiations: Worlds of Warfare and Geology
In the office of Major Cengiz, commander of the gendarmerie command outpost of the
province of Siirt, I sat in the back, sipping a tea, while three men and a woman leaned against a
wall. The first man, wearing a camouflage jacket and pants was Major Cengiz, and the others
were Halil Bey and Ismail Bey, geologists employed at state-owned TP (Turkish Petroleum).
The woman was Seda Hanım, Head of Exploration at PERENCO, a mid-sized Anglo-French oil
and gas company that is the largest foreign oil producer in Turkey today. They were carefully
inspecting the two maps on the wall. One of them was a satellite map of the southeastern
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A folk song about Batman, “Batmane Batmane” by Bırindar Ali and Şahê Bedo.
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Anatolia region of Turkey, showing in detail the settlement areas, roads, and military outpost
locations, each of which had been marked with a pen. The other map was held by Ismail Bey,
who had taken it out from one of his khaki vest pockets. With colors designating the types and
ages of formations, lines indicating fault lines and tectonic units, and little black rectangles and
squares pointing to existing wells and deposits, this was a geological petroleum map of the same
region. Yet, the two maps looked completely different. Both aware of these discrepancies, Major
Cengiz and Ismail Bey looked baffled as they tried to understand each other’s maps. But a kind
of translation nevertheless took place.

Figure 35 Command Outpost in Siirt. Author photo.
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We were at the Siirt command outpost to obtain official permits for a geological survey
they planned to conduct a couple of weeks later. Doing this was a bit complicated, since the area
had been a de facto war zone, on and off, for years. After a few minutes of contemplation, Major
Cengiz started looking confused by the geological map and switched his attention to the military
satellite one: “Here, here, or here is safe for you to conduct this survey,” he said. “No,” replied
Ismail Bey, “Commander, we’re planning to do this a little bit south of that location. See, here?”
pointing to a yellow spot on the geological map. Major Cengiz’s eyes remained fixed on the spot
for a while and then moved to the satellite map. After a couple of back-and-forths, he said, “No,
that would be too dangerous; the PKK attacked 4 km south of that location seven months ago,”
he frowned. “How about here?” asked Ismail Bey, pointing to a spot about an inch south of his
previous suggestion. “Hmm, let me see your map. Are those roads?” the major asked, pointing to
the thin black lines on the map. “Ah, no, they are fault lines, Commander.” “Hmm, that doesn’t
serve any purpose for me,” he chuckled.
A negotiation was taking place between two different cartographic imaginaries in the
outpost office the day: geological and military. While the geologists wanted to conduct their
survey in areas where their knowledge had been lacking and some petroleum potential had been
predicted, Major Cengiz was trying to ensure the group would avoid the areas most vulnerable to
potential attacks by the PKK. As he said, summer, which always meant an increase in guerilla
activity in the region, had not begun yet, but they still had to be careful because there had been
attacks recently, even if sporadic. This had been the case in Turkey’s Kurdish regions since
2015, when the ceasefire between the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government and the
PKK collapsed. The negotiation taking place between geological and military registers could be
understood as “reverberations back and forth between disparate, interdependent fields”
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(Connolly 2013, 407), configuring Turkey’s Kurdistan as an oilfield and battlefield at the same
time. What kinds of frictions were generated in this encounter? What kinds of territorializations
have warfare generated in Turkey’s Kurdistan?
Cartography is a spatial technology that naturalize territory and normalize the
relationship between state, sovereignty, and space. Steinberg (2009) argues that the
“rationalization and abstraction of space embodied in the act of territorial bounding permits a
discourse premised on control and management, which in turn both reflects and enables the
exercise of power by those who, through control of territory, organize the social processes that
transpire within” (471). Maps create—rather than reflect—reality; through exclusion and
inclusion and rendering visible and invisible. They naturalize power relations, uneven
development, and the state itself as a timeless entity. The scene presented above, however,
complicates these arguments around cartography and power. In Siirt, the translation that took
place between two different maps: a military map of the terrain and the geological map of the
southeastern Anatolia basin. While terrains are established through complex entanglements
between physical geography and political or military logic (Gordillo 2013; Woodward 2014),
geological maps are far from being timeless representations of abstract space. Geological maps
are not just representation but also “enactments” (Mol 2002) of the materialities of the substrate
and the inhuman histories of the earth. Thus, what took place in the command outpost that day
was more than just a translation between different ways of knowing and representing the reality;
it was a collision between two separate but interdependent realities—military and geological—
that arranged geophysical space differently. This negotiation at the military outpost revealed that
the space of Kurdistan was cast as both military terrain and geological field.
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Cengiz paused. The commander was thinking. Finally, “No, I’m sorry,” he told Halil
Bey. “We cannot take that risk, although the summer season [of guerilla attacks] hasn’t begun
yet.” “Can’t you send a drone and see if there’s any activity there?” asked Ismail Bey. The
commander smiled. “There are places even our drones can’t see. There are blind spots. We
cannot know if terrorists are there before we send our men there, and that’s too risky.” The
commander’s words reminded me of what Ismail Bey had told me a couple months earlier about
exploration geology, that they just could never be certain that there was enough oil under the
ground until drilling into the strata. In that case, “risk” meant losing money and emerged partly
from the epistemic and ontological uncertainties inherent to geology and Earth. In this case, the
“risk” was calculated as “human cost,” but it was still embedded in the limits of technology and
the excess of Earth’s geophysical qualities in Turkey’s Kurdistan that cannot be totally captured
by the military.
Examining the frictive entanglement of geological and military imaginaries, oilfields and
battlefields, or resource geographies and “military geographies” (Woodward 2004), this chapter
analyzes the transformation of Kurdistan’s urban and rural space since the 1990s. While focusing
on multiple actors and relationships that come into being through the entanglement of oil and
warfare, this chapter examines the relations between engineers, workers, guerillas, chemicals,
non-human animals, bombs, mines, duct tapes, pipelines, and rocks between 2016 and 2017
while conducting my fieldwork for this research and in the 1990s, a decade that saw a series of
violent encounters as part of war and counterinsurgency that took place in or deeply affected
Batman and geographies of oil in Turkey: the Gulf War, the war between the PKK (Kurdistan
Workers’ Party) and the Turkish state in southeastern Anatolia, and a series of murders by
unknown assailants in Batman.
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Previous chapters have traced the emergence of Kurdish demands for development,
political autonomy, freedom, and justice during various periods and examined the ways in which
oil mediated these demands. Chapter 2, for example, focused on the socio-material relations of
negotiation, collaboration, and reciprocity that were brought into being by the mediation of oil
infrastructures in Turkey’s Kurdistan. This chapter examines the entanglement of oil
infrastructures—camps, barracks, engineers, pipelines, workers, wells—with warfare since the
early 1990s and traces Batman’s transformation into a military geography—a battlefield—and
the various territorializations that this transformation has generated. Finally, it analyzes how the
earthly materiality of military geographies are utilized and shaped by the Turkish state, Kurdish
guerillas, and geologists in the ethnographic present.

The Emergence of the PKK
On August 15, 1984, the PKK declared the start of its guerrilla insurgency against the
state by raiding two army bases in the towns of Eruh and Şemdinli near the Turkey-Iraq border
(Gunes 2012). With the outbreak of the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish Armed
Forces in 1984, Turkey’s Kurdistan became a zone of armed conﬂict, state of emergency, and
everyday state violence. Advocating that an independent nation-state was the only way to end the
repression and denial of Kurdish identity in the Turkish Republic, the PKK adopted armed
struggle as a revolutionary strategy. The Turkish state retaliated by declaring a state of
emergency in 11 provinces in 1987, recruiting and arming Kurdish peasants to serve as “village
guards,” a paramilitary force, and conducting massive military operations in mountain hideouts,
villages, and cities (Özar, Uçarlar, and Aytar 2013). As young Kurdish men and women began
taking up arms against escalating state violence, the ranks of the PKK dramatically expanded.
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From 1980 to 2002, Turkey’s Kurdistan remained under martial law and state-of-emergency
rule. In the early 1990s, the PKK’s insurgency evolved into a mass movement with supporters
and sympathizers numbering several million drawn from all parts of Kurdistan and the Kurdish
communities in Europe. Hence, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the PKK started to present a
powerful political challenge to Turkey’s authority in the Kurdish regions.
Thirty years of war between Turkey and the PKK have resulted in 45,000 casualties and
to 1.2 million people being subjected to forced migration. About a quarter of all rural settlements
in the region of Turkey have been emptied. Human rights organizations estimate that the conflict
has led to up to 4 million being displaced, the majority of which came from thousands of Kurdish
villages being burned down by the military (Jongerden 2007; KHRP 2003). As will be explored
in the following sections, systematic environmental destruction has also been an effect and a
strategy of warfare for the Turkish state as a counterinsurgency strategy (Jongerden 2007).
In 1999, PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan was arrested in Kenya and imprisoned in Turkey,
and a ceasefire between the PKK and the Turkish state was declared. In 2001, AKP came to
power in a landslide victory with promises of ending the 15-year state of emergency rule in the
southeastern parts of Turkey and started having negotiations with Ocalan in 2013. In 2015,
however, the ceasefire broke due to regional and national political concerns of the Turkish
government.87 Rather than the “normalization” promised by AKP, Turkey’s Kurdistan moved
towards a new emergency regime with intensified security measures. The war also transformed
from rural guerilla warfare to urban warfare, turning urban centers into battlefields.
Shadows and Mutations: Colonial Occupation
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The AKP government was concerned about the potentially negative way that having talks with the PKK could
impact its votes. Turkey’s hostile attitude towards the 2014 Siege of Kobane in Syria and the YPG (People's
Protection Units, a pro-Kurdish militia in Syria) also escalated the tensions and contributed to the breakdown of
negotiations.
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Back at the command outpost in Siirt, after another half an hour of negotiation, Captain Cengiz
and Ismail Bey had agreed on the site to conduct the geological survey: an area in Eruh, a district
of Siirt, with 50 villages and 28,000 inhabitants, who live on an elevated and mountainous
topography. Captain Cengiz told us to visit the outpost in Eruh and speak to Captain Enis to
arrange the details, such as the exact location and route, armed protection, and civilian
assistance. We left the outpost, which was surrounded by enormous concrete barriers for
protection against possible PKK attacks. Five minutes later, we were at the Siirt city square,
which was not very crowded. On a big screen, there was a video of a Turkish flag being flown.
But the remnants of the HDP meeting that had been held that morning were still there [Figure
36].

Figure 36 Central square in Siirt after the HDP meeting. Author photo.
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Purple, green, red, and yellow flags were wrapped around the historic clocktower of the
city square, and the municipality’s sanitary workers were collecting placards left in the area that
read, “NO!”, “WE WON’T LET YOU BE THE PRESIDENT!”, “NO TO PEACE!”, “NO TO
FREEDOM!”, and “NO TO KAYYUMS!”.88
Our next stop—the Eruh outpost—was an hour’s drive away. This place was even more
securitized than the command outpost in Siirt. As we waited for our IDs to be checked in the car,
I spotted an inscription on the sidewall of a building in the yard [Figure 37]:
Dear friend on guard-duty! What you watch over is not a vehicle, soil, or rock. What you
watch is our brother, your child, your home. What you watch over is your history, honor,
mother. What you watch over is spirit, homeland at heart.89
When five minutes later, a young soldier approached us to give us back our IDs, Halil
Bey asked him how much longer his service tour was. “246 days,” said the serious-looking man,
as Halil Bey smiled at him bitterly. We got out of our truck and entered the building. Captain
Enis, a man in his early 30s, welcomed us with a gentle smile. As we entered the main building
that reminded me of the state-owned schools or hospitals in the rest of the country—perhaps
because of its smell—, I caught a glimpse of a small signboard near the door:

No incident has taken place in this establishment for 155 days.90

Winded from the sense of extraordinariness and imminent danger that the sign had briefly
instilled in us, we were directed to the command offices of Major Cengiz. Things looked calm.
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As discussed in Chapter 2, kayyums are federally appointed “trustees.” Using emergency powers that had been in
place since after the coup d’état attempt in July 2016, kayyums were installed by AKP in 82 opposition-run
municipalities in Turkey’s Kurdistan after the elected mayors had been removed due to suspected ties to the PKK
89
This “motivational” poem is found in many posts and barracks throughout Turkey.
90
This statement uses the same format of workplace accident signboards.
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After the compulsory service of tea that accompanied the initial chitchat, Ismail Bey got down to
business. A similar version of the conversation they had had with Major Cengiz in Siirt ensued—
only now, since his superior in Siirt had already agreed and he been phoned a few minutes
earlier, Captain Enis seemed relaxed. Major Cengiz, Ismail Bey, Halil Bey, and Seda Hanım
discussed the logistics of their survey trip: how many guards they would need, if they had a
driver who knew the terrain well, and how long the survey would take.

Figure 37 The sidewall of a building in the yard of the Siirt command outpost. Author photo.

We drove through the oilfields and battlefields of Turkey’s Kurdistan, through steep hills
of sedimented black-and-white limestone, clay, and sandstone over belts and massifs through
which brand-new, smooth, and dark-colored asphalt roads cut. Halil Bey told me that this had, of
course, been done for the comfort and promotion of the government, as roads tend to signal
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modernity (Adalet 2018) and other kinds of “promises” (Harvey and Knox 2015), but in this
case, there was another reason: it was more very difficult to install mines under asphalt roads
than dirt ones. And as there was nothing more plentiful than asphalt in Batman and Siirt, roads,
counterinsurgency, and oil aligned smoothly in this case, making mobility between Siirt and
Batman very easy and fast. And less than two hours later, we were back in the city of Batman,
where TP headquarters and guesthouses were located. The vast site of TP stood in stark contrast
to the rest of the city’s old, poor quarters and dusty streets. As our car stopped at the traffic light
at Emek (Labor) Junction, I realized that I was not able to see the municipal building that was
supposed to be there, because it was surrounded by 10-foot high and 10-inch thick concrete
security blocks. Realizing my surprise, our driver Barış told me that they had been erected just a
few days earlier. As Seda Hanım and Ismail Bey remained silent about the scene in front of us,
Halil Bey clicked his tongue in protest. But it was our driver Barış, who broke the silence. “It’s
as if an occupying army is here,” he murmured.
Seda Hanım was born and raised in Ankara. She had attended the prestigious TED Koleji
and then studied petroleum geology at Hacettepe University in Ankara. Soon after, she was
employed by the Anglo-French oil company PERENCO as an exploration geologist and stayed
there since. She was good at her job, spoke good English, and maintained good relations with
Turkish bureaucrats and geologists at TP. But she did not seem interested in what was going on
in Batman or Diyarbakır. She wasn’t a government supporter or an HDP sympathizer. At times,
if Ismail Bey or someone else complained about another incident of clientelism or favoritism at
TP, she would shake her head and say something like, “When are we going to be rid of these
people?” referring to the government. She said nothing of the sort on that day, while we were in
a car near the kayyum-occupied Batman municipality.
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Figure 38 Batman Municipality Building under kayyum rule in 2017. Author photo.

In Batman and many other towns in Turkey’s Kurdistan, these barriers had allegedly been
erected to protect the staff quarters of policeman and soldiers, the governor’s office, and,
ultimately, the municipal building—where the former mayor, a locally elected official from the
pro-Kurdish, left-wing HDP had worked until his removal from the office and arrest in
November 2016. Batman was not an exception. HDP’s municipal buildings were heavily
guarded by police and surrounded by barriers, calling to mind the “elastic geography” of the
“temporary, transportable, deployable and removable” (Weizman, 2012, 6) and “dynamic,
constantly shifting, ebbing and flowing” (Weizman 2007, 7) walls, barriers, and checkpoints in
Palestine under Israeli occupation (see also Kotef 2015).

221

In Batman, almost all kayyums had immediately fired the old staff after being appointed;
the few that remained decided to implement new policies.91 The first task of the kayyum in
Batman was to change the municipality’s logo, possibly due to the former logo’s colors, red,
green and yellow—the colors of Kurdistan. [Figure 39].

Figure 39 Batman Municipalities old (left) and new (right) logos.

Sometimes even wearing a combination of these three colors was reason enough to be taken into
custody by the police. A few months later, during another stay in Batman, I would be struck by
another development regarding the architecture of occupation in Batman. In March 2017,
Batman’s kayyum figured that the concrete blocks looked ugly and uninviting and decided to
decorate them with plastic grass and flowers, mutating the aesthetics of occupation and violence
in a grotesque fashion.

91

In Siirt, the kayyum replaced the Turkish flag on the lawn of the municipality building; the old one “had worn
out.”
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Figure 40 Concrete barriers around the municipality and grass decorations being installed in Batman.
Author photo.

If the cages that protect oil pumps and wells mentioned in Chapter 2 were “misused” and
reappropriated as target boards, while generating new and insurgent modes of territorialization,
the reconfiguration of concrete barrier blocks as vertical gardens in an attempt to render them
aesthetically pleasing or less visible revealed another side of misuse, one that both sedimented
internal-colonial state occupation and created an effect that I found grotesque. The residents of
Batman were frustrated and angered by the forceful removal of their elected mayor. But when
the kayyum installed the fake plants on the concrete blocks, many of them laughed at them.
Similar to the internet shutdown that tried to create a certain effect but ended up creating another,
Barış, thought that the walls now “ended up highlighting the situation.” “What situation?” I
asked him one day, as we were driving by HDP headquarters in Batman, which was decorated
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with purple, yellow, and green flags as a part of the “No” campaign for the upcoming
presidential system referendum in April 2017. “You know, that this place is not a normal place.”
The extreme expansion of the security infrastructure, such as police, military, walls,
barriers, checkpoints, was not only a result of the state of emergency rule declared after the coup
attempt. The political present in Batman was built upon a shift following the insurgency and
counterinsurgency tactics that the PKK and the Turkish state have been employing for more than
30 years. As the PKK, which had traditionally relied on urban guerilla warfare tactics since its
first attack in 1984, moved warfare to the cities from the countryside in order to organize mass
urban uprisings and organize blockades and counter-occupations; in tandem with global shifts in
insurgency tactics, the Turkish state’s counterinsurgency strategies also shifted. The AKP
government initially responded with “anti-terrorism operations,” relying on special police
operations units, special gendarmerie operation units, commando, and armored army units. When
Kurdish political parties and popular movements started to organize around self-governance
practices and democratic autonomy strategies in urban centers, the AKP regime responded with
violence and urban counterinsurgency tactics. As the Kurdish insurgents tried to defend cities by
creating urban enclaves and barricades, the Turkish Army forces gradually surrendered them,
employing a total destruction strategy. Armed conflicts took place in 16 towns and city centers,
which completely destroyed large parts of Kurdish cities like Nusaybin, Cizre, Silopi, İdil, and
Diyarbakır, turning them into debris and displacing 400,000 people in 2015 (GABB 2016).

Diyarbakır
During the course of my official research, I stayed in Diyarbakır for a month in May 2017, as it
was closer to the fields around the province, such as Sarıcak or Pirinçlik. Diyarbakır’s historic
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Sur region was among the neighborhoods completely destroyed during urban warfare. By May,
the remaining residents had also been forcibly evacuated for a “Sur renovation project” that the
government had initiated in collaboration with the kayyum-appointed municipality. Everyone
knew that this meant gentrifying Sur and making sure insurgent populations were excluded from
the urban space. The rest of the city was filled with the heavy presence of anti-riot vehicles,
security blocks, and police, while the city’s famous colorful cafés in the Ofis neighborhood were
filled with ex-municipal employees who had found themselves without a job overnight. Police
barricades were set up literally in the middle of pedestrian sidewalks, making it impossible to
walk on some parts of the streets without risking being hit by a car. At other times, being a
pedestrian meant trying to constantly avoid the gaze of police, being careful of what you say, and
looking out for undercover police, whose stubbly mustaches often gave them away. These
experiences, of course, were not new to Diyarbakır, but the scale of urban destruction and the
unapologetic presence of a colonial-state occupation was.
In the next section, I examine Batman in the 1990s, during the height of the war between
the PKK and Turkey, in order to capture another moment in which warfare, violence, and oil
have been deeply entwined in Turkey’s Kurdistan.

Ruptures and Misuse: Batman during the Gulf War
On August 8, 1990, the Turkish government announced the closure of the crucial KirkükYumurtalik pipeline and the suspension of all other commercial links with Iraq and occupied
Kuwait. On September 5, 1990, the Turkish parliament passed a bill allowing the government to
send troops abroad and receive foreign troops on Turkish soil, thus allowing its airbase in İncirlik
near Adana and military stations in Batman to be used by NATO and US forces for air strikes
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against Iraq. Turkey's support for the allied coalition marked a radical departure from its policy
of noninvolvement in regional conflicts and wars. By shutting off the twin pipelines that had
carried Iraq’s oil exports and permitting the US to use İncirlik airbase in Adana for strikes in
northern Iraq, Turkey played a key role in the UN-backed military and economic campaign
against the Saddam Hussein regime (Sayari 1997).
Batman found itself in the midst of an international crisis in 1990, when the oil price shock
first hit Batman. A double crisis occurred when Turkey joined the boycott and stopped importing
oil from Iraq and the Kirkük-Yumurtalik pipeline between Iraq and Turkey, which had supplied
75 percent of Turkey’s petroleum demand. The TÜPRAŞ petroleum refinery in Batman stopped
selling diesel fuel, gasoline, kerosene, and LPG to retailers for military-security reasons, in case
it was needed for military defense purposes, against the possible threat of the state war. The
TÜPRAŞ refinery in Batman, besides the Kirkük-Yumurtalik pipeline’s filling facilities in
Alexandretta, was the main source of fuel in Turkey’s Kurdistan. In Alexandretta, many
kilometers of traffic formed, while the newspapers talked of the “exodus of oil tankers from East
to West,” (Cumhuriyet, September 7, 1990) to İzmir and İzmit, where other petroleum refineries
were located.
On January 8, with the opening of the air space, the first allied air raids from İncirlik were
launched. As American F-15s, F-16s, and F-111s were taking off from İncirlik to bomb targets in
Iraq, tensions in Adana, Batman, Siirt, Diyarbakır, and border towns rose. American and British
squadrons, which were stationed at İncirlik (the main NATO airbase in Turkey), would be
mobilized if Turkey were attacked. US aircraft are permanently stationed at Incirlik. During the
crisis, however, the US was reinforced by a British air detachment, which led to widespread
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public anxiety that Iraq might counterattack and that the second front would also become a land
war in Kurdistan (Hale 1992; Haberman 1991).
The war was televised on CNN. Many in Kurdish cities did not trust the Turkish national
media and tuned in to CNN to stay updated and prepared. Fears of Iraqi missiles rose despite
government assurances that the chances of an attack were remote. The Iraqi missile assaults on
Israel made things worse, and tens of thousands fled their homes in southeastern regions near the
border to seek temporary shelter. Thousands of people migrated to cities in the west or escaped
to the highlands in the countryside.
Against the threat of a land war, the Turkish government installed or activated its emergency
siren systems in Kurdish cities. These sirens often malfunctioned. Due to what the authorities
would later call “technical problems,” loud sirens were heard in the middle of the day. Sirens
meant red alert. Upon hearing them, people would run home and call the police, mayor’s office,
and the municipality. The deluge of incoming calls jammed the phone lines, creating even more
panic and complaints. Furthermore, there was constant talk of chemical attack. People were
cautioned to purchase gas masks. Civil defense experts told people that gas masks were the last
resort, but some brochures disseminated in schools said otherwise. People wondered how and
from where they could purchase these masks, which—along with shelters in the event of a
chemical attack—were too few (Cumhuriyet, January 29, 1991).
Finally, people took matters into their own hands; some made hundreds of copies of these
brochures and distributed them to their neighborhoods. While the Ministry of Health deployed
“gas measurement” units in the “critical” cities, additional health professionals, and hospital
beds, while PTT (the Post and Telegraph Directorate of Turkey) installed special phone lines for
emergency communication, and the Ministry of Defense sent gas masks to depots for use if
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necessary. It also stated that it had set up shelters. But in Adana only 10,000 of the city’s 700,000
citizens could be sheltered. Diyarbakır was no different: There were only 41 shelters for 25,000
people in a city of 500,000 (Cumhuriyet, January 24, 1991).
Brochures handed out at schools advised people to duct tape their homes and cover their
windows with cardboard. They recommended that families seek shelter in a room in their homes
and seal the shelter with duct tape and plastic sheeting.92 Gas masks were crucial for protection,
but in the event of their absence, one had to wrap a wet towel around their face, covering their
mouth and nose, the brochures stated. Bu no gas masks were delivered, of course. The rumor was
that they had been handed out only to civil servants—to bureaucrats, police, and doctors—and
not to the Kurdish residents of these towns (Cumhuriyet, January 29, 1991). As petit
entrepreneurs took advantage of the situation and went into the tape production business, scared
people ran to stores and stocked up goods—onions, tomatoes, beans, bulgur, lentils, pasta, and
rice. The lucky ones were able to find gas masks. Others, in the city, leaned on wet towels and
duct tapes. They bought rolls and rolls of duct tapes and wrapped their doors and windows in it
(Başlangıç 1991; Erkiner 1991).
In Siirt, five of nine members of a family that had airproofed its home died when carbon
monoxide was released from the burned coal. In Antep, a father and son died from asphyxiation.
Newspapers sarcastically described these events as “Civil Defense Panic” (Cumhuriyet, January
19, 1991). Perhaps they were scared of the sounds of the malfunctioning sirens, thinking that a
chemical attack was on its way. But their deaths were translated into ignorance and
backwardness “These precautions might not find their way into civil defense books, but they will
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Similar recommendations were made in the US by the Bush administration and the Department of Homeland
Security as recent as 2003 to protect against a possible chemical or biological terrorist attack (see Chang and Miller
2003; Kulish and Spors 2003).
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certainly be in autopsy reports from the Southeast,” joked one piece (Cumhuriyet 1991b). The
same article ironically criticized the state and bureaucracy as well, implying that the local people
had found the best civil defense remedy: migration. “The people of the region have been already
appealing to this strategy in response to oppression and terror,” it said.
Things were extraordinary. In Adana and Batman, extra security measures were being
taken against possible attacks or sabotage. The İncirlik airbase, oil storage facilities, refinery, and
NATO airport and radar base in Batman were considered high-risk targets, now referred to as
“critical infrastructure.” Armored military vehicles and personnel were sent to oil camps in
Dodan, Raman, and West Raman, while the Turkish Army’s reserve forces were stationed in
TP’s facilities in Batman (Cumhuriyet 1991a). “Oil facilities and Batman city are intertwined;
thus, a possible attack on these facilities could cause a lot of loss of life,” an article in
Cumhuriyet declared with generic statements on Batman and the war from interviews with
Kurdish residents. Yet, another article also added that “the people of the region” were clearly
against the war (Cumhuriyet, January 24, 1991). People got angry and felt helpless in the face of
the extraordinary emergency within which they lived.
On January 28, 1991, “Batman found itself in the midst of the Gulf War, before it had a
chance to feel joyful over its designation as a province or enjoy the discovery of high-quality oil
deposits one after another” wrote a news piece in Cumhuriyet. This piece was in fact about the
violent turn of events following the anti-war protests in the city on January 1991. After a rally,
during which residents of Batman protested the role of the US and Israel in the war, police
attacked the protesters. Eight people were injured, and 40 were detained. News reports also
claimed that US soldiers had been attacked by the residents during the protests.
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Police forces in Batman took extreme measures following the demonstrations. Gatherings
of more than 10 people were prevented, while the police announced “disperse!’ to any group of
people they deemed “suspicious.” As news of about 60 German leopard tanks being deployed at
Botan and Raman oil camps in Batman and three patriot missile batteries being placed to protect
the NATO airport and oil refineries in Batman was keeping residents awake at night, fears of a
missile attack or a chemical attack arose (Cumhuriyet, January 30, 1991). The war brought more
panic, a sense of insecurity and danger, and an increased police and military presence to the
newly made administrative center of Batman and other municipalities in Turkey’s Kurdistan.93

Collisions and Negotiations: Guerilla Warfare and Oil
If 1991 in the oil geographies of Turkey’s Kurdistan was marked by the chemical
shadows and duct tape from the lifeworlds of the Gulf War and imperial aggression of the US,
backed by the UN, Israel, and other warmongers, the year 1992 was woven with the war between
the Turkish state and the PKK. The PKK abducted foreign tourists, civil servants (teachers,
doctors, etc.), journalists, and peasants, mostly for propaganda purposes, while it dealt with state
and military personnel and facilities in more violent ways. In other cases, the PKK frequently
attacked economic targets. Attacks on economic units increased from 1991 to 1999. The
mounting violence served two purposes: to ensure the flight of capital from the region and to hurt
the state’s economic interests: livestock, infrastructure projects, and extractive operations. They
raided a chicken farm in the central district of Hakkâri and burned 13,000 chickens alive.
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Batman became a province in 1990, enabling the establishment of administrative infrastructures that would make
it easier for the state forces to manage dissent, such as the implementation of a new and more comprehensive
security structure.
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Infrastructure, mining, and other extractive industries came to be the PKK’s primary
economic targets, particularly state-controlled enterprises. Coal mines in Şırnak and tobacco
processing facilities throughout southeastern Anatolia were subject to frequent guerilla attacks.94
Small-scale mining companies and private contractors specializing in infrastructure projects also
faced intense pressure. Yet, oil drilling sites and oil storage facilities in Batman province were
the primary targets of the PKK. It often targeted oil facilities of TP and others, including
periodical acts of sabotage on the Kirkük-Yumurtalik Iraqi-Turkish oil pipeline. These acts
spurred extensive national news coverage that outlined the economic damage caused and the
engineers, workers, and security personnel abducted, injured, and sometimes killed Karanfil and
Tapan 1991; Çelik 1998).95
For example, on August 31, 1992, the PKK attacked a Shell production field in Kastel
with bazookas, allegedly causing 2 billion Turkish liras worth of petroleum to be “lost to fire”
(Cumhuriyet, November 27, 1992). On September 24, 1992, the PKK attacked another field
owned by Shell, this time in Yeniköy, causing a 500 million liras worth of damage and
destroying rigs, according to news reports. After these incidents, Shell decided to move its
headquarters to a more secure location near Diyarbakır. The most lethal incident, however, took
place at a facility owned by Mobil. On September 13, 1992, guerillas attacked Mobil’s facilities
at the Selmo field, allegedly killing three engineers and injuring five workers. The guerillas later
set fire to a filling tank and an oil rig, news reports wrote, adding that they had caused a billion
dollars in damage (Cumhuriyet, September 12, 1992). This was followed by another attack on
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For example, in September 1992, PKK members burned 15,000 bales of tobacco in Kulp (Milliyet, September 21,
1992). PKK members raided the same chicken farm in June 1998, killing 10,000 chickens (Hürriyet, July 1, 1998).
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For a sample of incidents, see “TPAO’ya PKK Baskını,” Milliyet, June 22, 1993 and “33 PKK’lı Öldürüldü,”
Milliyet, September 12, 1992. The pipeline was attacked in 1986, 1987, 1994, 1997, and 1998 (“BOTAS=‘̧=a PKK
Saldırısı,” Milliyet, January 25, 1994; “BOTAS=̧=Boru Hattına Bomba,” Milliyet, July 4, 1994; “Yüksekova Göç
Ediyor,” Milliyet, August 21, 1993). For earlier attacks on oil companies in Lice and Kozluk, see “Petrol Tankları
Kundaklandı,” Cumhuriyet, September 1, 1992; and “9 PKK’lı Öldürüldü,” Milliyet, October 5, 1992.
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October 5, which caused half a billion dollars in damage, according to the papers (Cumhuriyet,
November 27, 1992). Finally, after an attack on August 1993, Mobil indefinitely suspended its
operations (Cumhuriyet, August, 22 1993). Following these incidents, foreign oil companies
started to either suspend their operations or leave altogether: Mobil stopped its operations on its
26 drilling wells in September 1993, transferring its licenses to TP (Cumhuriyet, October 13,
1993). By 1994, Chevron, Mobil, and Shell had canceled either their oil drilling licenses or
closed their oil sites (Cumhuriyet, September 1, 1992).
As Aydin and Emrence (2015) note, businesses were faced with two options:
pay a protection fee to the PKK or leave the region” (61). Most businesses—like Shell and
Mobil—left, while others chose to strike a deal with the PKK. Private contractors paid up to
25,000 DM per year for their safety (Milliyet, August 6, 1996)..Evidence also suggests that local
administrators of large-scale state enterprises, including TP and TEKEL (Tobacco, Tobacco
Products, Salt and Alcohol Enterprises), paid protection money to ward off attacks.
An exclusive report surfaced about an alleged meeting between a TP employer and a
PKK member, exposing that secret negotiations had taken place in 1992 between TP and the
PKK regarding the construction of a refinery. Journalist Behiç Kiliç claimed that the stateemployed engineers were negotiating payoffs and offering the PKK gas stations and money as
well as guaranteeing the construction of roads in places where asphalt roads did not exist.
Conspiracy theories claimed arose in 2016 that journalists who had witnessed the encounter were
going to be assassinated by the “deep state” before they reached Diyarbakır, in order to cover up
the illegal negotiations between state employees and the PKK, which the Turkish state
considered a terrorist organization.
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PKK’s attacks continued into the 2000s.96 In August 2010, PKK guerillas killed two
security personnel at TP’s West Raman oil field and set fire to a container. Four men saw the
flames from the neighboring village of Demirlipınar. Assuming that the blazes had been caused
by burning saps, they decided to drive to the field to be the first responders to the fire. A mine
planted on their road, however, detonated, killing all of them. They were all prominent proKurdish activists, lawyers, and politicians, much loved and respected by the local population.
This incident produced contradictory reactions from the Kurdish public. While some questioned
the methods and actions of the PKK, others claimed that the horrific death of these Kurdish men
could only be the doing of Turkey’s “deep state.” Some argued that this could be an act of
collaboration: the PKK and the deep Turkish state together, killing popular and respected figures
fighting for peace and justice.

Shadows and Erosions: Murders by Unknown Assailants
An organization called Hizbullah—not to be confused with Hezbollah in Iran—emerged in
the early 1990s with the objective of overthrowing the regime in Turkey, which it considered
non-Islamic and, thus, illegitimate and establishing a Sharia-based Islamic state in its place.
Despite that, Hizbullah has not once targeted the Turkish state and has even positioned itself as a
paramilitary force alongside the Turkish state in the first half of the 1990s, when the fighting
between the PKK and the Turkish state was at its most intense. Despite Hizbullah’s alleged
connection with elements of the deep state such as JITEM (Turkey’s Gendarmerie Intelligence
and Anti-Terror Organization), Hizbullah has never admitted to cooperating with the Turkish
state. Yet extended analyses of the organization indicate that while the Turkish state may not
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In another attack at Şelmo on November 24, 2011, two private security guards and a worker were killed. The PKK
also attacked the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline.
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have actively collaborated with Hizbullah, it clearly permitted Hizbullah’s acts of violence as
long as they were in the state’s interest (Cakır 2011, 86–90).
Between 1991 and 1995, over 700 people were killed in the Kurdish provinces of Turkey.
According to official records, 500 of them were PKK members or sympathizers and the rest from
Hizbullah (Cakir 2011, 70). Kurt notes that his informants say the number is actually in the
thousands (Kurt 2017). Hizbullah also operated as a subcontractor for JITEM in the 1990s and
carried out a considerable number of the estimated 17,000 “murders by unknown perpetrators”
(faili meçhul cinayetler). However, it was not only PKK members who were killed by Hizbullah
in the 1990s. Other victims include prominent imams, leaders, and intellectuals of Islamist
cemaats; those who were deemed to have strayed into a non-Islamic life; journalists; politicians;
women who supposedly engaged in prostitution; and even two boys who happened to stray onto
the roof of a Hizbullah cell while looking for their birds (Cakir 2011).
Shadow organization killing sprees hit Batman the worst. By 1993, it was no longer
known for being an “oil town.” The national media coined names like “terror town” or “murder
city” for the city (Cumhuriyet, February 9, 1993). Murders by unknown assailants skyrocketed,
leaving Batman’s residents constantly fearing for their lives. A feature story on Batman
described it as “The Town Whose Assailant Is Unknown” and stated that two murders per day
took place in the city, amounting to 147 people in only three months (Cumhuriyet, November 20,
1992). Batman’s residents feared walking in groups smaller than three and were off the streets
right before dusk.
Most of these stories were imbued with nostalgia about the glory days of Batman. For
instance, a piece titled “Sister Saliha Escapes Terror,” about a 52-year-old retired hairdresser
who owned TP’s first women’s hair salon, tried to capture Sister Saliha’s melancholic
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attachment to Batman and TP. Complaining about the everyday violence that had made her sick
with fear, Saliha declared that she had decided to leave Batman, where she had lived and worked
for 40 years (Cumhuriyet, October 15, 1993). Journalist Engin Aydin’s feature in the daily
Cumhuriyet began with the following statement: “Batman doesn’t smell like petroleum anymore;
it smells like blood!” Referring to a recent murder that had taken place near the railways, Aydin
alluded to the train wagons that carried petroleum products every day and the rails that glowed
with fresh blood. He wrote about the pools of blood on the streets and the children playing
around them, all of the city stores being shuttered, and the silence of the town. In this space of
utter emptiness, Aydin figured, only fear was tangible (Cumhuriyet, February 19, 1993).
As Engin’s articles from the period illustrates, the town of Batman was articulated in
many senses and sensibilities through a kind of nostalgia. The so-called glory of the oil complex
in 1960s Batman and the promises that oil had bestowed upon it and the rest of the country
seemed to have given way to a bleak future of perpetual violence and fear. But the Kurdish
residents of Batman only partially shared this nostalgia, since they had experienced the kind of
modernity that oil’s emergence supposedly brought to Batman as unevenness, exploitation, and
de-development.
During the 1990s, residents of Batman were often caught between conflicting
prohibitions set by the Turkish state, the PKK, and Hizbullah, all of whom claimed some level of
authority over the governance of the town. One of these prohibitions involved newspapers. The
governor’s office in Batman had banned the selling of the pro-PKK Özgür Gündem (Free
Agenda) at newsstands.97 In return, the PKK banned newsstands from selling pro-Turkish
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Özgür Gündem was an Istanbul-based daily newspaper in Turkish that was mainly read by people of Kurdish
origin. Launched in May 1992, the newspaper was accused of making propaganda for the PKK. Its editors and staff
have frequently been arrested and tried, and there have been multiple publication bans within Turkey. Since April
1994, the publication continued under different names until Özgür Gündem was relaunched on April 14, 2011.
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nationalist newspapers, while Hizbullah members attacked newsstand owners who were still
selling Özgür Gündem. Under these circumstances, only four of the 22 newsstands in Batman
were still in business after a few months. Other bans included the PKK’s bans on Turkish flags,
smoking foreign cigarettes, gambling, migrating to cities in the west, and lumbering; Hizbullah’s
ban on alcohol; and the Turkish military’s ban on traveling and migration, as well as the
implementation of curfews (Cumhuriyet October 15, 1993). The Turkish state imposed these de
facto bans (like Hizbullah and the PKK did): speaking, publishing, and reading in Kurdish all fell
somewhere on the spectrum of prohibitions that were subject to legal or paralegal punishment.
In a few months, hundreds had been murdered by unknown assailants. Many of these
were ordinary people; others were prominent Kurdish activists, politicians, or lawyers, including
DEP’s (Democracy Party) Mardin province MP Mehmet Sincar and Batman province’s DEP
head Metin Özdemir. These murders were specific to Batman and Kurdish geographies, but they
also shared a common trace of the deep state with the murders of left-wing journalists in Ankara
and Istanbul during the same time. The Turkish public demanded a “clean” government and an
accountable state (Navaro-Yashin 2002). But they remained unaware of or indifferent to statesanctioned violence, or they simply supported it in the southern towns of Turkey. In the
following section, I examine an American archeologist’s account that reflects the entanglements
of warfare and oil. Michael Rosenberg (1994) recounted events that occurred during a salvage
project in Batman and between 1991 and 1994, which clearly support the Turkish state’s
perspective on warfare. Yet, despite the ways in which histories of state violence are silenced in
Rosenberg’s account, his narrative traces the gradual decrease of the Turkish state’s sovereignty
in the region and the interlinked processes of oil and warfare (and archeology). Finally,
Rosenberg’s account reveals the entanglements of earth, war, and technology between 1991 and
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1994 in the oilfields and battlefields of Kurdistan, how scientists, engineers, guerilla, and
military personnel had to mediate the forces of the earth, and how they turned geological
formations into tools of insurgency and counterinsurgency.

Geopower and Warfare
An archeologist at Mobil’s oilfields
In 1991, American archeologists working at a salvage project that mapped and excavated sites
along the Tigris River in Batman, which would be flooded by the dam projects in the region,
found themselves in the midst of warfare. Sympathetic to the Turkish state’s views. In June
1991, they began a salvage excavation at a site about 50 km north of Batman. The site was
situated adjacent to the Shelmo oil field, which is being worked by Mobil. In 1994, right after
returning from the site in Batman for good, Rosenberg wrote about the events in Middle East
Quarterly:

In 1991, the situation was essentially unchanged from previous years except for a sharp
drop in tourism—light fallout from the Gulf war. I had no qualms about dragging a full
excavation team of fourteen people into the field with me. No one suggested that what I
was doing was imprudent, either, as my Turkish colleagues were doing more or less the
same things. Mobil was actively drilling at Shelmo—and when our refrigeration system
failed in the July heat, the Mobil engineers and geologists, all highly educated, urbane
Turks, took pity on our plight and regularly dropped off truly cold soft drinks and beer at
our camp. (Rosenberg 1994)
The events of 1992 convinced Rosenberg that the situation was not getting better. Two
archaeology graduate students from Ankara University died in 1991 near Mardin from either a
land mine or a bomb placed under the vehicle. A few months later, the Mobil production/storage
facilities at the Shelmo oil field were hit by a rocket. One night, PKK guerillas visited the village
Rosenberg and his team were staying in. Rosenberg decided to move his team to the city of
Batman, but the new arrangement caused problems as well:
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Traveling back and forth raised concerns about possible PKK mines in the dirt roads
leading to the site, inasmuch as the military patrols regularly used the same roads. We
therefore scrupulously avoided potholes and generally kept our vehicle's wheels only in
ruts showing undisturbed tire tread marks. (Rosenberg 1994)
As the murders committed by Hizbullah got worse than ever before, the archeologists decided to
ask Mobil if they could stay at their compound in Batman, and Mobil agreed. In November 1992,
PKK guerillas attacked the Mobil drilling team at the Shelmo field, and three Turkish engineers
working at the site were killed. When the team returned the next summer, in June 1993, they
“immediately saw that we were working in the middle of a war zone”:
We devoted the first day of the 1993 field season to visiting the military outpost situated
a few kilometers from the site to apprise it of our presence and plans, making
arrangements for workers at the village near the site, and other errands. Along the route,
our Kurdish driver treated us to a running commentary, pointing out such new grisly
points of interest as the telephone poles where the muhtar of a village had been recently
hanged by the PKK, the place on the road where so-and-so's friend had been executed at
a PKK roadblock, and so forth. The military told us in no uncertain terms not to be at the
site before 7:00 a.m. and not to remain at the site past mid-afternoon. This virtual
admission that Turkish forces had lost control of the area at times other than full daylight
came as a rude surprise. We politely declined the offer of a full-time military escort on
the grounds that it would make us an even more inviting target than we already were, as
well as create tension between the local Kurdish villagers and us. Instead, we agreed to
maintain hand-held radio contact with the military outpost, and Mobil once again came
through for us by providing radios of the type their teams used for the same purpose.
(Rosenberg 1994).
Their workdays at the salvage site were often disrupted by the sounds of Turkish air force planes
“swooping down on bombing runs.” The Kurdish villagers working at the site told Rosenberg
that the military was bombing a large cave in the area, which was a PKK operation base.
Rosenberg describes other military activity that included the “whooshing sounds” of regular
helicopter overflights for reconnaissance and attacks, “battalion-strength” armored vehicles, and
trucks rolling by the sites “in clouds of dust” carrying “troops holding their weapons at the
ready.” These operations, however, did not seem to weaken the PKK, which, according to
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Rosenberg, occurred during nighttime village visits, roadblock executions, attacks on the homes
of government-armed village guards, and bombings of outlying government facilities.
These included a particularly brazen rocket attack early one evening on the Türk Petrol
(the government-run oil company) facilities at the outskirts of Batman City. That
particular attack was memorable for the many stop-and-search roadblocks within the city
and on surrounding roads set up immediately thereafter in an effort to catch the
perpetrators. We had to negotiate several of these (with a van full of suspicious-looking
excavation equipment) upon returning to the Mobil compound in Batman. Our papers,
personally signed by the provincial governor, had been enough to get us waved blithely
past military checkpoints. Not this time. (Rosenberg 1994)
Rosenberg then talked about how “as a result of the PKK violence,” economic activity fell off
the region, Mobil evacuated its resident Turkish staff’s family from the Batman compound, and
restricted its activities to production from existing wells with only a skeleton staff. Finally, after
receiving anonymous threats and warnings from the commander of a military patrol that
Rosenberg and his team’s movements were being tracked by the PKK, the archeologists left the
site.

Caves and Warfare
As Rosenberg’s impressions reveal, the caves of the Upper Tigris Valley were in the
middle of the guerilla combat of the PKK and the Turkish state’s various methods of
counterinsurgency. In this period, Kurdistan’s geology was framed not only as a problem of
backwardness but also as one of security—a new stratum. This framing arose during the war that
broke out between the Turkish state and the PKK in 1984 and lasted until 1997. The PKK
emerged as a Marxist-Leninist organization aiming to establish a socialist Kurdish state in the
late 1970s. Advocating that an independent nation-state was the only way to end the repression
and denial of Kurdish identity in the Turkish Republic, the PKK adopted armed struggle as a

239

revolutionary strategy. In response to the Turkish state’s efforts to create a national space and
docile citizens, the PKK launched a counter-territorialization project. Guerillas used the
cavernous formations in the subterrain and terrain of Kurdistan to pursue an alternative territorial
strategy. The Turkish state eventually developed counterinsurgency tactics that were deeply
entangled with the geological: From smoothing out and terraforming landscape to systematically
burning forests, the environmental and the geological have always been central to the
counterinsurgency tactics of the Turkish Army.
The Turkish state retaliated by declaring a state of emergency in 11 provinces in 1987,
recruiting and arming Kurdish peasants to serve as “village guards” in a paramilitary force and
conducting massive military operations in mountain hideouts, villages, and cities. As young
Kurdish men and women began taking up arms against escalating state violence, the ranks of
PKK dramatically expanded. From 1980 to 2002, Turkey’s Kurdistan remained under martial
law and state-of-emergency rule. The 30 years of war between Turkey and the PKK resulted in
45,000 casualties; 1.2 million people were subjected to forced migration. About a quarter of all
rural settlements in the region of Turkey were ultimately emptied. Human rights organizations
estimate that up to 4 million were displaced as a result of the conflict (Jongerden 2007).
Hasankeyf and the caves of Sikeftan found themselves right in the midst of the war.
While the mountainous terrain along the Turkey–Iraq border provided hiding places for guerrilla
members, it significantly diminished the efforts of a regular army like the Turkish state to
contain a guerilla insurgency. Realizing it was rapidly losing control of the countryside to the
PKK’s successful execution of a Maoist-styled insurgency, the Turkish Army changed its
strategy to one of “ﬁeld domination,” which involved restricting rural space (Jongerden 2010, 7).
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While earlier strategies focused on military mobility and rapid response, later ones were based
on evacuating and destroying rural settlements (Jongerden et al. 2007).
As Jongerden’s account shows, geology and the environment (as well as their
appropriation and control) played a major role in technologies of war, counterinsurgency, and
state violence throughout the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state, as they have also
been central to the settler-colonial state of Israel (see Weizman 2007). To eradicate the villagers
who sympathized with the PKK and supplied food and shelter to the guerillas, the Turkish Army
forcefully evacuated more than 3,000 rural settlements and systematically burned forests, killed
animals, and burned and evacuated villages (Jongerden 2010). This violent strategy was key to
the Turkish state’s revised military tactics and redeﬁned the war; its new “ﬁeld domination
doctrine” aimed at “total environmental deprivation” (Jongerden et al., 2007; Van Etten et al.,
2008) of the guerrilla forces. Further, a perpetual state of emergency was in Kurdish cities
(including Batman), where a dirty war was being carried against the PKK and suspected PKK
sympathizers.
It is in this context that the geological, cavities, and the subsoil became a
counterinsurgency problem. Starting in the mid-1990s, Kurdistan’s cavernous and mountainous
geology became an object of public security concern because it provided hideout locations to the
PKK guerillas. News articles on raids and destruction of caves, with graphic images of the
interiors of the caves occupied TV screens and newspapers. Securing these caves was depicted as
a conquest-like victory of the state, while photos of the left-behind belongings of the guerillas
offered the public clues of the “secret” lives of Kurdish guerillas.
In 2007, a seemingly obscure, geological topic appeared in the politics section of a
national newspaper in an article entitled “Geologic Collision in the Southeast!” Near a large,
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color photo of the mountainous and cavernous landscape of the region was the subheading:
“Nature Provides Convenience to Terrorists.” Drawing on the statements of a geologist and the
army’s counterinsurgency reports, the article declared that
Southeast Turkey has a mountainous structure, due to the collision of the Arabian
Peninsula and the Anatolian Plate. According to scientists, the geological structure that
allows terrorists to take shelter and go unnoticed easily, is the result of a geological
process during which the Arabian Peninsula’s collision with Anatolia left southeast
Turkey compressed between them. The land was, thus, elevated, creating a steep, rocky,
and mountainous geography. A second factor is the specific properties of the geological
structure of the region: limestone. The dissolution of limestone leads to the formation of
caves, enabling terrorists to hide and lay an ambush in them. All in all, mountainous and
cavernous geographies like Hakkâri and Mount Cilo, which have hosted PKK terrorists,
are the consequences of this geological structure and tectonic collision. (Milliyet 2007)
The article appeared during the resurgence of the two-decade war between the PKK and
the Turkish state. Linking seemingly irreconcilable things—plate tectonics and geomorphology
with armed conflict—, the “Geologic Collision in the Southeast!” article revealed that human
workings of power were entangled with inhuman geological forces. It brought together inhuman
temporal and spatial scales with human ones, tied the slow movements of Earth’s lithospheric
plates and the material qualities of limestone rocks to the war between the Turkish Army and the
PKK. It hinted at the extent to which geological forces situated, informed, and limited political
forces, revealing how geophysical formations could obstruct the state’s counterinsurgency tactics
and how the geomorphology of the region could allow guerilla forces to develop effective shelter
tactics against the state, creating a complex and multidirectional web of relationships between
insurgency-counterinsurgency and geology.
Similar to Gordillo’s examination of insurgency and terrain in Afghanistan, where
guerilla forces’ knowledge of the terrain allowed them to turn the mountains’ volume into a
powerful weapon (see Gordillo 2018), Kurdish guerillas used the cavernous formations in the
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subterrain and terrain of Kurdistan to pursue an alternative territorial and counterinsurgency
strategy, a “weapon of the weak” (Scott 2008). The Turkish state eventually developed
counterinsurgency tactics that were deeply entangled with nature and geological formations too:
From smoothing out and terraforming landscape to systematically burning forests and building
dams to flood caves and valleys, geological and geophysical formations became central to the
counterinsurgency tactics of the Turkish Army.
Yet, mountains, caves, and earthly materiality could not be fully weaponized or
capitalized upon—neither by the Turkish Army nor the PKK. As Nigel Clark (2011) argues, the
strata of the earth have a pre-political existence, and the earth might not conform to political
projects (Clark 2017). In the last section of this chapter, I return to the ethnographic present and
provide fragments from the geological survey in the mountains of Eruh in Siirt. This last section
offers another perspective on how earthly formations are reckoned with in the mountains of
Kurdistan’s oilfields and battlefields.

Collusions and Contradictions: A Geological Survey Day
This chapter began with a scene from a countryside outpost, the oilfields and battlefields
in Siirt’s Eruh district. Two weeks after my visit to the military outposts in Siirt to get permission
and figure out logistics for a prospective survey trip in the mountains of Eruh, we finally made it
to Eruh to conduct the survey. Eruh, however, was significant in the histories of Turkey, warfare,
and Kurdish insurgency for another reason: A mile away from the Eruh outpost, where TP’s
geologists met Captain Enis, the very first PKK attack took place in 1984, when guerilla forces
attacked the gendarmerie station in Eruh, killing one gendarmerie soldier and injuring nine
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people. We would be walking in the same terrains that the PKK guerillas had once controlled
and started a historical insurgency.
Our team included more seven geologists—including Ismail Bey, Halil Bey, and Seda
Hanım—, two drivers, a private security guard, a “local assistant,” and me. We had been doing
fieldwork since 7 a.m. that day, shadowing Halil Bey all day, putting the rock samples he gave
me into the cotton bag I was carrying in my left hand or drawing numbers on rocks with the red
spray bottle in my right. It was right after noon when Halil Bey muttered in distress, “Oh shit,
I’ve destroyed their home.” He was holding his rock hammer in his right hand, and he looked
genuinely upset. “What happened?” I asked, already slightly on edge because of the security
guard ghosting us since the morning and the prospect of other things than oil. “I was trying to
collect a sample from this rock. Turns out that there was an ant colony behind it. Ugh, I’ve
accidentally destroyed their nest,” he frowned. I took a few steps towards the rock he was
pointing at. Thousands of ants had scattered into the soil aimlessly and—according to my
interpretation in that moment—in shock.
A few minutes later, Halil Bey suddenly stopped and held up his binoculars. He looked
up, tense, towards the top of the steep hill facing us. “What’s happening?” I asked. “Oh,
nothing,” he said. He relaxed again. “It’s just the village guards. The commander has stationed
them. They’re here to protect us.” I squinted and tried to see them. There were dark silhouettes
on the top of the hill; they were also watching us. It gave me a chill. The men watching us from
the distant top of the hill were village guards indeed—Kurdish civilians turned paramilitary
forces by the Turkish state and armed in the 1990s as a strategy to combat the PKK’s guerilla
tactics. Captain Enis had deployed them to protect the team of geologists during their survey.
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As our route got more elevated with each step and as I climbed higher and higher, the
figures of the men waiting on the top of the hill became clearer. Trying not to kick pebbles onto
the engineers climbing a few meters behind me, I used my remaining energy to make it to the top
of the hill. Towards the top of the hill, the silhouette of a man extended a hand to me, pulling me
from to the top, a flat area with green grass. As my eyes got used to the bright light, I realized
that there were five men there, all dressed in khaki green, armed with rifles. I had finally met the
village guards, who had been watching us over for hours.
Barış was already there, smoking a cigarette and gazing at the vast landscape. He
introduced me to the guards as a researcher and a college professor. Their attitudes changed
instantly, and they started calling me hocam, meaning “teacher” or “professor” in Turkish. The
oldest among them, a 40-year-old man shook my hand and said he was the leader of the group. “I
am Mahmut,” he said. Other men came and shook my hand as well, a bit shy but genuinely.
There was a portable grill on the ground, quietly burning its last bits. “You missed the grilled
chicken wings, but we still have other food. Let us prepare you a feast, hocam!” I crouched
down, as two village guards joined me. The other three were positioned in different parts of the
cliff, calmly monitoring the environment.
As I snacked on the bread, black olives, tomatoes, and cheese, Mahmut’s younger brother
Kenan talked about himself, recounting how being a village guard has been a tradition in their
entire family, how they were all related, and their precarious work conditions. He talked about
how they were viewed “as traitors by the guerillas” and “errand boys” by the Turkish state. In no
story could they be depicted as heroes or have the moral high ground. As paramilitary agents,
they were caught in between. Ultimately, the conversation came to the subject of the referendum.
To my surprise, Kenan said he had voted for the pro-Kurdish, left-wing party HDP and that he
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would definitely be voting “No” in the upcoming presidential referendum. As we kept talking
about HDP, the imprisonment of the mayors of Kurdish cities, HDP’s leader Selahattin Demirtaş,
and other daily matters of concern, I realized that Barış was standing on top of a cliff, holding an
AK-47 as two of the younger village guard men took his picture with a smartphone. Mahmut
called my name, inviting me to do the same. I had never held a rifle in my life. With slightly
trembling hands, I accepted their offer. As I stood in the middle, surrounded by geologists and
village guards who posed joyfully, with their guns raised, the Turkish flag on their collars, a
smile on their faces, facing the mountains of Turkey’s Kurdistan, Kenan made a “grey wolf”
hand gesture, while raising his index and pinky fingers in the air with the middle and ring ones
firmly pressed on the thumb. I was really, really taken aback this time. Why would Kenan, a
Kurdish village guard and an HDP supporter who would be voting “No” in the referendum make
the ultra-nationalist, fascist “grey wolf” sign? Such contradictions were normal Kurdistan, where
socio-material collisions had blurred clear-cut lines of friend or foe or, according to Ozan Bey—
the engineer I had talked to—between traitor and pro-state.
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Figure 41 Kenan and his cousin. Author photo.

The sun was setting. I felt how quickly it could get cold at that altitude once the sun
started going down. We had completed our survey, or at least we had to call it a day before the
sunset. The village guards were getting uneasy; they were eager for us to start heading back
before it got darker and unsafe. As all of were sitting in the pickup truck a few minutes later with
tired limbs and arms, Seda Hanım asked, pointing at the ruins of a bunch of stone houses on top
of a hill: “Are these some kind ancient relic?” Putting up his bitter smile again, “No,” said Halil
Bey. “They are debris of the Kurdish villages that were burned down in the 1990s.” In
Kurdistan’s oilfields and battlefields, an object of aesthetic curiosity could turn out to be an
archive of war, destruction, and ruins. The lifeworlds mediated by oil were complex and
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dynamic, products of encounters, saturated with contradictions, mutations, in-betweens, and
shadows that go beyond neat camps of domination and resistance.

Conclusion
Examining how Kurdistan’s oilfields simultaneously became battlefields in the 1990s
during the Gulf War and the insurgency of the PKK in Turkey, this chapter analyzed how
warfare has shaped the mutual making of territory and oil in the cities and rural geographies of
Turkey’s Kurdistan. It traced the ways in which earthly matter and infrastructure mediated
warfare and everyday life in Batman. If oil’s emergence and the formation of oil infrastructures
in Batman, Siirt, and Diyarbakır had created both new inequalities and the kinds of mobilities
and spaces through which Kurds articulated demands of freedom and justice, and asserted
practices of counter-territorialization against the territorial imperative of the Turkish nation-state,
then the armed insurgency that came out of this formation used the socio-material spaces and
infrastructures of oil as targets. The PKK utilized oilfields and oil infrastructure as
counterinsurgency strategies—targeting pipelines and stations, while aiming for economic
destruction, and the creation of counter-territorial practices through “liberated zones,” resulting
in the formation of differentiated sovereignty. This chapter also examined how the Turkish state
responded to the PKK’s guerilla warfare strategies by developing new counterinsurgency tactics
that redefined both terrain and warfare. As a result of increasing “security concerns,” the foreign
oil companies that the “National Oil Campaign” unsuccessfully attempted to expel in 1965 left
Turkey, creating an ironic emergence of Turkish resource sovereignty triggered by an
organization that the Turkish state was at war with. In response to the guerilla tactics of the PKK,
the Turkish military aimed for environmental destruction and the annihilation of living
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environments—Kurdish villagers—, who were seen as the main resources sustaining PKK’s
power in rural geographies. The Turkish military counter-weaponized earth and infrastructure,
framing “environmental destruction as a counterinsurgency strategy” (Van Etten et al. 2008).
systematically burned villages and forests (Jongerden 2010; Jongerden, Voss & Van Etten 2007),
and built dams which flooded valleys and caves that the PKK utilized as camouflage, shelter, or
bases of operations.
Neither the Turkish state’s nor Kurdish guerillas’ efforts to weaponize nature, earth, and
geophysical formations were total, however, as the forces of the earth were sometimes
indifferent to human efforts to contain or capitalize on them. Recently, as the spatial logic of the
conflict shifted from rural guerilla warfare to urban warfare, and cities became battlespaces
(Graham 2009), the PKK and other armed forces have begun employing trench-barricade
warfare tactics in urban areas. This has led to the Turkish government resorting to total
destruction of urban areas, “urbicide” (Graham 2013) and the occupation of strategic locations,
including the “political” occupation of municipalities and the subsequent barricades and tanks
being placed outside these offices in urban centers such as Diyarbakır, Batman, and Hakkâri. As
the war shifted to urban spaces, oilfields—the former battlefields—of Siirt and Batman were
subjected to new forms of territorialization. Areas previously inaccessible to geologists were
suddenly transformed into new frontiers and targets of geological surveys and petroleum
geology, as our survey in Eruh exemplified, while urban spaces once controlled by the
democratically elected mayors from HDP were transformed into new enclaves or occupied
territories. Warfare was waged in environments, oilfields, and infrastructures, both shaped space
and turned it into ruins in the present-day Kurdistan, with evacuated villages, bulldozed quarters,
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and flooded sites. Warfare in Kurdistan transformed earth and oil infrastructures into targets and
weapons, militarized spaces of insurgency and counterinsurgency, and ruins and frontiers.
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CONCLUSION: A POLITICAL GEOLOGY OF THE FUTURE
In September 2015, Sıtkı Tayar, a middle-aged and Kurdish former construction worker
from Van (Wan), sent a letter to the exploration department of the Turkish Petroleum District
Management in Batman. This was the fourth letter he wrote to the company in the past two
years, and he was already frustrated with the lack of attention he had received from the
“authorities.” In his letter, he declared that he was a “gold, copper, and oil expert from Van” and
that he had found “the source of the oil” in Batman’s famous Raman fields. “And it’s right under
Van.” He added that he had contacted many officials and petroleum geologists about this, but
none seemed to be interested in “this crucial information that will elevate the country.” He
concluded with a biting comment: “Maybe these officials were not with the best of intentions.”
Akif Bey, the head of exploration of the TP District Management in Batman, told me that
Tayar had been walking and exploring the hills and plateaus of Van for almost two years. Almost
every other day, he would leave his house, drive about 40-50 kilometers and then walk for hours,
looking for signs, picking up rocks, sniffing them for traces of sulfur, photographing, and
sketching anything he found significant. His primary targets were oil seeps – or leakages, as he
liked to call them. He had first noticed a thin trail of black liquid seeping into the ground while
driving to Tatvan (Datvan, Têtwan), a city on the southwest shore of Lake Van (Gola Wanê),
near the small district of Gevaş (Vostan, Westan) during a visit to distant cousin. Realizing it was
petroleum, he followed the trail southwards, as it appeared here and disappeared there along his
path. A month later, he borrowed the hand drill of another distant cousin, who was a part-time
“treasure hunter.” He drilled in areas wherever oil seeps accumulated and where they seemed to
escape and disappear. He noted his findings and ultimately came up with a comprehensive map
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of “the underground.” He included this map in his letter to Turkish Petroleum. A year later, at the
office of Akif Bey, I got to see the map. Akif Bey found it all ridiculous. As he waved the map at
me with exhaustion, he grumbled, “I receive dozens of letters like this every year. These people
call themselves oil experts, and this is what they think of how oil exists under the ground?”

Figure 42 Akif Bey and Tayar’s map. Author photo.

I first thought what Tayar was doing was rather fascinating, especially in relation to the
geological map of the southeastern Anatolia region that was installed behind Akif Bey’s desk.
For Tayar, the underground was composed of countless passageways. Oil followed these
passageways and, depending on the slope, it flowed from one direction to another. Some

252

passageways were larger and broader than others, while others crossed, forming larger
passageways. Finally, there was a single source of all that flow and movement. Oil found in
Raman oilfields, in Siirt or Diyarbakır (Amed), originated from a single, grand source. This
source, Tayar thought, was near Lake Van, right under the Hizan district of Bitlis
(Baghesh/Bidlîs), a province that neighbors Van, Siirt (Sġerd/Sêrt), and Batman (Êlih). In
Tayar’s imagination, the underground was constituted almost like a huge subway system, with
endless tunnels and a central junction where they all came together. This and other speculative
practices of imagining oil and the substrate enacted the subsoil as something other than how the
Turkish state or Turkish Petroleum geologists saw. These ways in which Tayar and other “oil
hunters” followed, imagined, draw, oil seeps and reserves, I thought, brought into being
relationships between space, earth, and power that could unsettle the territorial and temporal
ontologies of the Turkish nation-state.
But then I remembered something. “Akif Bey, what was his cousin, this ‘treasure hunter,’
doing exactly?” I asked. “You know, looking for gold or other valuables left behind.” “Left
behind?” I asked. “You know… Eh, during the deportation.” Akif Bey murmured. Then, it
dawned on me. Tayar and his cousin were those semi-professional people called “treasure
hunter” meant rummagers, gravediggers, gold hunters, who searched for the artifacts left behind
by the victims of the Armenian Genocide of 1915, which the state still refuses to recognize as a
genocide. This silence around or disavowal (von Bieberstein 2017, 174) of the genocide was
especially significant in Kurdistan, since the atrocity took place in the very same place, the
historic homeland of Armenians, and with the collaboration of the Kurdish people, although
there were many cases of Kurds refusing to collaborate, and, in some cases, Armenian victims
were protected by some Kurdish tribes. Yet, this did not change the extent to which the Kurdish
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population were complicit in the atrocities and how in the following years, property, and capital
that had once belonged to Armenians had been appropriated by the Kurdish population in the
region (Akcam and Kurt 2015; von Bieberstein 2017; Onaran 2010). Equipped with expensive
metal detectors, treasure maps of lands and the underground, protective or curse-breaking spells,
myths of previous treasure hunters and hidden wealth, and an extensive network of material
tools, know-how, and sociability, these “treasure hunters” looked for Armenian wealth hidden in
subsoil, in Armenian ruins, graveyards, backyards, and caves for decades now.
Rather than being enactments that unsettled the territorial ontology of the Turkish nationstate, Tayar’s search for oil and treasure in Turkey’s Kurdistan was situated within the genocidal
act that enabled the erasure of Armenians from Van, the erasure of the Armenia itself from
Anatolia, and emergence of the Turkish nation-state as an uneven and colonial, but nevertheless
Muslim collaboration between of Turks and Kurds in the first place.98 Seeps of oil that Tayar
traced and the subsoil that Tayar imagined to be abundant with petroleum, were entangled with
the remainders of Armenian victim of the genocide — objects that conjured up the histories of
violence and Kurdish complicity with the Turkish imperial and nation-state project, revealing
once again that socio-material relations of power and space are much more complex and
“ambivalent” (von Bieberstein 2017, 173), when examined under the light of longer histories.
How oil manages to seep into even seemingly unrelated stories about Armenian Genocide
and treasure hunting is not a coincidence, revealing the ways in which political, spatial, and
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As von Bieberstein 2017 writes, “The genocide entailed the emergence and fostering of a Muslim bourgeoisie
through the mass transfer of Armenian, Assyrian and Greek wealth. In the process of as well as following the
deportation and murder, movable and immovable assets were looted, confiscated and appropriated. Land and houses
were either distributed directly to Muslim migrants from the Balkan and the Caucasus and to local notables, or they
were registered as ‘abandoned property’, sold and revenues distributed to the state budget, to the genocidaires
themselves and their families, or to Kurdish feudal lords” (181).
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ontological categories of victimhood, subalternity, are always relational and historical, and so is
“Turkey’s southeast,” Southeastern Anatolia, and Kurdistan. I favored the latter term throughout
this work, but in doing so, I inevitably dismissed Western Armenia, and the historical processes
that enabled the erasure of this geographical imaginary.
Planetary Ruins
Oil in Turkey has been imbricated with perpetual cycles of violence, destruction,
ruination, excess, and animation, akin to both Nietzschean recurrences of creative excess and
Benjamin’s repetitive cycles of devastation inherent to modernity. Rethinking the present as
ruination shifts how history and time are configured. In Walter Benjamin’s articulation of the
past as “one single catastrophe, which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage,” history becomes a
“petrified, primordial landscape” (Benjamin 1999, 249). Against Hegel’s philosophy of history
which sees ruins and catastrophe as necessary tools in service of the triumphal march of Reason
and “unavoidable moment of humanity’s Progress towards the Consciousness of Freedom,”
Benjamin approach consists precisely in standing this view of history on its head and
demystifying progress. (Löwy 1995).
I ended Chapter 5 with the ruins of that a historical arrangement between earth, territory,
and power has enacted in Turkey. I started this chapter with another process of ongoing ruin. But
ruination is not limited to Turkey; it’s a planetary-environmental predicament, and the making of
oil into a fetishized commodity-resource has been at the heart of this condition. As climate crisis
threatens millions of living beings with dispossession and death, the destructive effects of the
accumulation of toxic matter, nuclear radiation, and other wastes that have first been dumped
upon the colonized lands of Global South are beginning to weigh on the rest of the world. The
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present looks less like the culmination of centuries of techno-scientific and political progress and
more like a space of ruins and ruination.99 Ecological ruination is the planetary—yet still
uneven—condition of our political present, haunted by the artifacts and remains of colonial and
capitalist ruins: climate chaos, rubble, toxicity, extinction. Scientists, activists, indigenous
people, and children are screaming that this is our critical moment. This moment reveals that
“world history” is the environmental-ecological history of Earth (Chakrabarty 2008).
From the vantage point of a ruinous present, thus, world history starts to look like the
culmination of “slow violence” (Nixon 2011) instead of a progressive, teleological story of
progress and development. This study examined one fragment of this process through the story
of oil and territorialization in Turkey. In capturing this process, I also highlighted the ways in
which the excess inherent to geological matter or earth also contain the possibilities for change.
What is the role of time and time’s indeterminacy in political projects of composing a future
beyond ruins?

Beyond Politics of the Present
As David Scott (2014) notes, for moderns, temporality had been an experience of the
unfolding of historical time in which modular and progressive change took place, while the
present was a state of expectation and waiting for the fulfillment of the promise of social and
political improvement (5). Climate crisis has disrupted this relation between past, present, and
future. An anti-historicist rethinking of the world-historical present as the unfolding of
colonial/capitalist and ruination moves beyond the experience of ruination and despair, allowing
itself to imagine new kinds of non-teleological and non-progressive temporal politics that are
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Anna Tsing (2015) writes that ruins have become “our collective home” (3). Also See Stoler (2013) and Trouillot
(1995).
256

neither techno-optimist nor based on forms of left or modernist (or petro-) melancholia
(LeMenager 2011). What kinds of temporal politics do the reconfiguration of the present-asruinous conjure up, beyond melancholia, then? Provocative answers come from feminist science
and technology studies and anthropology, which against “ruin porn” or an apolitical faith in
techno-fixes, and mainly in response to the conditions of environmental crisis and discussions
around the Anthropocene. In Staying with the Trouble (2016), Donna Haraway writes against
two kinds of futurisms: both the faith in technofixes (optimism) and the position that it’s game
over (pessimism). For Haraway, living overtly in the future forces us to choose between
“apocalyptic despair and salvational hope” (4). The challenge is to root that future in a way of
being in a present fully informed by the past.
For Haraway, “eschewing futurism, staying with the trouble is both more serious and
more lively” and “neither despair nor hope is tuned to the senses, to mindful matter, to material
semiotics, to mortal earthlings in thick co-presence. Neither hope nor despair knows how to
teach us to “play string figures with companion species …” (4). Eduardo Kohn uses the term
“ongoingness” to capture this temporal orientation that “is a form of staying with what is,
holding it with care in a way that might leave open a space for unexpected flourishing” (99).
Similarly, arguing that narratives of progress should not be the grounds for political thought in
the current status of things, Anna Tsing (2015) cautions her readers that “there might not be a
collective happy ending” (21) and opts for possibility of life in capitalist ruins. This is hope for
finding life in “blasted landscapes” (Tsing 2014) not in a delayed future but in the present.
Hailing the “end of global progress’s easy summer” (2), the “dwelling in the ruins” paradigm
conceptualizes politics as “collaborative survival” (2015, 5) while taking “ideas of future
improvement said to be impossible, and creation and audacity denigrated as outdated artifacts of
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the 20th century” (Wakefield 2018, 8). Others are cautious about the temporal politics in what
they call “broken world thinking” (Jackson, 2014), where resilience or the “the substrate of a
liberal regime promising neither redemption nor progress but only survival of existing, ruinous
conditions amidst catastrophe” is the ultimate ideal (Wakefield 2018, 7). But in contrast to
appraisals of resilience, or “staying with the trouble,” for many who, and generations before
them, grew up in the midst of ruins of warfare, toxicity, and destruction in the Global South,
staying with the trouble is not an option, nor it is desired.100 And neither is the entanglements of
economic development and fossil fuel extraction. These political actors demand to decolonize
and reclaim the future, an indeterminate future that is built on an anti-progressive, nonteleological framework of time and a geontology (Povinelli 2016) that does leave fossil fuels
under the ground by deterritorializing the arrangements between earth, space, and state.

Beyond the Carboniferous
Sedimenting Territory has demonstrated the multiple ways and instances in which
emancipatory, otherwise, or radical futures and spaces that “carbon imaginary” (Povinelli 2016)
that oil is embedded have appropriated, reterritorialized or foreclosed in Turkey in the past
century. As the previous chapters have shown political formations that align themselves with
radical or emancipatory ideologies in Turkey have also been taken over by the carbon imaginary.
Sedimenting Territory could thus be read as a cautionary tale that calls for linking anti-capitalist,
anti-imperialist political projects to those that both envision a future beyond fossil fuels and
petrochemical and extractivist forms of political life that are simultaneously anti-colonial and
anti-racist. As the history of oil’s entanglement with coloniality in Kurdistan, territory, and earth
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in Turkey shows, without such an alignment, emancipatory and just futures for all species are
foreclosed, leaving the way to fascist, racist, or expansionist political projects and aspirations.
Only by reclaiming such a future, that links anti- and decolonial projects with anti-capitalist and
anti-nationalist ones, what Benjamin marked as the redemptive, emancipatory potential in
ruination becomes apparent. Sedimenting Territory has urged that such a future could only be
possible by letting go of not only oil, but also other kinds of earthly matter under the ground that
are cast as resource commodities.
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